Comments - Transcript of Rob Garner's ARZone Guest Chat - Animal Rights Zone2024-03-28T16:21:13Zhttp://arzone.ning.com/profiles/comment/feed?attachedTo=4715978%3ABlogPost%3A15118&xn_auth=noWhen Garner says “I think the…tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-12:4715978:Comment:151572010-12-12T20:45:01.000ZTim Gierhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/TimGier
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>When Garner says</span></span></span></span></span></span> <span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><em><span><span>“</span></span></em></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><em><span><span>I think the…</span></span></em></span></span></span></em></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>When Garner says</span></span></span></span></span></span> <span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><em><span><span>“</span></span></em></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><em><span><span>I think the 'enhanced' position I advocated later, which recognises that animals have an interest in life is more ethically desirable,”</span></span></em></span></span></span></em><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>he is saying that it is better to hold, as a moral or ethical position, that sentient nonhumans have interests in liberty and life which deserve to be protected by the recognition of rights. This is the rights-based argument of abolition. However, he also believes that as a practical matter, given certain cultural, societal and political realities, that making such an argument outside the halls of philosophy departments would be mostly futile. Instead, he argues that his position based on sentience, which requires that humans refrain from causing suffering in sentient beings, when such suffering is not necessary to some important human ends, is adequate to end most of the abuses visited upon other animals.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span>I have five objections to Prof. Garner’s position.</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span>First, it is somewhat elitist to suggest that most people cannot or are unwilling to carefully consider the rights-based argument. The rights-based argument is not that difficult to either articulate or understand, and most people are perfectly well equipped to comprehend it. Here it is:</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><em><span><span>Nonhuman animals are like human ones in morally relevant ways and because of that, they should not be treated exclusively as the means to an end. They should not be considered as the property of others, but should be respected as the owners of their own lives. Abolishing the exploitation of other rights-holders is a moral imperative – regulating or reforming current systems and methods of exploitation is unacceptable. Becoming vegan is the single most important action which any of us can undertake to respect the rights of others and to abolish exploitation.</span></span></em></span></span></span></em></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span>Perhaps such an argument will not fit on a bumper sticker, or make for a good “sound-bite” for some politician, but it is not that hard to understand.</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>Secondly, his position necessarily creates ambiguous criteria by which we ought to judge morally correct behavior. This was noted by Prof. Francione in his question to Garner,</span></span></span></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><em><span><span>“How do you determine what levels of suffering are ‘acceptable’?”</span></span></em></span></span></span></em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>. In other words, which uses of nonhumans by humans are necessary? Considering the use of humans by other humans, we accept that there are no uses, that is, no exploitation, of humans that we deem morally acceptable. Why should we consider that any use of nonhumans would be acceptable then?</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span>Third, Garner’s “position from sentience” necessarily means that there are uses of nonhumans which are acceptable. Any use that did not involve “suffering” would necessarily not be immoral use. So, rather than abolishing use, this position legitimizes at least some use, and as seen above, which use (or uses) would be legitimate would be subject to ambiguous, and almost certainly arbitrary, criteria.</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>Fourth, what are we to make of this: </span></span></span></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><em><span><span>“It is not so much that animals don’t care for their lives. What I’m getting at…is the view that the interest that animals have in continued life is less than humans.”</span></span></em></span></span></span></em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>?</span></span></span></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>Prof. Garner suggests that this is not a contentious position to hold, and he is right, it isn’t. But that a position is not widely contended does not adequately speak to either its value or its veracity. I am sure that the consensus view of well-educated and intelligent physicists before Einstein was thought to be the reasonable and appropriate one. After Einstein, we now know that the consensus view was also quite wrong. So, we need more than just majority opinion to guide us. Do have what we need?</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span>No. When we think about the interests which nonhumans have in the continuation of their own lives, we necessarily must be thinking in terms of what we, as human beings, value in our own lives. We have no way of knowing what a rabbit or a rattlesnake thinks about his or her own life, or the interests they may have or not have in them. Thinking that rabbits and rattlesnakes don’t have interests in their own lives and their own liberty can only be justified when we use human criteria to judge such interests. For example, we could say that since rabbits don’t bury their dead, or celebrate in song the lives of those lost to death, that they don’t value life as we do. But, saying that only recognizes that rabbits cannot act in the same ways that humans act, it doesn’t elucidate what rabbits think about their own existence.