Comments - The Paradox of Paternalism: A Dilemma for Naturalism - Animal Rights Zone2024-03-29T15:24:15Zhttp://arzone.ning.com/profiles/comment/feed?attachedTo=4715978%3ABlogPost%3A100361&xn_auth=noHi Paul, you may find this qu…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-25:4715978:Comment:1019072012-06-25T17:49:58.709ZTim Gierhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/TimGier
<p>Hi Paul, you may find this quote from an interview published today interesting (link below):</p>
<p><strong>3:AM:</strong> The normativity of self-constitution is a key idea in your philosophy isn’t it? What do you take this to be and why is it so important to you and to what you take philosophizing to be?</p>
<p><strong><strong>Christine M Korsgaard</strong>:</strong> It’s not the normativity of self-constitution. It’s that a particular form of self-constitution is the source of…</p>
<p>Hi Paul, you may find this quote from an interview published today interesting (link below):</p>
<p><strong>3:AM:</strong> The normativity of self-constitution is a key idea in your philosophy isn’t it? What do you take this to be and why is it so important to you and to what you take philosophizing to be?</p>
<p><strong><strong>Christine M Korsgaard</strong>:</strong> It’s not the normativity of self-constitution. It’s that a particular form of self-constitution is the source of normativity.</p>
<p>All living things are self-constituting, in the sense that they are engaged in a constant process of making themselves into themselves. Living things are made of fragile materials which are always decaying or being used up, and they constantly take in new materials and transform those materials into themselves – that is, into their own parts and organs and energy. In fact, a living thing just is such a process.</p>
<p>Human life is a form of life, and I believe that the things that make human life so different from that of the other animals can be traced to a special feature of the way we carry on this process of self-constitution. There is an aspect of our identity – I call it practical identity – which we construct self-consciously. By that I don’t mean that we go around thinking “okay, now I am constructing my identity.” I mean that when we decide what to count as reasons for our actions and what principles of action to commit ourselves to, we are also deciding who to be. What makes this possible is the fact that human beings have a particular form of self-consciousness, which makes us aware of the grounds of our beliefs and actions – in the case of actions, the motives that prompt them, in the case of beliefs, the perceptions, the evidence, the arguments that make them seem compelling. The other animals believe and act as their nature prompts them, but they lack the kind of control over their nature which our awareness of the grounds of our beliefs and actions gives us. Being aware of their grounds, we cannot commit ourselves to belief or action unless we can endorse those grounds. To endorse them is to treat them as reasons. That’s why human beings need to have reasons for what we believe and what we do.</p>
<p>In the practical case, the case of action, we get these reasons from the roles and relationships that life makes available, and perhaps some we carve out for ourselves. That you are someone’s mother or friend, that you have a certain occupation, that you have enrolled yourself to fight for some cause, are all sources of reasons and obligations for you. There are two things interesting about this kind of identity. One is that we carve it out for ourselves and are responsible for it, and the other is that it is normative, or value laden. That is, having a certain practical identity is something that we try to live up to, that we succeed or fail at, that makes us good or bad.</p>
<p>That’s something I think is special about being human – having a normative self-conception, wanting, as we say, to respect yourself, thinking of yourself as worthy or unworthy, rating yourself. It’s a condition that gives a strange extra dimension to human life, both a special source of pride and interest and a profound cause of suffering. Some of the other animals seem to have moments of pride, but they don’t seem in general to think of themselves as worthy or unworthy beings. Some of them certainly want to be loved, but I don’t think they worry about being lovable. So having a normative form of identity that you carve out for yourself is one of the most distinctive features of being human. It is because we are self-constituting in this way, I believe, that human beings are governed by rules and laws and norms.<br/><br/><a href="http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/treating-people-as-ends-in-themselves/">http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/treating-people-as-ends-in-themselves/</a></p> Tim, your rebuttal to the Ran…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-22:4715978:Comment:1015552012-06-22T17:18:44.361ZPaul Hansenhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/PAULHANSEN
<p>Tim, your rebuttal to the Randian view makes sense to me. It also sounds very close to what the Kantians have been arguing: that we ought to act in a manner that can be <em>universalized</em> without contradiction or self-defeat. This was an essential plank in Kant’s theory. So Gewirth appears to be a Kantian of sorts (?). I will try to read something by him. Kant’s “system” has been criticized by the contextualists for being solely dispassionate, impartial, and universal…</p>
