Kate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥ's Posts - Animal Rights Zone2024-03-29T14:22:27ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurthttps://storage.ning.com/topology/rest/1.0/file/get/3145322711?profile=RESIZE_48X48&width=48&height=48&crop=1%3A1https://arzone.ning.com/profiles/blog/feed?user=1tzlozwuv3cmz&xn_auth=noOur Cruel Treatment of Animals Led to the Coronavirus - David Benatar (The New York Times)tag:arzone.ning.com,2020-04-13:4715978:BlogPost:1773292020-04-13T11:30:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/opinion/animal-cruelty-coronavirus.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/opinion/animal-cruelty-coronavirus.html</a><br></br><br></br>Opinion THE STONE<br></br>April 13, 2020<br></br> <br></br><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><strong>Our Cruel Treatment of Animals Led to the Coronavirus</strong></span> <br></br><span style="font-size: 12pt;">The conditions that lead to the emergence of new infectious diseases are the same ones that inflict horrific harms on…</span></p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/opinion/animal-cruelty-coronavirus.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/opinion/animal-cruelty-coronavirus.html</a><br/><br/>Opinion THE STONE<br/>April 13, 2020<br/> <br/><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><strong>Our Cruel Treatment of Animals Led to the Coronavirus</strong></span> <br/><span style="font-size: 12pt;">The conditions that lead to the emergence of new infectious diseases are the same ones that inflict horrific harms on animals.</span> <br/><span style="font-size: 12pt;">By David Benatar</span> <br/><br/>There is the obvious and then there is what should be obvious. The obvious is that the coronavirus pandemic has brought much of the human world to a standstill. Many countries are in lockdown. So far, more than 1.7 million have been infected, more than 100,000 have died, and billions live in fear that the numbers of sick and dead will rise exponentially. Economies are in recession, with all the hardship that entails for human well-being. <br/><br/>What should be obvious, but may not be to many, is that none of this should come as a surprise. That there would be another pandemic was entirely predictable, even though the precise timing of its emergence and the shape of its trajectory were not. And there is an important sense in which the pandemic is of our own making as humans. A pandemic may seem like an entirely natural disaster, but it is often — perhaps even usually — not. <br/><br/>The coronavirus arose in animals and jumped the species barrier to humans and then spread with human-to-human transmission. This is a common phenomenon. Most — and some believe all — infectious diseases are of this type (zoonotic). That in itself does not put them within the realm of human responsibility. However, many zoonotic diseases arise because of the ways in which humans treat animals. The “wet” markets of China are a prime example. They are the likely source not only of Covid-19 but also of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and some outbreaks of avian influenza, for example. (Another possible source of the coronavirus that causes Covid-19 may be one of the many mixed wildlife-livestock farms in China, but humans are responsible for those, too.) <br/><br/>The “wet” markets, which are found not only in China but also in some other East Asian countries, have a number of features that makes them especially conducive to spawning infectious zoonotic diseases. Live animals are housed in extremely cramped conditions until they are slaughtered in the market for those who have purchased them. In these conditions, infections are easily transmitted from one animal to another. Because new animals are regularly being brought to market, a disease can be spread through a chain of infection from one animal to others that arrive in the market much later. The proximity to humans, coupled with the flood of blood, excrement and other bodily fluids and parts, all facilitate the infection of humans. Once transmission from human to human occurs, an epidemic is the expected outcome, unless the problem is quickly contained. Global air travel can convert epidemic to pandemic within weeks or months — exactly as it did with the coronavirus. <br/><br/>It is these very conditions that facilitate the emergence of new infectious diseases and that also inflict horrific harms on animals — being kept in confined conditions and then butchered. Simply put, the coronavirus pandemic is a result of our gross maltreatment of animals. <br/><br/>Those who think that this is a Chinese problem rather than a human one should think again. There is no shortage of zoonoses that have emerged from human maltreatment of animals. The most likely origin of H.I.V. (human immunodeficiency virus), for example, is S.I.V. (simian immunodeficiency virus), and the most likely way in which it crossed the species barrier is through blood of a nonhuman primate butchered for human consumption. Similarly, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease probably had its origins in its bovine analogue — bovine spongiform encephalopathy (B.S.E.), or “mad cow disease.” The most probable mechanism of transmission is through human consumption of infected cattle. <br/><br/><br/>In the future, we should fully expect our maltreatment of animals to wreak havoc on our own species. In addition to future pandemics, we face the very real risk of breeding antibiotic resistance. The major contributor to this is the use of antibiotics in the animal agriculture industry, as a growth promoter (to bring animals to slaughter weight as quickly as possible) and to curb the spread of infections among animals reared in cruel intensive “factory farmed” conditions. <br/><br/>It is entirely possible that the human future will involve a return to the pre-antibiotics era, in which people died in droves from infections that have been effectively treated since the discovery of penicillin and other early antibacterial agents. If so, it may turn out that the antibiotics era was a brief interlude between two much longer periods in human history in which we succumbed in large numbers to bacterial infections. That prospect, which is even more awful than the current crisis, is no less real for that. We, as a species, know about this problem, but we have not yet done what needs to be done to avert it (or at least minimize the chances of its happening). <br/><br/>What these and many other examples show is that harming animals can lead to considerable harm to humans. This provides a self-interested reason — in addition to the even stronger moral reasons — for humans to treat animals better. The problem is that even self-interest is an imperfect motivator. For all the puffery in calling ourselves Homo sapiens, the “wise human,” we display remarkably little wisdom, even of a prudential kind. <br/><br/>This is not to deny the many intellectual achievements of humankind. However, they are combined with many cognitive and moral shortcomings, including undue confidence in our ability to solve problems. In general, humans respond to pandemics rather than act to prevent them — we attempt to prevent their spread after they emerge and to develop treatments for those infected. The current crisis demonstrates the folly of this approach. The closest we come to prevention is the effort to develop vaccines. But even this sort of prevention is a kind of reaction. Vaccines are developed in response to viruses that have already emerged. As the coronavirus experience shows, there can be a significant lag between that emergence and the development of a safe and effective vaccine, during which time great damage can be done both by the virus and by attempts to prevent its spread. <br/><br/>Real prevention requires taking steps to minimize the chances of the virus or other infectious agents emerging in the first place. One of a number of crucial measures would be a more intelligent — and more compassionate — appraisal of our treatment of nonhuman animals, and concomitant action. <br/><br/>Some might say that it is insensitive to highlight human responsibility for the current pandemic while we are in the midst of it. Isn’t it unseemly to rub our collective nose in this mess of our own making? Such concerns are misplaced. Earlier warnings of the dangers of our behavior, offered in less panicked times, went unheeded. Of course, it is entirely possible that even if we are now momentarily awakened, we will soon forget the lessons. There is plenty of precedent for that. However, given the importance of what lies in the balance, it is better to risk a little purported insensitivity than to pass up an opportunity to encourage some positive change. Millions of lives and the avoidance of much suffering are at stake. <br/><br/>-<br/><br/>David Benatar is a professor of philosophy and the director of the Bioethics Center at the University of Cape Town. His most recent book is “The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life’s Biggest Questions.”</p>Carnage - It's 2067, the UK is vegan, but older generations are suffering the guilt of their carnivorous past. Simon Amstell asks us to forgive them for the horrors of what they swallowed.tag:arzone.ning.com,2017-03-20:4715978:BlogPost:1621632017-03-20T14:00:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p04sh6zg/simon-amstell-carnage">http://www.newstatesman.com/2017/03/simon-amstell-s-mockumentary-carnage-makes-veganism-funny-and-obvious-ethical-choice</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p04sh6zg/simon-amstell-carnage"><br></br>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSreSNaLtZQ<br></br> <br></br> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Il9_WV8j6_o<br></br> <br></br> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rE--RWHYl9w…<br></br> <br></br></a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p04sh6zg/simon-amstell-carnage">http://www.newstatesman.com/2017/03/simon-amstell-s-mockumentary-carnage-makes-veganism-funny-and-obvious-ethical-choice</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p04sh6zg/simon-amstell-carnage"><br/>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSreSNaLtZQ<br/> <br/> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Il9_WV8j6_o<br/> <br/> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rE--RWHYl9w<br/> <br/> http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p04sh6zg/simon-amstell-carnage</a><br/> <br/> <a href="http://www.thememo.com/2017/03/21/simon-amstell-carnage-review-veganism-diet-future-of-food/">http://www.thememo.com/2017/03/21/simon-amstell-carnage-review-veganism-diet-future-of-food/</a><br/></p>
<p><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/carnage-review-bbc-iplayer-simon-amstell-vegan-comedy-actually-funny-a7636871.html">http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/carnage-review-bbc-iplayer-simon-amstell-vegan-comedy-actually-funny-a7636871.html</a><br/> <br/> <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/simon-amstell-on-his-new-vegan-mockumentary-carnage">https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/simon-amstell-on-his-new-vegan-mockumentary-carnage<br/> <br/> http://www.denofgeek.com/uk/movies/carnage/48070/carnage-review<br/> <br/> http://www.chortle.co.uk/review/2017/03/19/27110/simon_amstell%3A_carnage<br/></a></p>
<p></p>