</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span>Beyond that, as an objective matter, there are beings who struggle mightily to stay alive, and to reproduce. Unless we assume that sentient lives are automatons, nothing more the Cartesian biological machines, then it’s safe to assume that sentient beings who strive to stay alive have an interest in staying alive. Whether that interest is the same as our interest, on our terms, is one question. Whether that interest is valuable to them on their terms is another altogether. Given that none of us can immediately know the contents of another mind, whether that mind is human or nonhuman, it seems that to discount the interests of other animals based solely on observable characteristics, or the lack thereof, can only be because of a speciesist perspective.</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span>Fifth, and finally, Prof. Garner’s position from sentience appears to be based on a inconsistent definition of suffering. Garner admits elsewhere that suffering is not limited to physical pain. Most people accept that fear, boredom, alienation, despair, anguish and some other mental states are each properly understood as forms of suffering. Animal welfare laws recognize and protect “species specific behaviors” and animal’s “well-being” beyond mere physical health and safety.</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>In what sense then, can we understand the various mental states of nonhumans, and protect their interests relative to them, while at the same time that we deny that it inflict death is to cause suffering? It seems that we cannot, accept insofar as to say that </span></span></span></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>if</span></span></span></span></span></span></em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span> we kill another without inflicting physical pain and </span></span></span></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>if</span></span></span></span></span></span></em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span> we kill another in such a way as they don’t see it coming, and </span></span></span></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>if </span></span></span></span></span></span></em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>they would not otherwise strive to stay alive, </span></span></span></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>only then</span></span></span></span></span></span></em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span> can we say that we cause no suffering by killing them. That is to say, there can only be no suffering in death when the physical pain of the killing is absent, when the psychological dread of death is unknown, and when an interest in a continued life is nonexistent. Otherwise, death necessarily involves suffering.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span>Given that Prof. Garner admits that nonhuman individuals do have at least some interest in their lives, the he must also accept that even his position from sentience, which requires that we not inflicting suffering on other sentient beings, requires that we not deprive them of their lives either.</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>What we are left with then, is as Prof. Garner himself says, that the position </span></span></span></span></span></span><em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span>“which recognises that animals have an interest in life is more ethically desirable.”</span></span></span></span></span></span></em><span style="color: #000000;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span><span><span> Since it is more a ethically desirable position, it is what a moral person, and a moral society, ought to aim for. To aim for less would be an injustice.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p> @GLF: Thanks for bringing his…tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-12:4715978:Comment:151532010-12-12T17:53:15.000ZEric Prescotthttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/EricPrescott
<p>@GLF: Thanks for bringing his formal positions to the fore here. I have read the book, and I remember this inconsistency there, too. I'm looking forward to discussing The Animal Rights Debate with others at a reading group in January. I hope others who read the book will be struck by these incoherencies, particularly the incoherence of recognizing as a fundamental basis for one's position that animals are sentient while denying their interest in (and a corresponding claim to) continued…</p>
<p>@GLF: Thanks for bringing his formal positions to the fore here. I have read the book, and I remember this inconsistency there, too. I'm looking forward to discussing The Animal Rights Debate with others at a reading group in January. I hope others who read the book will be struck by these incoherencies, particularly the incoherence of recognizing as a fundamental basis for one's position that animals are sentient while denying their interest in (and a corresponding claim to) continued existence (i.e., the moral right to have that interest in continued existence protected).</p> More comments:
Robert says: "…tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-12:4715978:Comment:151522010-12-12T17:45:30.000ZGary L. Francionehttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/GaryLFrancione
<p>More comments:</p>
<p>Robert says: "<span style="font-size: small;">the counterproductive argument is based on the assumption that the best way of achieving a vegan future is to make things so bad for animals that people react against it, and refuse to eat meat."</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">No, it is not. The "counterproductive" argument is based on two notions, neither of which Robert refutes.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">First, it is based on the notion…</span></p>
<p>More comments:</p>