<p>Tim, your rebuttal to the Randian view makes sense to me. It also sounds very close to what the Kantians have been arguing: that we ought to act in a manner that can be <em>universalized</em> without contradiction or self-defeat. This was an essential plank in Kant’s theory. So Gewirth appears to be a Kantian of sorts (?). I will try to read something by him. Kant’s “system” has been criticized by the contextualists for being solely dispassionate, impartial, and universal and—allegedly—therefore unable to accommodate the <em>particular</em> circumstances and preferences of the individual players in ethical situations. There is even a school of thought called “moral particularism.” The work of Val Plumwood on ethics is interesting. There is so much to read and so little time!! Thanks for your input.</p> Oh, I forgot to say, Thank yo…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-22:4715978:Comment:1013812012-06-22T14:20:35.910ZTim Gierhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/TimGier
<p>Oh, I forgot to say, Thank you again for this interesting and thought-provoking discussion. I am enjoying it and learning something as well!</p>
<p>Oh, I forgot to say, Thank you again for this interesting and thought-provoking discussion. I am enjoying it and learning something as well!</p> Hi Paul,Not all living human…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-22:4715978:Comment:1015532012-06-22T14:19:02.889ZTim Gierhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/TimGier
<p>Hi Paul,<br></br><br></br>Not all living human organisms are also persons and most other animals are not persons. Only persons can have moral rights (and I don't understand what "natural rights" are supposed to be; absent conscious rational minds that conceive of them, rights, moral or otherwise, cannot and would not exist). Non-persons ("marginal cases" and most other animals) ought to be respected according to their relevant interests, and no one should be unjustly disadvantaged based on any…</p>
<p>Hi Paul,<br/><br/>Not all living human organisms are also persons and most other animals are not persons. Only persons can have moral rights (and I don't understand what "natural rights" are supposed to be; absent conscious rational minds that conceive of them, rights, moral or otherwise, cannot and would not exist). Non-persons ("marginal cases" and most other animals) ought to be respected according to their relevant interests, and no one should be unjustly disadvantaged based on any perceived but arbitrary differences between or among them and others. So, at first glance, I seem to agree with Bernstein as you've quoted him. <br/><br/>What Gewirth contends, if I understand him correctly, is that the normative force of his argument hinges on the contradictions that would ensue were people to ignore his argument. I will offer a rough sketch of a possible argument against one of the questions you've raised. For example, if a person really believed that <span>“walking over others to get to the top” was the way that people ought to act, then she must be committed to being walked over by others who are on their way to the top. That is, she must accept the contradiction that she ought to both walk over others and be walked over by them, otherwise she would have to say that others are not as radically free as she claims herself to be. Now, certain libertarians may claim to hold the belief that a world in which people walked over each other to get to the top would be desirable, but to actually believe such a thing would necessarily entail an endorsement of a raw and uncontrolled state of nature, not a society worth getting to the top of. Perhaps those Randians would say "so what?" but the rest of us would be correct to judge them irrational: they ought not to hold such beliefs.</span></p> Madeleine, you can be an athe…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-22:4715978:Comment:1013802012-06-22T09:39:06.402ZPaul Hansenhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/PAULHANSEN
<p>Madeleine, you can be an atheist and still both empathize with the suffering of (people and) animals, and recognize that <em>class oppression</em> is wrong wherever we find it (sexism, racism, speciesism, etc.). It’s true that biblical religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) have subjugated animals in the service of humans, but many contemporary religious activists have a “green” reading of scripture, realizing that ALL nature is valued by God, who declared it “good”, and that human…</p>