<p></p>David Benatar on Reasonable Vegan! Excellent interview with brilliant vegan professor David Benatar by the talented Reasonable Vegan Rebecca Fox.tag:arzone.ning.com,2016-06-27:4715978:BlogPost:1581102016-06-27T10:32:47.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<p><span class="font-size-3">There’s a lot of talk in the vegan community about whether having children is a good idea or not. Obviously the default human position is that giving birth is encouraged, or at least accepted. Most of us exist as a result of the decision to create life, and government policies that attempt to restrict procreation are met with harsh criticism. Conversely, almost every nation offers paid paternity leave…</span></p>
<p><span class="font-size-3">There’s a lot of talk in the vegan community about whether having children is a good idea or not. Obviously the default human position is that giving birth is encouraged, or at least accepted. Most of us exist as a result of the decision to create life, and government policies that attempt to restrict procreation are met with harsh criticism. Conversely, almost every nation offers paid paternity leave<a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-1" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-1" name="reference-1">[1]</a>, and only a minority of nations allow abortions when health is not a factor<a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-2" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-2" name="reference-2">[2]</a>.</span></p>
<p><span class="font-size-3">In philosophy, the pro-birth position is called <em>natalism</em> (or sometimes <em>pronatalism</em>), and the moral objection to procreation is called, unsurprisingly, <em>antinatalism</em><a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-3" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-3" name="reference-3">[3]</a>. Contemporary antinatalists, like many contemporary vegans, tend to focus on the problem of suffering: put simply, every child will necessarily suffer if they exist, but they can’t suffer if they don’t exist, so procreation results in suffering. Some vegan antinatalists see the act of refusing to partake in animal industry as an expression of antinatalism – without adequate financial incentive, farmers won’t breed more animals for industrial abuse.</span></p>
<blockquote class="pullquote right"><span class="font-size-3">While many humans’ lives are not as bad as those of factory-farmed animals, everybody will suffer considerable evil. The only way to prevent that is not to bring them into existence.</span></blockquote>
<p><span class="font-size-3">Antinatalism has a long and storied history. Socrates is credited with the remark ‘to live is to be sick for a long time’; the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer advanced the idea in the nineteenth century<a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-4" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-4" name="reference-4">[4]</a>, and the philosopher/comedian Peter Wessel Zapffe continued in the following century<a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-5" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-5" name="reference-5">[5]</a>. More recently the character Rustin Cohle in the television show <em>True Detective</em> expresses clear antinatalist (if misanthropic) tendencies, the comedian Doug Stanhope has proposed paying people not to have children<a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-6" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-6" name="reference-6">[6]</a>, and the maniacal YouTube personality Freelee the Banana Girl has made her antinatalist views known.</span></p>
<p><span class="font-size-3">The most comprehensive argument for antinatalism to date was given by the philosopher David Benatar<a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-7" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-7" name="reference-7">[7]</a> in his 2006 book <em>Better Never to Have Been</em>. His book made me reconsider many of my prior beliefs about the moral issues surrounding procreation, and I highly recommend it. It’s not a coincidence that Benatar is a vegan, and I was delighted to get the chance to ask him some of the burning questions that I and the community have wondered about.</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> Antinatalists often describe the choice to have a child as a gamble. In <em>Better Never to Have Been</em> you discuss the different potential outcomes of procreation by comparing a scenario in which a person exists to one in which they do not:</span></h2>
<p></p>
<p class="figure"></p>
<div class="frame"><span class="font-size-3"><img class="figure" src="http://rvgn.org/media/figures/benatar/fig2.1.svg" title="Comparison of potential scenarios"/></span></div>
<div class="meta"><span class="font-size-3"><em>Figure 1 : Comparison of potential scenarios</em></span></div>
<p></p>
<p></p>
<h2><span class="font-size-3">Can you explain why you think the odds favour a negative outcome for the offspring of people who chose to procreate?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> My view is not merely that the <em>odds</em> favour a negative outcome, but that a negative outcome is<em>guaranteed</em>. The analogy I use is a procreational Russian Roulette in which <em>all</em> the chambers of the gun contain a live bullet. The basis for this claim is an important asymmetry between benefits and harms. The absence of harms is good even if there is nobody to enjoy that absence. However, the absence of a benefit is only bad if there is somebody who is deprived of that benefit. The upshot of this is that coming into existence has no advantages over never coming into existence, whereas never coming into existence has advantages over coming into existence. Thus so long as a life contains some harm, coming into existence is a net harm.</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> In the last few years consent has become an important issue for those of us concerned with human rights. Generally, we believe that potentially harmful actions should not be enacted without the express consent of all those involved. Vegan advocates have pointed out that non-animals are unable to consent to any of the harms we regularly subject them to. Like non-human animals, non-existent people do not have the ability to consent to being brought into existence, and yet we often believe that making the decision to bring new people in the world is acceptable because we can be reasonably sure that they will retrospectively consent once they are able to do so.</span></h2>
<h2><span class="font-size-3">Why do you think this assumption fails to solve the issue of consent?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> The assumption that most people brought into existence will retrospectively consent to their creation is likely true. However, it does not justify our bringing children into existence. This is partly because we have reason to think that the preference of most people to have come into existence is an “adaptive preference” — a preference that people develop in order to cope with an unfortunate situation. When the infliction of harm causes the person harmed to come to consent to it, we should be very wary. If, for example, lobotomizing somebody caused that person to endorse the lobotomization, we would not – and should not – think that the retrospective consent justifies the practice.</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> You advance the argument that ‘coming into existence is always a harm’ based on the indisputable fact that all sentient beings will, at some point in their lives, experience suffering. In your work you point out that many people suffer from chronic ailments in addition to the everyday suffering of existence, and how the few neutral or pleasant states we experience are outweighed by these negative experiences. To take an example from my own life I recognise that my chronic (though thankfully mild!) back pain gives me more negative experiences than pleasurable experiences. That said, weighing my back pain against my general ‘chronic happiness’ (or contentment) I think my back pain loses.</span></h2>
<h2><span class="font-size-3">Do you contend that suffering outweigh our contentment for those of us lucky enough to experience chronic happiness?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> I do think that the bad outweighs the good in even the happiest lives. The reason why this seems so strange is that (most) humans have psychological traits that lead to their underweighting the bad and thus thinking that in their lives as a whole there is more good than bad. The most prominent of these traits is an optimism bias, but there are others too.</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> In your book you cite several studies demonstrating the optimism bias. Even people who experience extreme misfortunes and suffering tend to have an optimisic view of their lives. This hedonic adaption is obviously evolutionarily advantageous – those of us who found our suffering unbearable were less likely to live long enough to pass on our genes. You draw our attention to how inaccurate humans are in assessing the quality of their lives. But couldn’t this very misjudgement be used as an argument <em>for</em> procreation? That is, if all potential people are going to believe they are happy, then why not create more seemingly happy lives?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> First, it’s not true that <em>all</em> potential people are going to have a positive outlook. There are many who find life a struggle. Second, while the misjudgement may make lives less bad than they would otherwise be, it does not follow that the quality of life is as good as it is misjudged to be. It is still possible for life to be worse than one thinks it is. The concern about adaptive preferences applies here too.</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> When someone contends that the pleasure in their lives outweighs the suffering, many antinatalists might remind them of the optimism bias and suggest that they could be incorrect in the assessment of their own wellbeing. This seems to make the claim that suffering outweighs pleasure practically unfalsifiable, and therefore suspect.</span></h2>