<p>Robert says: "<span style="font-size: small;">the counterproductive argument is based on the assumption that the best way of achieving a vegan future is to make things so bad for animals that people react against it, and refuse to eat meat."</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">No, it is not. The "counterproductive" argument is based on two notions, neither of which Robert refutes.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">First, it is based on the notion that welfare reform does little more than make animal exploitation more economically efficient and does not provide significant increases in protecting animal interests.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">Let me put this point another way: if there were a Government Department of Efficient Exploitation that employed agricultural economists who did not give a toss about animal welfare except in so far as it promoted efficient animal use, that Department would make the same recommendations as these welfare groups promote in their campaigns. The supposedly wonderful welfare campaigns that are presently ongoing: CAK, gestation crates, etc., involve, for the most part, changes that will probably increase production efficiency and will not in any significant way increase production cost. Robert talks about the EU regs on battery cages. Putting aside that the chances that those reforms will be implemented by 2012 is somewhere less than than 1%, all they require is "enriched" cages that increase cost by about .01-.02 per egg. Given the inelasticity of egg demand (price increases, unless very great, do not affect demand), producers will be able to charge a considerable increase and demand will not be affected. In sum, the "happy" egg campaign has shown producers that there was a *more* economically efficient way to exploit battery hens. <br/></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">It is pathetic when the entire "animal movement" takes a position that, in effect, is indistinguishable from what a rational agricultural economist would propose.<br/></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">Second, welfare reform is counterproductive because it makes people feel more comfortable about exploiting animals (even though it does little or nothing to increase protection for animals) and actually increases net suffering. I have *never* said that we ought to allow things to get really bad so people stop eating meat. I am not sure why Robert continues to make that point as I have never said it and I stared that explicitly in our book.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">Gary L. Francione</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">Professor, Rutgers University<br/></span></p> In response to Eric Prescott:…tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-12:4715978:Comment:151512010-12-12T16:45:43.000ZGary L. Francionehttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/GaryLFrancione
<p>In response to Eric Prescott:</p>
<p>Robert's "enhanced sentience position," which prohibits use even if there is no suffering (unless it is necessary to save human lives), and his "sentience position," which maintains that animal use is morally permissible as long as there is no "unacceptable" suffering, are two *very* different position.</p>
<p>In our book, Robert argues in his essay for the "sentience position." In the discussion section, at page 200, he articulates the "enhanced…</p>
<p>In response to Eric Prescott:</p>
<p>Robert's "enhanced sentience position," which prohibits use even if there is no suffering (unless it is necessary to save human lives), and his "sentience position," which maintains that animal use is morally permissible as long as there is no "unacceptable" suffering, are two *very* different position.</p>
<p>In our book, Robert argues in his essay for the "sentience position." In the discussion section, at page 200, he articulates the "enhanced sentience" position. That is not the position that argues for in his essay in the book and I find it difficult to understand how he can even maintain the "enhanced" position given that he explicitly claims that animal lives have a lesser moral value than human lives and that a right not to be used cannot be plausibly defended based on what he views as relevant cognitive differences between humans and nonhumans.</p>
<p>In any event, these are two very different positions.</p>
<p>Gary L. Francione</p>
<p>Professor, Rutgers University</p> "According to the position I…tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-12:4715978:Comment:151492010-12-12T15:20:48.000ZEric Prescotthttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/EricPrescott
<p><em>"According to the position I have elaborated to Tim such an action wouldn't be morally justified, because the animal is not being killed (in the case of the cow) to save human lives."</em></p>
<p>Robert's response here seems inconsistent with his position that animals do not have an interest in their own lives (he also adjusts this position elsewhere to say that their lives are less important, though he doesn't mention who judges that or how).</p>
<p>Either animals have an interest in…</p>
<p><em>"According to the position I have elaborated to Tim such an action wouldn't be morally justified, because the animal is not being killed (in the case of the cow) to save human lives."</em></p>
<p>Robert's response here seems inconsistent with his position that animals do not have an interest in their own lives (he also adjusts this position elsewhere to say that their lives are less important, though he doesn't mention who judges that or how).</p>
<p>Either animals have an interest in their own lives, or they don't. This wouldn't be contingent upon whether killing the animal has some human benefit. And if they do have an interest in their own lives, which seems apparent enough, then we have no justification for killing them for trivial purposes.</p> A few comments:
1. Robert say…tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-12:4715978:Comment:151462010-12-12T13:55:12.000ZGary L. Francionehttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/GaryLFrancione