<p>Madeleine, you can be an atheist and still both empathize with the suffering of (people and) animals, and recognize that <em>class oppression</em> is wrong wherever we find it (sexism, racism, speciesism, etc.). It’s true that biblical religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) have subjugated animals in the service of humans, but many contemporary religious activists have a “green” reading of scripture, realizing that ALL nature is valued by God, who declared it “good”, and that human stewardship means “tending the garden”—the land—he has entrusted to us, who have the freedom to manipulate it for good <em>or</em> for ill. (Only humans are “ecologists.”) Other religious traditions (Daoist, Buddhist, Hindu, Jainist) support “earth care”, although some are rather fatalistic and encourage stoic acceptance of worldly conditions “the way they are.” Gandhi’s India had the concept of <em>ahisma</em> or non-violence.<br/><br/>I think the recent effort to demonstrate “sameness” among all animals is both futile and needless. It is futile, because every species is unique and will excel in <em>some</em> respects. It is needless, because animals or ‘non-rational agents’ don’t need to be “persons” in order to deserve <em>respect</em> and “humane” treatment. I agree with Bentham and Rouseau, that sentience (“Can they suffer?”) is a sufficient criterion for moral <em>patienthood</em>, and that one need not be a “rational moral agent” in order to be a moral <em>patient</em>. I think a lot of confusion in animal ethics results from a failure to appreciate the agent-patient distinction—that is, demanding that moral patients have all the capacities that moral agents do.<br/><br/>Yes, there are some jerks in this country who think that big cats (lions, tigers, leopards) can be horded in enclosures or back yards like domestic animals (or exhibited for tourists as truck stops). Such animals belong in the wild. The use of animals for entertainment (circuses) also has its down side.</p> Tim, in answer to your earlie…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-22:4715978:Comment:1013792012-06-22T08:47:12.598ZPaul Hansenhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/PAULHANSEN
<p>Tim, in answer to your earlier question (and to reiterate my original conclusion), I think that “religious” views in general (not just Christian theism) “are more promising for animal rights causes than a naturalistic one when it comes to grounding what I call ‘creature value’ or, more broadly, intrinsic value in general. Many secular activists—in both environmental and animal issues—are simply unaware of the positive organizations and movements that are afoot among faith-based groups, and…</p>
<p>Tim, in answer to your earlier question (and to reiterate my original conclusion), I think that “religious” views in general (not just Christian theism) “are more promising for animal rights causes than a naturalistic one when it comes to grounding what I call ‘creature value’ or, more broadly, intrinsic value in general. Many secular activists—in both environmental and animal issues—are simply unaware of the positive organizations and movements that are afoot among faith-based groups, and would be surprised to hear what they are doing. (I could list a dozen, but will save the space here.) And that is in addition to the religiously-motivated activists (like myself) who support many environmental organizations that are <em>not</em> overtly religious. <br/><br/>Regarding your most recent comment, you are certainly free to assert yourself as a “free, autonomous and rational agent” entitled to be unmolestsed. But claiming—or denying—the same for <em>others</em> is not so simple. I haven’t read Alan Gewirth and so can’t comment on him, but his views sound interesting—something like those who interpret Kant’s moral imperative as ‘rational agents being a law unto themselves.’ However, two questions arise for me: (1) What room does Gewirth (or you) leave for virtues like beneficence or altruism? Suppose someone else decided she wanted to embrace an Ayan Rand philosophy/attitude, or a kind of social Darwinism that entailed “walking over others to get to the top”? Would Gewirth criticize that view merely by calling it ‘inconsistent’? Statutory laws tend to be predominantly negative or prohibitive, whereas virtues are positive behavior that governments cannot legislate or compel (e.g., good samaritan laws). (2) How does Gewirth treat “marginal cases”? Your final paragraph claims that if animals and other “marginal cases” are to have rights, then persons must grant them, “but those who are not free, autonomous and rational agents are not persons and only persons can have moral rights.” The requirements for <em>rationality</em> and <em>agency</em> would disqualify “marginal humans” (such as mental incompetents, the senile, and the comatose) from personhood. Are you alluding to the distinction some make between ‘natural rights’ (for some animals) and ‘moral rights’ (for humans), where the adjective ‘moral’ is <em>by definition</em> restricted to human relations? <br/><br/>Anti-speciesists may be inclined to deny a natural hierarchy of sentience or consciousness in the animal kingdom, but I don’t think they are willing (or able) to affirm that insects, mollusks, echinoderms, crustaceans, or microbes are “rational agents” (or “subjects of a life” as Regan puts it). And if such are therefore deemed “non-persons” having no <em>moral</em> status (in the restrictive sense), do they therefore deserve NO respect whatsoever? As I argue elsewhere (and in my forthcoming book), “The error of anthropocentric thinking is not that of favoritism or partiality toward our own species, but that of <em>exclusivity.</em> The tendency to value humanity <em>exclusively</em> is an error that many ‘right-to-life’ advocates make.”<br/><br/>Personally, if I were seeking a non-theological premise for ‘moral considerability’ (or ‘creature value’), I would prefer something like Mark Bernstein’s metatheoretical (normative) principle. He writes: </p>