<h2><span class="font-size-3">Is there any way that someone could satisfactorily disprove the antinatalists’ ‘suffering outweighs pleasure’ theory?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> Noting the optimism bias and other psychological traits that lead to overestimation of the quality of life is only the first step in the argument. We can then point to a host of facts about the good and bad things in life. Here we should recognize some important empirical asymmetries that support a pessimistic conclusion. For example, the most intense pleasures are short-lived but pain is much more enduring. The worst pains are also worse than the best pleasures are good. Injury is swift but recovery is slow. These are but a few examples. All these claims can be assessed against the facts. They are not unfalsifiable.</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> Some opponents of antinatalism accuse antinatalists of falling prey to a ‘pessimism bias’, which is common in people who suffer from depression. How do you respond to people who suggest that your assessment of the relative quantities of suffering and happiness is affected by your own emotional state, and not measurable evidence from the external world?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> I am not depressed. I do have a pessimistic view, but that, I argue, is what the evidence warrants. Thus I invite opponents of antinatalism to consider the evidence fairly. I have only gestured at it here, but your readers can find a fuller treatment not only in <em>Better Never to Have Been</em> but also in <em>Debating Procreation</em>(where I debate the issues with David Wasserman).</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> Another question often levelled at antinatalists can be generalised as, <em>if existence is so awful, why not end your life?</em> Does an antinatalist have to be pro-suicide in order to be logically consistent?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> No, being an antinatalist does not entail being pro-mortalist, at least not always. An antinatalist can think that it is bad both to begin existing and to cease existing. Indeed one reason why it might be bad to begin existing is that we shall die. This is not to say that death is always bad all things considered. At some point the quality of life may become so bad that death is the lesser evil. It does not follow that one should kill oneself well before that point. However, the prospect that life will get so bad that death is the least bad option is excellent reason for thinking that coming into existence is bad. If we never exist we face neither the suffering of life nor the annihilation brought on by death.</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> Although many vegans either have—or look forward to having—children, we are staunch antinatalists when it comes to the breeding of non-human animals for human consumption or entertainment. Few of us believe we are saving animals’ lives by abstaining from animal products; rather, we realise that we are saving animals from being born by decreasing demand for certain products. How does your antinatalism influence the way you think about veganism?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> You’re quite right about the inconsistency. One commonly hears the following sort of argument from meat-eaters: “If we did not eat the sorts of animals that are bred for food, those animals would not have had an opportunity to live. Thus we have done them a favour by breeding them for human consumption.”</span></p>
<p><span class="font-size-3">This is an appalling argument. Imagine somebody proposing to give many more humans the “benefit” of life by breeding them and then killing them after a short life of suffering. The fundamental flaw in the argument is that nobody has an interest in coming into existence.</span></p>
<p><span class="font-size-3">While many humans’ lives are not as bad as those of factory-farmed animals, everybody will suffer considerable evil. The only way to prevent that is not to bring them into existence. Since that course of action has zero cost for those not brought into existence, we should desist from creating suffering humans, just as we should desist from creating suffering non-human animals.</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> As vegans we are concerned with non-human animal suffering, but as researcher Brian Tomasik has pointed out<a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-8" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-8" name="reference-8">[8]</a> we tend to predominantly focus on human-caused animal suffering.</span></h2>
<h2><span class="font-size-3">We know that wild animals suffer from predation, disease and injury and that the majority of suffering experienced on earth is borne by wild animals. Brian argues that as human populations increase, wild animal populations decrease due to our encroachments on their habitats and resource use, and therefore the overall level of suffering decreases.</span></h2>
<h2><span class="font-size-3">If Brian is right<a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-9" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-9" name="reference-9">[9]</a> and the number of humans is inversely proportional to overall net suffering, shouldn’t those of us concerned about suffering be pronatalists, or at least not oppose the desires of other humans to procreate?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> I agree that the vast majority of (non-human) animal suffering is that of wild animals - caused by other wild animals or by naturally induced starvation, disease and injury. This is cause for deep gloom – another way in which pessimism is supported by the evidence. I also agree that human rapaciousness has encroached on animal habitats and reduced animal populations – in the case of many species to the point of extinction. However, we cannot infer pronatalism from this. Indeed, Brian Tomasik himself recognizes this, and calls only for the inclusion of wild animals’ suffering in our moral calculations and for further research.</span></p>
<p><span class="font-size-3">The problem is that attempting to do good by harmful means is controversial at the best of times. It is still more problematic when the causal networks are so complex that we may well end up having inflicted much more harm than we will have prevented. This error is so common in human history that we ignore it only at our moral peril. The very human activities that reduce animal populations, thereby preventing suffering, also have many (non-lethal) harmful effects on present and future beings. Those who would confidently argue that the benefits outweigh the costs should be reminded that even mass extinction does not reduce suffering if other (sentient) species emerge or proliferate in the vacated niche. It is estimated that 99.9% of all species that ever existed have become extinct. Suffering has not ended. Instead it has instantiated in new species. This is not to say that the extinction of all sentient life will never occur. I am only saying that we should not assume that this will result from rampant human pronatalism.</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> Many vegan parents hope that, by raising compassionate children, they will contribute to future improvements in the world for animals and humans. Though not every child raised vegan will continue that lifestyle, it does seem plausible that a child raised to care about the suffering of others is more likely to make a positive contribution to the world. Because your argument for antinatalism is built upon a concern for the suffering of others, it seems likely that altruistic people would be more likely to adopt that sort of philosophy.</span></h2>
<h2><span class="font-size-3">Are you concerned that by encouraging people not to procreate you could be decreasing the number of altruists in the human population, and therefore slowing ethical progress?</span></h2>
<hr/><p><span class="font-size-3"><strong>DB:</strong> If I am correct that bringing somebody into existence inflicts a terrible harm on that person, we should be worried about prospective parents who are willing to inflict that harm on their potential children in the hope that those children will help spare others suffering. Part of the worry is about those parents instrumentalising their children. How compassionate is it to do that? And what example are they setting? Another worry, however, is whether any child raised even by compassionate people would indeed make the world a better place. In <em>The Misanthropic Argument for Anti-natalism</em><a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/#footnote-10" class="footnote tooltipstered" id="reference-10" name="reference-10">[10]</a>, I point to just how much harm humans cause. Vegans, all other things being equal, do less damage than their omnivorous conspecifics. However, even vegans do some damage. Moreover, all other things are rarely equal.</span></p>
<p><span class="font-size-3">Those who still want to raise compassionate children might consider adopting, thereby saving two birds from one stone. Those who adopt care for a child who would otherwise have had no parents, and they rear it as well as possible. They prevent suffering (of the otherwise parentless child) and they prevent suffering (that that child would cause if it were raised less well).</span></p>
<hr/><h2><span class="font-size-3"><strong>RVGN:</strong> Thank you so much for your time! We hope interested readers will go on to explore your ideas in more detail in your book Better Never to Have Been, and that this interview can contribute to the vegan conversation about antinatalism becoming better informed and more productive.</span></h2>
<div class="original-appearance"><span class="font-size-3">David Benatar is a professor of philosophy and head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town. His books <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Better-Never-Have-Been-Existence/dp/0199549265" class="external-link" target="_blank">Better Never To Have Been</a> and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Debating-Procreation-Wrong-Reproduce-Ethics/dp/0199333556" class="external-link" target="_blank">Debating Procreation: Is It Wrong to Reproduce?</a> (in which he debates David Wasserman), are available on Amazon and well worth your time.<br/><br/><a href="http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/">http://rvgn.org/2016/06/19/better-never-to-have-been-an-interview-with-david-benatar/</a><br/></span></div>Professor David Benatar on The Species Barrier! Excellent episode with pre-eminent philosopher David Benatar, musician Mistro & author Jan Smitowicztag:arzone.ning.com,2015-10-10:4715978:BlogPost:1514352015-10-10T16:00:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<h2><strong><span class="font-size-2">Professor David Benatar on The Species Barrier!<br></br> Excellent episode of The Species Barrier featuring interviews and discussions about Antinatalism, Veganism, and more with pre-eminent Professor of philosophy David Benatar, marvellous musician Mistro, and eco-thrilling author Jan Smitowicz.</span></strong></h2>
<h2>The Species Barrier 35 Antinatal</h2>
<h4>October 9th, 2015</h4>
<div class="entry"><div>Episode #35 of The Species Barrier... South African…</div>
</div>
<h2><strong><span class="font-size-2">Professor David Benatar on The Species Barrier!<br/> Excellent episode of The Species Barrier featuring interviews and discussions about Antinatalism, Veganism, and more with pre-eminent Professor of philosophy David Benatar, marvellous musician Mistro, and eco-thrilling author Jan Smitowicz.</span></strong></h2>
<h2>The Species Barrier 35 Antinatal</h2>
<h4>October 9th, 2015</h4>
<div class="entry"><div>Episode #35 of The Species Barrier... South African Professor of Philosophy David Benatar, writer of Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence joins us to discuss his work. Mistro, musical artist from Norway has a new album out called The Tragedy of Birth, and author Jan Smitowicz from America is the writer of revenge novel Orange Rain.<p></p>
<p>Also in the news discussion, we attended the Premiere of Unity (Long awaited followup to Earthlings) and give our thoughts, World Overshoot Day passes, water and food predicted to run out, The Pope's encyclical covers environmentalism and animal ethics, Beyonce's "veganism", techno fixes can't save the oceans, Cecil The Lion and it's been made official that humans are driving The Sixth Great Extinction event in geological history.</p>