<p><span style="font-size: small;">A few comments:</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">1. Robert says: "in the sense that in my view it would not require a critical mass of vegans to effect any meaningful change, but rather a wide-spread acceptance that animals have interests which deserve to be considered."</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">My response: What? There *has* been widespread acceptance that animals have morally significant interests in not suffering for about…</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">A few comments:</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">1. Robert says: "in the sense that in my view it would not require a critical mass of vegans to effect any meaningful change, but rather a wide-spread acceptance that animals have interests which deserve to be considered."</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">My response: What? There *has* been widespread acceptance that animals have morally significant interests in not suffering for about 200 years now. If there is any moral norm that ubiquitously shared in western culture, it is that animals are "partial" members of the moral community. But there are more animals being used now in more horrific ways than at any time in human history. <br/></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">2. Robert says, in response to a question about large organizations pursuing welfare reform: "I think it is unlikely they are wrong Carolyn simply because of the number of people involved in these organizations and their experience of animal advocacy."</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">My comment: He argues this in the book. I found it remarkable then and I find it remarkable now. This begs the question on many levels, including that the big dollars are in promoting welfare reform and single-issue campaigns that do not require much change on the personal level. Frankly, I find this sort of argument no different from maintaining that any political or economic entity is right because "that's the way they do things."<br/></span></p>
<p>3. Roger asked on my behalf: "<span style="font-size: small;">In our co-authored book, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation? you state that animals have a right not to suffer "unacceptably." How do you determine what levels of suffering are "acceptable"?"</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">Robert answers: "Of course, Gary is right to say that a great deal depends on the ability to quantify what degree of suffering is acceptable. This is not, however, an exact science. I still maintain though that we can talk sensibly about degrees of suffering. Clearly, all of us suffer to some degree! But we all know what the difference is between a great deal and a little and we should aim to only accept minimal suffering."</span></p>
<p>My comment: This is the new welfarist position that is promoted by many of the large organizations, Singer, etc. This is the thinking that motivates the quest for "happy" meat and animal products. Putting aside the moral issues involved, this is a position that makes people feel better about consuming animals because they believe that we can reach the magical "acceptable" level so they'll continue to consume "approved" products along the way and support "happy exploitation" reforms.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">4. Robert says: "I hope that after explaining my argument it might become clear why I think adopting a rights position based on sentience might justify abolitionist objectives."</span></p>
<p>My comment: A position that advocates "acceptable" suffering is not going to lead to abolition. It can't. The modern "happy exploitation" movement is proof of that; if you think that sort of approach is going to lead to abolition, I strongly disagree.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">5. Robert says "I am 99% vegan. Occasional lapse with cheese!"</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">My comment: That surprises me as in our book, I ask him that question and he replies: "I have been a vegetarian throughout my adult life, and I am currently a dietary vegan, and I do not wear leather." (page 257). Maybe he meant "flexible vegan." I shall have to ask him!I</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">I could make more comments but I will suggest that those of you interested, go read the book as these issues do not lend themselves to internet-box analysis and these are precisely the issues we discuss throughout the book. Robert states: "I am accepting the view that, all things being equal, nonhuman animal life (of most nonhuman species at least) is of less moral value than human life." (p. 187) I disagree. That disagreement is the focus of disagreement between abolitionists and welfarists/new welfarists.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: small;">Gary L. Francione</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: small;">Professor, Rutgers University <br/></span></p> You're very welcome, red dog.…tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-12:4715978:Comment:151272010-12-12T08:13:46.000ZCarolyn Baileyhttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/CarolynBailey
<p>You're very welcome, red dog. We're glad you find the chats useful!</p>
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<p>You're very welcome, red dog. We're glad you find the chats useful!</p>
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<p> </p> Thanks as always for organizi…tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-12:4715978:Comment:151232010-12-12T07:10:45.000Zred doghttp://arzone.ning.com/profile/reddog
<p>Thanks as always for organizing these chats. They're very helpful.</p>
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<p>Regarding the cheese, my guess is that the "99 percent" response was a joke ... maybe Professor Garner was giving the OTT character "Douglass" the cliché answer he was looking for?</p>
<p>Thanks as always for organizing these chats. They're very helpful.</p>
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<p>Regarding the cheese, my guess is that the "99 percent" response was a joke ... maybe Professor Garner was giving the OTT character "Douglass" the cliché answer he was looking for?</p>