<blockquote><p>“<strong>(M) If an individual <em>can</em> be morally considered or treated, then she <em>ought</em> to be morally considered or treated.</strong> I suggest that this statement is extremely plausible, especially where “ought” is understood defeasibly. That is, I am minimally claiming that, all else being equal, or “special circumstances” aside, if an individual has the capacity for being morally considered, she warrants (deserves, merits) moral consideration. Moreover, I believe that all parties interested in providing an account of moral considerability at least implicitly subscribe to (M).”</p>
</blockquote> Paul, it seems to me that I v…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-21:4715978:Comment:1016042012-06-21T00:48:05.861ZTim Gierhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/TimGier
<p>Paul, it seems to me that I value myself, for myself. My life - as I conceive of it in this instant, with respect to its history, and to my projections of myself into the future - is intrinsically valuable to me. I have experiences that matter, and they matter in ways that are meaningful to me, for me. Given that I value these experiences (past, present and future) then I claim for myself the right to have them - I state to the world that I am free, autonomous and rational and that all…</p>
<p>Paul, it seems to me that I value myself, for myself. My life - as I conceive of it in this instant, with respect to its history, and to my projections of myself into the future - is intrinsically valuable to me. I have experiences that matter, and they matter in ways that are meaningful to me, for me. Given that I value these experiences (past, present and future) then I claim for myself the right to have them - I state to the world that I am free, autonomous and rational and that all persons are obliged to leave me unmolested. As a rational actor who cares about his own well-being across time, I must make such a claim; to do otherwise would be irrational. Since I claim that, as a free, autonomous and rational being I have the right to be unmolested, then I must will for the world to be the sort of place wherein any free, autonomous and rational being has the right to be unmolested; to do otherwise would create a contradiction. Therefore, I must also claim the right to be unmolested for every free, autonomous and rational being in order to be consistent (and since I am rational, I must be consistent). Therefore, I also claim that all free, autonomous and rational beings have intrinsic value just as I do. I don't need a theology to ground these claims. (I owe this line of reasoning to Alan Gewirth.) <br/><br/>Now, the problem seems to me to be how to extend this claim of a moral right to be unmolested to those who are not free, autonomous and rational, such as most other animals and some humans. Rather than suppose a theology to ground such I claim I prefer not to make the claim in the first place. If the "marginal cases" of humans and most other animals will have rights, they will have them because free, autonomous and rational moral agents grant them - those rights will be social constructions designed to protect the interests of those we decide have interests that ought to be protected. Those rights will be legal rights, but those who are not free, autonomous and rational agents are not persons and only persons can have moral rights, the way I see it. </p> Hi Paul - thanks for taking t…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-18:4715978:Comment:1010712012-06-18T23:49:44.883ZMadeleine Longhursthttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/MadeleineLonghurst
<p>Hi Paul - thanks for taking the time to reply to all my questions (and, yes, it would be better in the pub!). Picking up on what Tim just said, do you think atheism might promote welfare, but not promote abolition (as it would not see intrinsic value in animals)? Also, might Christianity (with it's view of 'man' as the pinnacle of creation) be a hindrance to any attempt to gain a position of value (or respect) for animals? Buddhism has a similar hierarchy of beings, but at least contains…</p>
<p>Hi Paul - thanks for taking the time to reply to all my questions (and, yes, it would be better in the pub!). Picking up on what Tim just said, do you think atheism might promote welfare, but not promote abolition (as it would not see intrinsic value in animals)? Also, might Christianity (with it's view of 'man' as the pinnacle of creation) be a hindrance to any attempt to gain a position of value (or respect) for animals? Buddhism has a similar hierarchy of beings, but at least contains an implicit 'sameness' between us and animals, given that we can reincarnate as one. Also Buddhism (as Gary F's Jainism) has non-violence towards all beings at its core (though that doesn't stop the Dalai Lama eating meat!). Indeed I've known Buddhists who (like Gary F) wouldn't walk on the grass for fear of killing insects. On the subject of pet 'ownership' - yes I think that's harder to categorise as 'animal abuse', though we have taken wild animals and selectively bred them in the same way we have for animals that we eat - domestication of wild animals is, I think, hard to justify theoretically.</p> Hi Paul, thanks for your clar…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-18:4715978:Comment:1013072012-06-18T21:11:59.171ZTim Gierhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/TimGier