<p>Welcome To The Species Barrier... where two vegan, environmentalists question how we interact with the planet and the other animals who call it home. Prepare to have your preconceptions challenged and explore that barrier in place which separates the human animal from other species.</p>
</div>
</div>
<p><br/> <a href="http://thespeciesbarrier.podbean.com/e/the-species-barrier-35-antinatal/">http://thespeciesbarrier.podbean.com/e/the-species-barrier-35-antinatal/</a><br/> <a href="https://ia801502.us.archive.org/35/items/TheSpeciesBarrier35Antinatal/tsb35.mp3">https://ia801502.us.archive.org/35/items/TheSpeciesBarrier35Antinatal/tsb35.mp3</a></p>Interview with vegan philosopher David Benatar about why it's better never to have been borntag:arzone.ning.com,2015-06-11:4715978:BlogPost:1499982015-06-11T08:30:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<h1 class="title" id="page-title">Better Never to Have Been Born: An Interview with David Benatar…</h1>
<div class="region region-content"><div class="block block-siteskeleton" id="block-siteskeleton-tabs"><div class="content"><div class="tabs"></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="block block-system" id="block-system-main"><div class="content"></div>
</div>
</div>
<h1 class="title" id="page-title">Better Never to Have Been Born: An Interview with David Benatar</h1>
<div class="region region-content"><div id="block-siteskeleton-tabs" class="block block-siteskeleton"><div class="content"><div class="tabs"></div>
</div>
</div>
<div id="block-system-main" class="block block-system"><div class="content"><div id="node-85341" class="node node-collection node-promoted node-type-collection-detail node-detail node-has-region-body node-has-region-bottom node-has-region-hidden clearfix"><div class="node-inner"><div class="node-contents"><div class="node-body"><div class="fieldlayout-region fieldlayout-region-body fieldlayout-region-body-detail"><div class="field field-name-body field-type-text-with-summary field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>Remember that scene in Frank Capra’s classic 1946 film, “It’s a Wonderful Life,” where George Bailey (played by Jimmy Stewart) has hit rock bottom and is seriously considering jumping off the bridge into the icy cold waves below to end it all? But before George can go through with it, his guardian angel, Clarence, jumps into the frigid water so that George has to save Clarence, instead of ending his own life. One could make the case that philosopher David Benatar’s life consists of many of George’s dark-night-of-the-soul moments.</p>
<p></p>
<img alt="Jimmy Stewart as George Bailey" src="http://www.ttbook.org/sites/default/files/public/images/thumbnails/IAWL.jpg"/>Jimmy Stewart as George Bailey<br/>
<p></p>
<p>When Steve Paulson posed the question “Do you wish you had not been born?” to Benatar, he replied, “Yes, I’d rather not have existed. That’s different from would I rather be dead.”</p>
<p>Benatar says that it’s important to make the distinction between not already existing and already existing. “If somebody is not existing yet and they may never exist, they have no interest in coming into existence. And so we don’t need as much to defeat the harms that they will suffer.”</p>
<p>Benatar is a philosophy professor at the University of Cape Town and the author of <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Better-Never-Have-Been-Existence/dp/0199549265%3FSubscriptionId%3DAKIAJWAGHMYTPK5725MQ%26tag%3Dwiscpublradi-20%26linkCode%3Dxm2%26camp%3D2025%26creative%3D165953%26creativeASIN%3D0199549265" target="_blank">“Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence.”</a> The dedication of his book reads: “To my parents, even though they brought me into existence; and to my brothers, each of whose existence, although a harm to him, is a great benefit to the rest of us.” It reads almost like a piece of Swiftian satire but Benatar assured Paulson that he is dead serious. “So long as a life will contain some bad in it, there’s a net harm to coming into existence.”</p>
<p>Benatar believes that the Pollyanna effect—where our minds tend to remember our more pleasant experiences—keeps us accentuating the positive. “I think we tend to radically underestimate the amount of bad that there is. And so I point to ample psychological literature which shows that humans have this bias towards optimism.”</p>
<p>But Paulson countered that the trials and tribulations of life are often what give it meaning. By overcoming adversity, you will find more meaning and your life will be richer for it. Benatar responded by saying that if you take that idea too far, it could be an argument for inflicting suffering.</p>
<p>Benatar’s ideas about the harms of coming into existence mean that we should never have children. He admits that it’s a radical idea but argues that our biological impulses are not rationally informed. Paulson asked him what that means in the case of someone being pregnant; does Benatar believe the fetus should be aborted? He says that it depends.</p>
<p>“If you’re dealing with a presentient fetus and you say, ‘Well, look in the relevant sense, it hasn’t begun existing,’ then this might imply that you ought to abort, that the morally preferable thing would be to abort. But that’s a spearate view from the anti-natalist view. You have to combine anti-natalism with some views of fetal moral status in order to generate what I call the pro-death view on abortion.”</p>
<p>Although his thoughts are bleak and in many ways life-nagating, Benatar says they’re worth taking seriously. “There are prospective benefits to be gained here because I think if you have a certain sensitivity to the way the world is and to the amount of suffering that there is in the world, not just your own but other people’s, then you might think twice about having children, about participating in a culture that encourages people to have children, that frowns on people who don’t. So I think there’s something to be gained from these things.”</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="field field-name-field-rel-seg-show field-type-node-reference field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><div id="node-85221" class="node node-segments node-teaser node-type-segments-teaser node-has-region-hard-left node-has-region-body node-has-region-hidden clearfix"><div class="node-inner"><div class="node-contents"><div class="node-left node-hard-left fieldlayout-region fieldlayout-region-hard-left fieldlayout-region-hard-left-teaser"><div class="field field-name-field-image-thumbnail field-type-image field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><a href="http://www.ttbook.org/book/harm-coming-existence"><img src="http://www.ttbook.org/sites/default/files/public/styles/thumbnail_small/public/images/detail/baby_birth.jpg?itok=h-4jcYEp" width="80" height="80" alt="A close up of the face of a newborn baby"/></a></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="node-body node-body-hard-left"><div class=" fieldlayout-region fieldlayout-region-body fieldlayout-region-body-teaser"><h3 class=" fieldlayout node-field-title"></h3>
<h3 class=" fieldlayout node-field-title"><a href="http://www.ttbook.org/book/harm-coming-existence">The Harm of Coming Into Existence</a></h3>
<h3 class=" fieldlayout node-field-title"></h3>
<div class="field field-name-field-audio-mp3 field-type-text field-label-hidden clearfix"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item ttbook-audio even"><ul class="wpr-audio">
<li class="0 first"><a href="http://www.ttbook.org/listen/85221" class="wpr-audio-stream" title="The Harm of Coming Into Existence" target="_blank">Listen Now</a></li>
<li style="list-style: none;"> </li>
<li class="1 last"><a href="http://mp3.wpr.org/download.php?f=tbk150531a3.mp3" class="wpr-audio-download" title="Download The Harm of Coming Into Existence" target="_blank">Download</a></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="service-links"><a href="http://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=http%3A//www.ttbook.org/book/harm-coming-existence&t=The%20Harm%20of%20Coming%20Into%20Existence" title="Share on Facebook" class="service-links-facebook" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"><img src="http://www.ttbook.org/sites/all/modules/service_links/images/facebook.png" alt="Facebook logo"/></a> <a href="http://twitter.com/share?url=http%3A//www.ttbook.org/book/harm-coming-existence&text=The%20Harm%20of%20Coming%20Into%20Existence" title="Share this on Twitter" class="service-links-twitter" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"><img src="http://www.ttbook.org/sites/all/modules/service_links/images/twitter.png" alt="Twitter logo"/></a> <a href="https://plus.google.com/share?url=http%3A//www.ttbook.org/book/harm-coming-existence" title="Share this on Google+" class="service-links-google-plus" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"><img src="http://www.ttbook.org/sites/all/modules/service_links/images/google_plus.png" alt="Google+ logo"/></a></div>
<div class="clear"></div>
</div>
</div>
<h3 class=" fieldlayout node-field-title"></h3>
<div class="field field-name-field-teaser field-type-text-long field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"><p>At one point in "It's a Wonderful Life," George Bailey (Jimmy Stewart) says he wishes he'd never been born. Of course, he ends up changing his mind. But philosopher David Benatar thinks George was right the first time. It really WOULD be better to have never been born.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="field field-name-field-vote field-type-fivestar field-label-hidden"><div class="field-items"><div class="field-item even"></div>
</div>
</div>
<h3 class=" fieldlayout node-field-title"></h3>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p><a href="http://www.ttbook.org/book/better-never-have-been-born">http://www.ttbook.org/book/better-never-have-been-born</a> </p>Why the Naïve Argument against Moral Vegetarianism Really is Naïve - DAVID BENATARtag:arzone.ning.com,2014-08-04:4715978:BlogPost:1471022014-08-04T09:30:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<p>Why the Naïve Argument against Moral Vegetarianism Really is Naïve - by David Benatar</p>
<p><br></br> <br></br> ABSTRACT<br></br> <br></br> When presented with the claim of the moral vegetarian that it is wrong for us to eat meat, many people respond that because it is not wrong for lions, tigers and other carnivores to kill and eat animals, it cannot be wrong for humans to do so. This response is what Peter Alward has called the naïve argument. Peter Alward has defended the naïve argument against…</p>
<p>Why the Naïve Argument against Moral Vegetarianism Really is Naïve - by David Benatar</p>
<p><br/> <br/> ABSTRACT<br/> <br/> When presented with the claim of the moral vegetarian that it is wrong for us to eat meat, many people respond that because it is not wrong for lions, tigers and other carnivores to kill and eat animals, it cannot be wrong for humans to do so. This response is what Peter Alward has called the naïve argument. Peter Alward has defended the naïve argument against objections. I argue that his defence fails.<br/> <br/> <br/> INTRODUCTION<br/> <br/> Moral vegetarians think that it is morally wrong for us to eat meat. A common response to this view, especially among non-philosophers, is what Peter Alward calls the naïve argument against moral vegetarianism. This is the argument that because it is not wrong for carnivorous animals like lions and tigers to kill other animals for food, it cannot be wrong for humans to do so. Peter Alward argues that the naïve argument is not defeated by moral vegetarians’ usual responses to it. I shall argue that his defence of the naïve argument is flawed.</p>
