Moral Distinction and Moral Baselines? - Animal Rights Zone2024-03-28T16:58:00Zhttp://arzone.ning.com/forum/topics/moral-distinction-and-moral-baselines?commentId=4715978%3AComment%3A110374&x=1&feed=yes&xn_auth=noHi Spencer, What I am trying…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-09-25:4715978:Comment:1103742012-09-25T23:06:04.609ZTim Gierhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/TimGier
<p>Hi Spencer, <br></br><br></br>What I am trying to say (and not doing a very good job of it!) is that it appears to me that in most cases where one person would say "my position is different as a moral matter" what they are saying is not that their position is different to another's with respect to the moral component of each. Rather what they appear to be saying is that, as a moral matter their position is superior to that of another. In the particular case I imagine in the post, there is a moral…</p>
<p>Hi Spencer, <br/><br/>What I am trying to say (and not doing a very good job of it!) is that it appears to me that in most cases where one person would say "my position is different as a moral matter" what they are saying is not that their position is different to another's with respect to the moral component of each. Rather what they appear to be saying is that, as a moral matter their position is superior to that of another. In the particular case I imagine in the post, there is a moral component to the position of Singer just as there is to the position of the animal rights abolitionist, but it's not correct to say that, just in case the animal rights abolitionist position places more demands upon us, that it is the morally better position. After all, I could hold the position that bacteria ought to have rights and then claim that my position would differ from the abolitionists as a moral matter, and that would be true, but only if others accept that bacteria ought to be included in one's moral consideration in the first place. In the same way then, Singer could respond to the abolitionist "No, your position is not different as a moral matter, because you are mistaking the principles and facts involved and are claiming things as salient that are not."<br/> <br/> <cite>Spencer Lo said:</cite></p>
<blockquote cite="http://arzone.ning.com/forum/topics/moral-distinction-and-moral-baselines?page=1&commentId=4715978%3AComment%3A110373&x=1#4715978Comment110373"><div><div class="xg_user_generated"><p>Hi Tim,</p>
<p>In the case where two people agree on moral principle P, but disagree as to whether it applies to situation S because of some factual dispute, it still seems to me that they hold to different moral positions - one believes that doing X in S is wrong, but the other believes that doing X in S is okay. Are you saying that if the factual dispute is easily settled (and one person simply refuses to see the evidence) then we would say that there is a moral difference between the two positions, but if the factual dispute is complicated (reasonable people disagree) then we would say that there is no moral difference between the two positions?</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote> Hi Tim,
In the case where two…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-09-25:4715978:Comment:1103732012-09-25T21:23:28.467ZSpencer Lohttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/SpencerLo
<p>Hi Tim,</p>
<p>In the case where two people agree on moral principle P, but disagree as to whether it applies to situation S because of some factual dispute, it still seems to me that they hold to different moral positions - one believes that doing X in S is wrong, but the other believes that doing X in S is okay. Are you saying that if the factual dispute is easily settled (and one person simply refuses to see the evidence) then we would say that there is a moral difference between the two…</p>
<p>Hi Tim,</p>
<p>In the case where two people agree on moral principle P, but disagree as to whether it applies to situation S because of some factual dispute, it still seems to me that they hold to different moral positions - one believes that doing X in S is wrong, but the other believes that doing X in S is okay. Are you saying that if the factual dispute is easily settled (and one person simply refuses to see the evidence) then we would say that there is a moral difference between the two positions, but if the factual dispute is complicated (reasonable people disagree) then we would say that there is no moral difference between the two positions?</p> Hi Spencer,
Thank you for you…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-09-25:4715978:Comment:1102662012-09-25T20:07:09.945ZTim Gierhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/TimGier
<p>Hi Spencer,</p>
<p>Thank you for your comment. I take your point about Singer's views, and I didn't mean to (and hope that no one thinks that I did) ascribe views to him that he may or may not hold. I agree with you about the distinction between positions being different as a moral matter vs. the judgmental "I'm more moral than you". I could have been more clear about the point I was making re: moral difference. I will try again. <br></br><br></br>I suppose that if a moral principle was established…</p>