<p>Hi Paul, thanks for your clarification. I have another question. Are you saying that without a theistic worldview we have less than adequate grounds for claiming that humans and other beings have intrinsic value or are you restricting your claim to how we might ground the notion of the intrinsic value of only other-than-human animals?</p>
<p>Hi Paul, thanks for your clarification. I have another question. Are you saying that without a theistic worldview we have less than adequate grounds for claiming that humans and other beings have intrinsic value or are you restricting your claim to how we might ground the notion of the intrinsic value of only other-than-human animals?</p> Madeleine, I think you are ri…tag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-18:4715978:Comment:1011442012-06-18T08:42:08.436ZPaul Hansenhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/PAULHANSEN
<p>Madeleine, I think you are right: If John Doe were abusing his wife, we’d still have the same problem (that of justifying our condemnation of it). <br></br><br></br>Most of the conservative Christians I meet are <em>indirectly</em> influenced by the theology of Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant—none of whom had a very high regard for animals. e.g., Pro-lifers are always touting “human dignity” or “the sanctity of human life” and the Lockean idea of “inalienable human rights” to “life, liberty, and…</p>
<p>Madeleine, I think you are right: If John Doe were abusing his wife, we’d still have the same problem (that of justifying our condemnation of it). <br/><br/>Most of the conservative Christians I meet are <em>indirectly</em> influenced by the theology of Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant—none of whom had a very high regard for animals. e.g., Pro-lifers are always touting “human dignity” or “the sanctity of human life” and the Lockean idea of “inalienable human rights” to “life, liberty, and property” (or “the pursuit of happiness” as Jefferson put it), but they fail to extend that sanctity or those rights to other animals. I think their view of nature is condescending, arrogant, and myopic (perhaps with hangovers of Platonic dualism). They should read Albert Schweitzer or Mahatma Gandhi, or their own biblical scriptures through a “green” filter.</p>
<p></p>
<p>But I think it is problematic to speak of “rights” as if they existed metaphysically—that is, <em>prior</em> to positive statutory law. In my view (and that of Stephen R.L. Clark), <em>humans and animals are not valuable because they have (metaphysical) “rights”; rather, we should accord them (legal) rights because they are valuable</em>. What is needed is an <em>attitude of <strong>respect</strong></em> toward their lives and places on the planet—not a notion of “equality” that is hard to explicate. (Equal in what sense? Moral status? But morality is not static and must consider priorities. Equality as ‘sameness’? But all animals are neither the same, nor equally sentient. Singer urges ‘equal consideration of their interests.’)<br/><br/>What Gary Francione has in mind are primarily other mammals—animals that are most “like us.” I fully agree with his view that the <em>property status</em> of animals under the law, which is <em>instrumental</em> in principle, has led to the systematic exploitation and commoditization of them, and that humans ought to intervene and advocate on their behalf. Francione greatly influenced the work of professor Bob Torres, who wrote a marvelous book called <em>MAKING A KILLING: The Political Economy of Animal Rights</em> (AK Press, 2007), in which Torres explains how animals were reduced to material widgets in the production of capital and how we ought to fight against class oppression wherever it is found.<br/><br/>However, I am unsettled by the suggestion that animal ownership is <em>always</em> (by definition) a pejorative term—that it <em>always</em> represents an <em>oppressive</em> relationship between ‘master and servant.’ It seems obvious to me that, in fact, sometimes this is not the case. Two examples come to mind: Many pet owners love and care for their animal(s) like a member of the family and are committed to their well-being, and the companionship they provide is enjoyed by the animal as well. Australian sheep dogs are uniquely “equipped” for herding sheep, and (whether you condone the wool industry or not) the dogs seem to “enjoy having a job” (as Roger Yates has put it). Such relationships are best described as “mutually beneficial” rather than “oppressive” or “cruel.”<br/><br/>So I think our activism should focus on institutions that are <em>systemically</em> oppressive or harmful, such as puppy mills, poaching, “exotic” animal trading, selling of hides and animals parts (for profit or medicinal use), medical research & experimentation, slavery (such as on Asian tiger farms or bear bile farms), trophy hunting, trapping, factory farming, and the like.</p>