<p><br/> <br/> PETER ALWARD’S ARGUMENT<br/> <br/> According to Peter Alward, a fair formulation of the moral vegetarian thesis is:<br/> <br/> VT: Eating the meat of an animal with properties X, Y, Z, ... that was killed for the purpose of being eaten is morally wrong.<br/> <br/> He presents the basic version of the naïve argument as follows:2<br/> <br/> P1) Lions, tigers and other carnivores eat the meat of animals with properties X, Y, Z,... which have been killed for the purpose of being eaten.<br/> <br/> P2) It is not morally wrong for lions, tigers and other carnivores to do so.<br/> <br/> C) Eating the meat of an animal with properties X, Y, Z, ... that was killed for the purpose of being eaten is not morally wrong.<br/> <br/> The conclusion of the naïve argument is the negation of VT (Peter Alward’s formulation of the moral vegetarian thesis).<br/> He notes that the usual response to the naïve argument is to accept P2 – that is, to deny that it is morally wrong for lions, tigers and other carnivores to eat the meat in question – but to claim that because of some difference between us, on the one hand, and lions and tigers, on the other, it is wrong for us. Two differences to which moral vegetarians usually point are that unlike us, lions and tigers (1) lack the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong; and (2) need meat in order to survive. Peter Alward argues that neither of these facts succeeds in undermining the naïve argument. I shall call these his no moral difference<br/> arguments. </p>
<p>First, he argues that the inability of lions and tigers to know that eating meat is wrong does not show that it is not wrong for them to do so. It only shows that they cannot be held culpable. He provides the analogy of a young child, too immature to yet discern the difference between right and wrong, attempting to slit the throat of his sleeping father. Were the attempt successful, says the author, the child would have done something wrong even though he cannot be blamed for it. Even if, for one reason or another, one thought that actions can only be judged wrong when they are blameworthy, one would still think that the child’s attempt to slit his father’s throat is what Peter Alward calls ‘prevent-worthy’. He says that a revised version of the naïve argument that accommodates this thought would be:<br/> <br/> P1) If it is wrong (i.e. blameworthy) for humans to kill animals for food, then it is prevent-worthy for lions and tigers to kill animals for food.<br/> <br/> P2) It is not prevent-worthy for lions and tigers to kill animals for food.<br/> <br/> C) It is not wrong for humans to kill animals for food.<br/> <br/> Second, Peter Alward argues that the naïve argument cannot be refuted by the fact that lions and tigers, unlike us, require meat for their survival. Here he compares a lion to an ‘innocent person A who has a gun pointed at her head and who will be killed unless she kills someone else B’. One might reason that it is<br/> acceptable for A to kill B if that is the only way to save her own life. But this case, says Peter Alward, is unlike that of the lion. A lion, he says, ‘has to continually kill and eat animals throughout its life. And the numbers do count. The outcome in which A kills B, C, D and E is morally worse than that in which A is killed by the gunman, despite her innocence.’</p>
<p>The upshot of his arguments, Peter Alward says, is that ‘if it is wrong for humans to eat the meat of certain animals, it is also wrong for lions and tigers and other carnivores to do so’. Thus, if, contrary to the naïve argument, VT were true, then we would have an obligation to prevent carnivores from eating meat when we could prevent them from doing so. Since it would be cruel to allow an animal to starve to death, we would be under an obligation to kill them painlessly if they could not be given other food to ensure their survival. He concludes with the tongue-in-cheek injunction, ‘Vegetarians, kill your kitties!’<br/> <br/> <br/> VEGETARIANS, KILL YOUR CARNIVOROUS FRIENDS AND FAMILY?<br/> <br/> Killing their kitties would not be all moral vegetarians would be obligated to do if there were an obligation to prevent animals from being killed and eaten. Almost all humans who eat meat can survive very well without it. However, if their carnivorous practices could not be prevented – perhaps by persuading them to desist from meat or by successfully imposing a ban on the consumption of meat – there would be an obligation to kill them too! In this way, Peter Alward’s ‘no moral difference arguments’, combined with VT, could entail an extreme (but admittedly unusual) animal liberationist conclusion. It would perhaps better be described as an extreme herbivore liberationist conclusion. It would require the killing of (human and non-human) carnivores if that were the only effective way of preventing them from eating the meat of herbivores killed for that purpose.<br/> Of course, Peter Alward is not himself committed to this position. The ‘no moral difference arguments’ alone do not entail this conclusion. Rather the conclusion is entailed by these arguments in conjunction with VT. It is VT that Peter Alward denies. I too reject the extreme herbivore liberationist position and its implicit prescriptions to kill kitties and other carnivores. I shall show, however, that contrary to Peter Alward’s claims and arguments, there are two related ways that a moral vegetarian might do this:<br/> <br/> (1) By denying that VT is the correct (or only possible) formulation of moral vegetarianism.<br/> <br/> (2) By rejecting the ‘no moral difference arguments’.<br/> <br/> My arguments will reveal the shortcomings of Peter Alward’s defence of the naïve argument.</p>
<p><br/> <br/> AGAINST CARICATURES OF THE MORAL VEGETARIAN THESIS<br/> <br/> The first problem with Peter Alward’s arguments is his formulation of the moral vegetarian thesis. Although VT is a formulation which some moral vegetarians might embrace, many would not. VT claims (or at least implies) that the eating of meat of an animal with properties X, Y, Z, ... that was killed for the purpose of being eaten is always wrong (i.e. in every conceivable situation). But many moral vegetarians would deny this. They would claim that while eating this meat is ordinarily wrong, it need not always be so. VT is a caricature of their position. There are a number of possible reasons why a moral vegetarian may be opposed to the eating of certain animals in most circumstances, which would not entail a categorical opposition to eating the meat of those animals. Consider, for instance:<br/> <br/> VT': Eating the meat of an animal with properties, X, Y, Z, ... that was killed for the purpose of being eaten is morally wrong if done for anything less than very weighty reasons.<br/> <br/> If VT' were combined with the quite plausible claim that killing such animals for one’s survival is a weighty reason but killing them for mere gastronomic delight is a trivial reason, one would conclude that it is almost always, but not always, wrong for humans to eat the meat of such animals. Thus some moral vegetarians<br/> might think that it is not morally wrong (even though regrettable) for snow- and ice-bound people, such as the Inuit sometimes are (or have been), to kill and eat certain animals because their very lives are at stake, while it would be wrong for the rest of us to do so. (Of course, if the Inuit could alter their position, as may<br/> now be the case, such that they could avoid dependence on animal flesh, then they would have a duty to do so and it would be wrong for them to continue to kill and eat animals.)</p>
<p>VT' may seem ad hoc to some, but a moment’s reflection should reveal otherwise. All those who reject moral absolutism accept analogues of VT'. For instance, very many people embrace what we might call a moral humanist thesis:<br/> <br/> HT: Killing human beings is morally wrong if done for anything less than very weighty reason.<br/> <br/> People disagree, of course, about what constitutes sufficiently weighty reason. Some might think that killing in self-defence is justified only when one’s life is threatened by an intentional aggressor. Others might also permit the killing of innocent threats – those whose continued existence threatens one’s life but through no fault of theirs. Consider, for instance, the baby whose cries will alert murderous pursuers to the whereabouts of hidden potential victims. Some think that a person’s having committed a murder is sufficient reason to execute him. Others disagree. Some, but not others, think that killing humans suffering<br/> terribly from terminal conditions is morally acceptable. Only absolutists about killing humans reject HT in favour of a principle that categorically rules out any killing of humans. Whether or not one thinks that such an absolutist view is correct, one should certainly recognise that a moral humanist could very well oppose the killing of humans for the sorts of reasons humans are usually killed – malice, intolerance, jealousy, indifference, sport, to attain property, to silence a witness, etc. – without thinking that there are never circumstances in which killing humans is morally acceptable (even if still regrettable). Now, if it is possible for somebody to have a qualified opposition to killing humans, why is it not possible for somebody to have a qualified opposition to killing and eating non-human animals? Why may somebody not think that it is morally wrong to kill animals in order to enjoy the taste of meat, but not wrong to kill them if that is necessary to save one’s own life?</p>
<p><br/></p>
<p>THE LION AND THE INUIT<br/> <br/> Peter Alward thinks that the survival of lions and tigers cannot justify their killing and eating of animals because their survival requires not one killing but continual killing and eating of animals over their whole lifetimes. For this reason, he says, lions and tigers are unlike the case of innocent A who will be shot by a gunman unless A kills innocent B. Even if one thinks that A is justified in killing B in such a circumstance, says Peter Alward, one could not say that A is justified in killing B, C, D and E in order to preserve her life.<br/> But is the gunman a suitable example with which to compare the lion? One reason to think that it is not is that the gunman case involves the killing of humans with properties L, M, N, ..., in addition to properties X, Y, Z, .... Now a moral vegetarian categorically opposed to the killing of any animal with properties X, Y, Z, ... would (likely) be opposed without qualification to the killing of humans that had additional morally significant properties (L, M, N, ...). But a moral vegetarian who had a qualified opposition to killing and eating certain animals could think that killing human animals (with the additional morally significant properties) is still worse and requires even stronger justification. A moral vegetarian who held this view could consistently claim that A’s survival cannot justify his killing a number of beings with properties L, M, N, ..., X, Y, Z, .... but A’s survival can justify his killing a number of beings with properties X, Y, Z, .... More specifically, such a moral vegetarian could think that an iteration of the survival justification is acceptable when the beings killed have properties X, Y, Z, ... but not when they have properties L, M, N, ..., X, Y, Z, .... For these reasons, extrapolation from the gunman example to the lion case is unwarranted. A much better analogy than the gunman is that of those Inuit who are dependent on continual killing and eating of animals for their survival. As I have indicated, VT', being more nuanced than VT, could permit such people to kill and eat animals (so long as they could not survive without doing so), while still prohibiting the rest of us from doing so.<br/> Some might suggest that the Inuit and lions examples are also disanalogous. In the one case, the killing of many animals is necessary for the survival of a human (a being with properties L, M, N, ..., X, Y, Z, ...) whereas in the other case the killing of many animals is necessary for the survival of a non-human animal (which has the same set of morally relevant properties – X, Y, Z, ... – as its victims). I agree that to some moral vegetarians this difference might be morally significant. However, I deny that it need matter to all moral vegetarians. It could be argued that the properties of the being that is killed, not the properties of the killer, are what are relevant in determining whether iterated survival killing is justified. For those who accept this, the Inuit example is more analogous to the case of the lions. According to VT' iterated survival killing by both Inuit and lions of animals with properties X, Y, Z, ... would be permissible.</p>