<p>Hi Spencer,</p>
<p>Thank you for your comment. I take your point about Singer's views, and I didn't mean to (and hope that no one thinks that I did) ascribe views to him that he may or may not hold. I agree with you about the distinction between positions being different as a moral matter vs. the judgmental "I'm more moral than you". I could have been more clear about the point I was making re: moral difference. I will try again. <br/><br/>I suppose that if a moral principle was established such that it would be wrong to kill any being who possessed some relevant property A (whatever A happened to be), then if a person killed another and if in so doing that person either willfully ignored or refused to accept uncontroversial evidence of that other's possession of relevant property A, then such a person would be acting immorally (and acting differently from another as a moral matter). However, if the moral principle in question wasn't established (that is, if that principle was argued for but neither proved nor widely accepted as valid) or if the facts of the matter were controversial (that is, it was an open question as to whether the other did possess property A in the relevant sense), then whether two people would act differently in the same situation doesn't seem like a matter of a moral difference to me. For example, two people might hold the exact same moral principle "Don't kill those who have self-awareness in the sense X", say, and yet act differently because the facts of the matter as to which beings possess that property are unknown. One of them shouldn't say of the other that she was acting differently as a moral matter, because the facts of the matter aren't settled. It could easily work the other way as well, with people agreeing about the facts of the matter but holding different principles, each of which principles would be reasonable and defensible.</p> Hi Tim,
Interesting thoughts.…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-09-25:4715978:Comment:1102592012-09-25T05:43:15.944ZSpencer Lohttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/SpencerLo
<p>Hi Tim,</p>
<p>Interesting thoughts. I have to read up on Singer (especially his <em>Practical Ethics</em>) because I'm not sure he actually holds to the view ascribed to him by some: that most animals lack self-awareness. My (limited) understanding is that Singer thinks it would be <em>more wrong, </em>typically, to kill a human than an animal because death is more harmful for a fully self-aware being, not that death wouldn't be harmful at all to the animal.</p>
<p>But suppose Singer did…</p>
<p>Hi Tim,</p>
<p>Interesting thoughts. I have to read up on Singer (especially his <em>Practical Ethics</em>) because I'm not sure he actually holds to the view ascribed to him by some: that most animals lack self-awareness. My (limited) understanding is that Singer thinks it would be <em>more wrong, </em>typically, to kill a human than an animal because death is more harmful for a fully self-aware being, not that death wouldn't be harmful at all to the animal.</p>
<p>But suppose Singer did hold to the view that most animals are not self-aware at all, and therefore killing them painlessly -- usually a practical impossibility -- is perfectly okay. If Singer's factual understanding is wrong, then I would say his position is different ethically from someone who correctly believed the opposite. Singer would believe that painlessly killing an animal is okay, whereas his critic would believe that painlessly killing an animal is not okay -- hence different moral positions. That their respective positions rest on different factual beliefs doesn't mean those positions aren't different as a moral matter. We should be able to evaluate ethical <em>positions</em> rationally (some are defensible, some not), but take care that in doing so, we're not morally evaluating the person who holds them. And certain ethical questions can be complex, such that there are plausible positions on various sides (answer isn't obvious), and we really can't say for sure which one is really correct.</p>
<p>So I would distinguish between claiming that my position is different than yours as a moral matter and claiming that, because my position is correct, I'm more moral than you. As for saying that "veganism is the moral baseline," I was always puzzled by what that meant. If it means that veganism is the most ethically appropriate position for an individual to hold (barring special circumstances), then I agree. But if it implies that veganism must be the <em>only</em> position promoted -- as opposed to, say, encouraging people to consume less animal products -- then I find that problematic, because that's likely to turn more people off. Ultimately, effective advocacy is what's most helpful to animals.</p>