<p><br/><br/> THE MORAL IGNORANCE OF LIONS<br/> <br/> So far, I have assumed that the moral ignorance of lions is no obstacle to their doing wrong. Now I wish to question this assumption. Peter Alward considers and rejects the objection that an action, even if undesirable, cannot be labelled ‘wrong’ unless it is blameworthy. He says that he is sometimes inclined to view this as ‘a purely verbal issue’. I am never inclined to view it as such. The oddity of labelling any undesirable event as ‘wrong’ can be seen more clearly if we consider natural events like volcano eruptions, floods or rock slides. Any of these events might be undesirable in that they bring about some deaths, but it would certainly be odd to term these events ‘morally wrong’ (unless one thought that they were quite literally ‘acts of God’, in which case they are not mere events but fully intentional actions). Surely it would not be wrong of the volcano to erupt, even if its erupting were undesirable or unfortunate. Now if a volcanic eruption is seen as undesirable but not wrong, why are the non-blameworthy actions of lions and babes not viewed similarly, given that lions and babes are no more responsible for what they do than are volcanoes?<br/> Peter Alward thinks that this is a mere verbal issue because even if one thinks that the lion’s actions are not wrong, one should still think they are what he calls ‘prevent-worthy’. In defence of this claim, he provides the analogy of the young child who attempts to slit his sleeping father’s throat. Although the child cannot<br/> be blamed for this action, we should prevent him from doing it.<br/>But is the case of the child and his sleeping father a good analogy? I think it is not. One significant difference is that the (most humane) way to prevent the lion from killing its prey is to kill the lion, whereas the way to prevent the child killing the father would simply be to remove the implement with which he would Swets = username 192.87.50.3 = IP address Tue, 04 Sep 2012 15:43:01 = Date & Time MORAL VEGETARIANISM 109 slit his father’s throat. It is possible for somebody to think that although both deaths are unfortunate, only one – that of the father – should be prevented.17 But what, it might be asked, if killing the child were the only way of preventing him from killing his father? I suspect that some would think it permissible to kill the child, while others would not, and that what view one takes would depend, all things being equal, on whether one thinks that innocent threats may be killed. However, even this modified example cannot serve as a useful benchmark for a judgement about the lion. After all, somebody might think that it is acceptable to kill those who innocently threaten the lives of beings with properties L, M, N, ..., X, Y, Z, ..., but not those who threaten the lives of beings with only properties X, Y, Z, .... Moreover, not everything that is undesirable or unfortunate must be prevented. Among those who reject consequentialism, this is a common view. On such a view, if the only way I can prevent 20 people from being killed is by killing one, I must not prevent the death of the 20. I do not wish to defend this view here, and Peter Alward does not offer a refutation of it. I wish only to note that if one can think this about humans, there is no reason why one should not also think it about non-human animals. What these reflections show is that a moral vegetarian could reject P1 of the recast version of the naïve argument. That is to say, a moral vegetarian can think it is wrong for humans to kill animals for food without thinking that it is preventworthy for lions and tigers to kill animals for food.</p>
<p><br/><br/>CONCLUSION<br/><br/>I have shown that the original version of the naïve argument fails. It caricatures the view of (at least some, but perhaps most) moral vegetarians. The dependence of lions and tigers on meat for their survival is a morally relevant difference between them and us, at least if one accepts a more refined moral vegetarian thesis than VT, such as VT'. The moral ignorance of lions is also relevant and requires the abandonment of Peter Alward’s original version of the naïve argument. Because P1 of the recast version of the argument can be rejected – that is to say, because a moral vegetarian could reject the claim that if it is wrong for humans to kill animals for food it must be prevent-worthy for lions and tigers to kill animals for food – this version of the argument also fails. I have not defended such claims as: (a) VT', (b) the non-absolutist position on killing humans and animals, and (c) the non-consequentialist view that some undesirable outcomes should not be prevented. All I have sought to show is that an oversimplification of the moral vegetarian position can lead one to overlook versions of it that are congruent with views commonly held by philosophers and others regarding inter-human morality. Because of this congruence, these versions of moral vegetarianism cannot simply be ignored. Although it is not immoral, it is certainly unfortunate and regrettable that lions, tigers and other carnivores must kill in order to survive. For many of us, the vast amount of suffering and death that is necessary for carnivores to sustain themselves is striking evidence that the natural order could not have been designed by an omnibenevolent being (who is also omnipotent and omniscient). It would have been better had some animals not needed to feed on others. However, I have suggested some reasons why, all things considered, it might still be wrong (or at least not obligatory) to prevent predators from killing the animals they need to eat for their survival. This is not to say that there are no ways we might be required or permitted to prevent the death and suffering that carnivores bring. For instance, although killing a kitty has costs to that kitty, avoiding a kitty’s coming into existence could have no costs to it. For this reason it seems to me that a stronger case can be made for vegetarians (and others) not to breed kitties than to kill them. I realise, of course, that vegetarians can disagree on the question of whether or not to breed carnivores. I do not mean to offer a definitive argument here. I intend only to show that there are different ways of preventing carnivorous killings and they do not all stand and fall together. Most importantly, we should remember one way of minimising the killing of animals that is readily within each moral agent’s control, is to abandon the eating of meat. As this would not involve any of the costs that it would to lions and tigers, it should receive our primary attention.18<br/><br/><br/>NOTES<br/><br/>1 Alward 2000. <br/>2 Ibid., p. 82. <br/>3 Ibid., p. 87. <br/>4 Ibid., p. 84. <br/>5 Ibid., p. 84. <br/>6 Ibid., p. 88. <br/>7 Ibid., p. 88. <br/>8 As far as I can tell, it is uncontroversial that humans can survive and thrive without meat, as long as they have other sources of nutrition. Clearly some people’s circumstances are such that they have no alternatives to gaining their nutrition from meat. Just how common such circumstances are, is a disputed matter. I cannot settle that issue here. I suspect, however, that there are fewer such cases than many people think. More controversial than the vegetarian diet, which is my main concern in this paper, is the diet of vegans – those who abstain not only from meat, but also from animal products such as eggs and dairy. Two pairs of scientists contributed to a debate on this subject in the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. The one pair concluded that ‘all known nutritional risks of vegan diets can be avoided by appropriate dietary planning that results in intakes of nutrients from foods … that meet levels suggested in the Recommended Daily Allowances’ (Dwyer and Loew 1994). The other pair of scientists concluded that ‘vegan diets can be chosen which are appropriate for pregnant and lactating women, infants, children and adolescents’ (Mangels and Havela 1994). <br/>9 That kitties cannot, but humans can, survive without meat, would not undermine the implication that vegetarians should kill those humans who could not be prevented from eating meat other than by killing them. <br/>10 The category ‘herbivore’ may actually be too narrow. A defender of the position I have in mind might think that those that feed on animals only that lack the relevant properties (X, Y, Z, ...) should also be protected. Insectivores may be a possible category, depending on what view one takes about what properties X, Y, Z, ... are. <br/>11 I use the term ‘carnivores’ in a broad sense to refer to all those who eat meat (that is, including omnivores) rather than in the narrower sense which denotes those who eat only meat. <br/>12 If X, Y, Z, ... were thought to be properties like sentience and some cognitive function, then L, M, N, ... could be thought to be properties like higher order sapience and selfawareness. <br/>13 Interestingly, Peter Alward himself, in answering an objection to his position, suggests that the properties of the victim are what count. See p. 86. <br/>14 Alward 2000: 87. <br/>15 Given their harmful effects, these events are prevent-worthy even where they are not preventable. Where the events themselves are not preventable, their effects are sometimes preventable. <br/>16 It might be objected that Peter Alward is not committed to claiming that death-causing volcanic eruptions are wrong, because volcanic eruptions are events whereas Peter Alward is speaking about the deadly actions of lions and babes. The problem with this objection is that it assumes an oversimplified taxonomy. It may indeed be the case that lions and babes act (at least in some sense of that word), whereas volcanic eruptions just happen. However, the actions of lions and babes are not like paradigmatic human actions – to which praise and blame can be attached. The reason for this is that lions and babies are no more responsible for what they do than are volcanoes. In this relevant respect, the actions of lions and babes are like volcanic eruptions and unlike ordinary human actions. My point is that a killing can be wrong only when it is brought about by a responsible agent. <br/>17 The expression ‘X is prevent-worthy’ is ambiguous. It could mean that ‘all things being equal, X should be prevented’ or it could mean ‘all things considered, X should be prevented’. I am adopting the latter interpretation because this is the interpretation required in order for the expression ‘prevent-worthy’ to do the work that must be done in Peter Alward’s argument. If, for instance, the former, weaker, interpretation were adopted, P2 of Peter Alward’s argument on p. 87 could quite easily be denied by moral vegetarians. <br/>18 I am grateful to Environmental Values reviewers for their comments.<br/><br/>REFERENCES <br/>Alward, Peter 2000. ‘The Naïve Argument against Moral Vegetarianism’, Environmental Values 9: 81–9. Dwyer, Johanna and Franklin M. Loew 1994. ‘Nutritional Risks of Vegan Diets to Women and Children’, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics7(1): 102ff. Mangels, Ann Reed and Suzanne Havala 1994. ‘Vegan Diets for Women, Infants and Children’, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 7(1): 118ff.<br/><br/></p>
<p><a href="http://www.erica.demon.co.uk/EV/EV1006.html"></a><a href="http://www.stafforini.com/txt/Benatar%20-%20Why%20the%20naive%20argument%20against%20moral%20vegetarianism%20really%20is%20naive.pdf">http://www.stafforini.com/txt/Benatar%20-%20Why%20the%20naive%20argument%20against%20moral%20vegetarianism%20really%20is%20naive.pdf</a><br/> <a href="http://ethik.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/inst_ethik_wiss_dialog/Benatar__D._2001_Veg_-_the_naiv_argument_s6.pdf">http://ethik.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/inst_ethik_wiss_dialog/Benatar__D._2001_Veg_-_the_naiv_argument_s6.pdf</a><br/> <a href="http://www.erica.demon.co.uk/EV/EV904.html"><br/></a></p>ZOOPOLIS: A Political Theory of Animal Rights - by Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlickatag:arzone.ning.com,2012-09-25:4715978:BlogPost:1104822012-09-25T16:00:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<p>ZOOPOLIS: A Political Theory of Animal Rights - by Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka</p>
<p></p>
<p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Zoopolis-Political-Theory-Animal-Rights/dp/0199599661">http://www.amazon.com/Zoopolis-Political-Theory-Animal-Rights/dp/0199599661<br></br> <br></br></a></p>
<p><a href="http://books.google.es/books?id=GppRuyOQLSwC&printsec=frontcover">http://books.google.es/books?id=GppRuyOQLSwC&printsec=frontcover…</a></p>
<p></p>
<p></p>
<p>ZOOPOLIS: A Political Theory of Animal Rights - by Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka</p>
<p></p>
<p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Zoopolis-Political-Theory-Animal-Rights/dp/0199599661">http://www.amazon.com/Zoopolis-Political-Theory-Animal-Rights/dp/0199599661<br/> <br/></a></p>
<p><a href="http://books.google.es/books?id=GppRuyOQLSwC&printsec=frontcover">http://books.google.es/books?id=GppRuyOQLSwC&printsec=frontcover</a></p>
<p></p>
<p><a href="http://www.ourhenhouse.org/2012/06/book-review-zoopolis-a-political-theory-of-animal-rights-by-sue-donaldson-will-kymlicka/">http://www.ourhenhouse.org/2012/06/book-review-zoopolis-a-political-theory-of-animal-rights-by-sue-donaldson-will-kymlicka</a><a href="http://www.ourhenhouse.org/2012/06/book-review-zoopolis-a-political-theory-of-animal-rights-by-sue-donaldson-will-kymlicka/">/<br/><br/></a><br/> <a href="http://page99test.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/sue-donaldson-and-will-kymlickas.html">http://page99test.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/sue-donaldson-and-will-kymlickas.html</a><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Zoopolis-Political-Theory-Animal-Rights/dp/0199599661"><br/></a></p>
<p></p>
<p><a href="http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Law/LawSociety/LawandSocialScience/?view=usa&ci=9780199599660">http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Law/LawSociety/LawandSocialScience/?view=usa&ci=9780199599660</a></p>Interview with Fiona Oakes: Vegan Marathon Runner - by Leigh-Chantelletag:arzone.ning.com,2012-06-01:4715978:BlogPost:993732012-06-01T19:00:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<h1 class="componentheading"><span class="font-size-5">Interview with Fiona Oakes: Vegan Marathon Runner</span></h1>
<div><p class="articleinfo"><span class="createdby">Written by Leigh-Chantelle </span><br></br> <span class="createdate">Created Thursday, 31 May 2012</span></p>
<p class="articleinfo"><span class="createdate"> </span></p>
</div>
<p>Fiona Oakes is a Vegan Marathon Runner from the UK who in 2012 finished the Marathon des Sables: 154 miles across the Sahara with 50°C temperatures.…</p>
<h1 class="componentheading"><span class="font-size-5">Interview with Fiona Oakes: Vegan Marathon Runner</span></h1>
<div><p class="articleinfo"><span class="createdby">Written by Leigh-Chantelle </span><br/> <span class="createdate">Created Thursday, 31 May 2012</span></p>
<p class="articleinfo"><span class="createdate"> </span></p>
</div>
<p>Fiona Oakes is a Vegan Marathon Runner from the UK who in 2012 finished the Marathon des Sables: 154 miles across the Sahara with 50°C temperatures. Fiona holds the course record for the Essex Country Marathon Championship since 2007. She is the only female runner to run under 3 hours on the course in its 17 year history. Fiona has come top 10 in several international marathons (Florence, Moscow & Amsterdam and Nottingham) and top 20 in London & Berlin. Fiona also cares for over 400 rescued animals at <a href="http://www.towerhillstables.com/">Tower Hill Stables Animal Sanctuary</a> in Asheldham, UK where Fiona does all the work with her partner's help at the weekends.</p>
<p></p>
<p><img src="http://vivalavegan.net/community/images/stories/Athletes__Fitness_interviews/332x500xFiona_Oakes.jpg.pagespeed.ic.NP7nI8sxsb.jpg" alt="Fiona_Oakes" width="332" height="500"/></p>
<p><strong><span> </span></strong></p>
<p><strong><span>Why Vegan?</span></strong></p>
<div><strong>When and why did you decide to become a vegan?</strong></div>
<div>I became vegan at around 6 years old. It was just a natural progression from vegetarianism. I decided to become vegetarian at the age of 3 or 4, as soon as I was able to make a conscious decision. I have been vegan all of my adult life.</div>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>What has benefited you the most from being a vegan?</strong><br/> Obviously, the health benefits of being vegan are written in stone but I honestly believe the most benefit to me being vegan is that I do not carry the burden of guilt that I would have to endure knowing that I abused others for my own 'benefit'.</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>What does veganism mean to you?</strong><br/> Veganism is everything to me. It touches every part of my life. It is my life. I could not begin to imagine living my life any other way. It's not just the diet, but the lifestyle and the life choices I have made through my veganism, such as starting the Tower Hill Stables Animal Sanctuary and my Marathon running.</p>
<p><span><strong> </strong></span></p>
<p><span><strong>Training</strong></span><strong> </strong></p>
<div><strong>What sort of training do you do?</strong></div>
<div>I run a maximum of 90 to 100 miles (144-160 kilometers) a week when seriously training for a Marathon.<br/> <br/> <strong>How often do you (need to) train?</strong></div>
<div>I split my training into 10 sessions divided between speed and endurance.</div>
<div> </div>
<div><strong>Do you offer your fitness or training services to others?</strong><br/> I always respond to anyone who is seeking advice regarding their running and combining it with a vegan diet but I always say that everyone is different and I can only tell them what has worked for me.<br/> <br/> <strong>What sports do you play?</strong></div>
<div>I used to cycle competitively, row and now I run Marathons. Recently I took up the ultimate challenge of the Marathon des Sables which I completed - the first ethical vegan woman to do so.<br/> <br/> <strong><span>Strengths, Weaknesses & Outside Influences</span></strong></div>
<div><strong>What do you think is the biggest misconception about vegans and how do you address this?</strong></div>
<div>I think the biggest misconception of vegans is that we are weak - often people think we are weak in body and mind. They mistake our compassion for weakness. This is why I took up the ultimate challenge of the Marathon des Sables, the toughest foot race on the planet which is renowned for making grown men cry!</div>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>What are you strengths as a vegan athlete?</strong><br/> My strengths as an athlete are that I am not an athlete for myself. I am doing it for the benefit of others, which makes me work much harder to achieve. I am not selfish enough to want something this badly for myself. It makes me push myself that bit harder knowing that by doing well I can possibly convince others to consider a vegan lifestyle. It does work too. Once, when I won a Marathon in a massive course record, the Mayoress who was presenting the prizes told me her daughter had wanted to go vegetarian but she was against it as she was not convinced it would be ideal for a young girl who was still growing. Seeing what I had just done on a vegan diet had convinced her that it was okay for her daughter, which was the biggest prize I could ever want!</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>What is your biggest challenge?</strong><br/> My biggest challenge is fitting everything I have to do into a day. I have the Tower Hill Stables Animal Sanctuary to look after with its 400 residents, my training and my work as a retained Fire Fighter.</p>
<div><strong> </strong></div>
<div><strong>Are the non-vegans in your industry supportive or not?</strong></div>
<div>The non-vegans in my sporting and Fire Fighting life can be very skeptical of my veganism but when they see what I can do that usually shuts them up.</div>
<div> </div>
<div><strong>Are your family and friends supportive of your vegan lifestyle?</strong></div>
<div>My family and especially my Mother have always been supportive of me.<br/> <br/> <strong>What is the most common question/comment that people ask/say when they find out that you are a vegan and how do you respond?</strong></div>
<div>The most common question I get asked is “Where do you get those enormous muscles from?” I answer “From my wonderful, healthy diet of course!”</div>
<div> </div>
<div><strong>Who or what motivates you?</strong></div>
<div>The only motivation I need is to know that I am helping others. I don't care where or what, just as long as I can use my life to benefit someone else less fortunate than myself. That is all that matters to me.</div>
<p><strong><span> </span></strong></p>
<p><strong><span>Food & Supplements</span></strong></p>
<p><strong>What do you eat?</strong><br/> I don't actually have a set pattern of regular eating such as breakfast, lunch and dinner. Due to my lifestyle it is impossible as I never know what I am going to be doing or where I am going to be from one minute to the next. I only actually eat when I am hungry and when I do it tends to be nuts, fresh fruit, rice, pulses and bread. I do not spend too long analysing my diet. I know what works for me but that might not suit everyone.</p>
<p>I think people need to be less hung up about food, follow their own eating patterns and work out what their body needs rather than always being told what to eat by others. My biggest piece of advice is to know yourself and listen to your body. Ultimately, it will tell you all you need to know if you have the wisdom to listen.</p>
<div><strong> </strong></div>
<div><strong>What is your favourite source of:</strong><br/> <strong>Protein</strong> - mainly lentils and nuts. I swear by almonds and pine nuts</div>
<div><strong>Calcium</strong> - Broccoli, Kale, Cabbage, Almonds and figs<br/> <strong>Iron</strong> - Sesame seeds, leafy vegetables and, of course, spinach</div>
<div><span><strong> </strong></span></div>
<div><span><strong> </strong></span></div>
<div><span><strong>Advice</strong></span><strong> </strong></div>
<div><strong> </strong></div>
<div><strong>Losing weight and toning up:</strong></div>
<div>I don't actually really think about gaining or losing weight or weight training to tone up etc. I live a very, very active lifestyle getting up at around 3:30am and basically doing manual work all day, either at the Sanctuary, at the Fire Brigade or actually doing my running training. I guess my energetic lifestyle is my cross training. I only really train either with rowing on my Concept 2 rower or running.</div>
<div>My weight is pretty much static whatever I do but, if you do want a top tip to losing weight I would have to say enter the Marathon des Sables. I lost 6 kilos in one week running it but this is rather extreme as it is 155 miles in the harshest Desert conditions you can imagine, crossing the toughest terrain carrying a backpack with all your supplies, weighing around 12 kilograms.</div>
<p><em>Fiona promotes veganism through her daily life as a fire fighter, a marathon runner and by rescuing animals at her <a href="http://www.towerhillstables.com/">Tower Hill Stables Animal Sanctuary</a>. Fiona encourages people to get involved the best they can to help hers and other animal sanctuaries continue to provide a safe and happy life for the animal inhabitants.</em></p>
<p><em><br/> <a href="http://vivalavegan.net/community/articles/294-interview-with-fiona-oakes-vegan-marathon-runner.html">http://vivalavegan.net/community/articles/294-interview-with-fiona-oakes-vegan-marathon-runner.html</a><br/></em></p>Tomándonos en serio la consideración moral de los animales: más allá del especismo y el ecologismo - Oscar Hortatag:arzone.ning.com,2012-05-28:4715978:BlogPost:970502012-05-28T13:00:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<h1><span class="font-size-3">Tomándonos en serio la consideración moral de los animales: más allá del especismo y el ecologismo<br></br> - Oscar Horta</span></h1>
<div class="author"></div>
<div class="entry clear"><p>Este texto explica los argumentos sobre los que se basa la defensa de la consideración moral de los animales no humanos. Examina también el modo en la que esta se opone a las posiciones que tienen en cuenta solo los intereses de algunos seres sintientes (básicamente los seres…</p>
</div>
<h1><span class="font-size-3">Tomándonos en serio la consideración moral de los animales: más allá del especismo y el ecologismo<br/> - Oscar Horta</span></h1>
<div class="author"></div>
<div class="entry clear"><p>Este texto explica los argumentos sobre los que se basa la defensa de la consideración moral de los animales no humanos. Examina también el modo en la que esta se opone a las posiciones que tienen en cuenta solo los intereses de algunos seres sintientes (básicamente los seres humanos), o proponen que sean otras entidades (como las especies o los ecosistemas) las que sean protegidas en perjuicio de los individuos con la capacidad de sufrir y disfrutar. Plantea, asimismo, las consecuencias prácticas que se siguen de todo ello.</p>
<p></p>
<p><a href="http://masalladelaespecie.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/tomando-serio-animales.pdf">Tomándonos en serio la consideración moral de los animales: más allá del especismo y el ecologismo</a></p>
<p></p>
<p></p>
</div>The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear against the Nonspeciesist Paradigm: A Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature - by Oscar Hortatag:arzone.ning.com,2011-12-14:4715978:BlogPost:747812011-12-14T21:00:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<p align="left"><b><font face="Arial" size="5"><font face="Arial" size="5">The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear against the</font></font></b></p>
<p align="left"><b><font face="Arial" size="5"><font face="Arial" size="5">Nonspeciesist Paradigm:</font></font></b></p>
<p align="left"><b><font face="Arial" size="5"><font face="Arial" size="5">A Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature</font></font></b></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Arial" size="2"><font face="Arial" size="2">by Professor Oscar…</font></font></p>
<p align="left"><b><font size="5" face="Arial"><font size="5" face="Arial">The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear against the</font></font></b></p>
<p align="left"><b><font size="5" face="Arial"><font size="5" face="Arial">Nonspeciesist Paradigm:</font></font></b></p>
<p align="left"><b><font size="5" face="Arial"><font size="5" face="Arial">A Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature</font></font></b></p>
<p align="left"><font size="2" face="Arial"><font size="2" face="Arial">by Professor Oscar Horta</font></font></p>
<p align="left"></p>
<p align="left"><b><font size="4" face="Arial"><font size="4" face="Arial">Abstract</font></font></b></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia">Humans often intervene in the wild for anthropocentric or environmental reasons. An example of such interventions is the reintroduction of wolves in places where they no longer live in order to create what has been called an “ecology of fear”, which is being currently discussed in places such as Scotland. In the first part of this paper I discuss the reasons for this measure and argue that they are not compatible with a nonspeciesist approach. Then, I claim that if we abandon a speciesist viewpoint we should change completely the way in which we should intervene in nature. Rather than intervening for environmental or anthropocentric reasons, we should do it in order to reduce the harms that nonhuman animals suffer. This conflicts significantly with some fundamental environmental ideals whose defence is not compatible with the consideration of the interests of nonhuman animals.</font></p>
<p></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><b><font size="4" face="Arial"><font size="4" face="Arial">1. Introduction</font></font></b></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">Humans intervene continuously in the wild. There are several reasons why they do so. In most cases, they do it just for the sake of clearly recognizable human benefits (as when they transform some environment to make it more comfortable and less risky for humans to inhabit or visit). In other cases, they intervene in order to maintain certain patterns of environmental balance. They often do the latter because it is in their own interest. The motives for this can be variable: the promotion of tourism, an interest in getting some resources present in the area in which the intervention takes place, scientific, cultural or aesthetical reasons... In other cases, though, they do it, allegedly, just for its own sake. The assumption then is that there is a certain value in the preservation of such balance, reflected </font></font><font face="Georgia" style="font-family: Georgia;">in Aldo Leopold’s well known dictum “[a] thing is right when it tends</font> <font face="Georgia" style="font-family: Georgia;">to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold 1966, 262). In spite of this, humans very rarely intervene in nature for the sake of the interests of other sentient beings, that is, nonhuman animals. Moreover, the kinds of intervention they carry out are often harmful for them. In fact, if such harm is ever considered, it is only insofar as it is instrumentally relevant for the ends that are being aimed at. The reduction of the harms animals suffer, per se, is not considered a goal that should be pursued when these kinds of interventions in nature take place. In this paper I will evaluate the reasons we may have to support the ends that different interventions aim to achieve. To carry out such analysis, I will begin with a particular intervention of this kind: the reintroduction of wolves. This measure has been considered in recent years in places such as the Scottish Highlands (see for instance </font>Watson Feathersome 1997; Nilsen et al. 2007; Wilson 2004; Manning et al. 2009; as well as BBC News 1999; 2000 and 2008; Morgan 2007; or O’Connell 2008 for media coverage of the issue). And it was implemented before in places such as Yellowstone National Park, in the United States. This is a measure that would be harmful for a number of animals but has been considered in order to stop certain changes in the Highlands environment, through the imposition on ungulates of what has been called an “ecology of fear” (Ripple and Beschta 2004). Such a measure has been much discussed, but not because of the consequences it would have for nonhuman animals, but rather because of the way it could affect some human (non-vital) interests. However, in dealing with this question I do not intend to restrict my analysis to this particular intervention, nor to this type of intervention. Rather, I will consider it as an example to examine the more general question of what should be the ends we should aim for when we intervene in nature.</p>
<p align="left"></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">I want to say in advance that I do not intend to make a technical case here as regards whether the particular intervention I will tackle might achieve its goals or not. Nor will I try to assess any other </font></font>alternative ways in which such ends could be pursued. On the contrary, I will try to examine the ethics underlying the acceptance of those ends. I will consider the question of whether it is right to harm animals in order to achieve such ends. I will then consider the reasons we may have to intervene in nature for the sake of a completely different purpose, which is to reduce the harms animals suffer. I will argue that this is something we should aim for even if it strongly conflicted with what environmentalists may regard as valuable. This means that the position I will defend here should not be confused with a criticism of intervention in nature per se. My conclusion will be that we are not justified in intervening in nature when doing so generates more harm for nonhuman animals. But I will also claim that others interventions should be carried out. To defend this, I will proceed as follows. First, in section 2, I will explain the reasons why environmentalists defend the reintroduction of wolves and the ways it would be harmful for a number of animals. Then, in section 3, I will claim that in proposing such a measure they are considering the interests nonhuman animals have in a way that is completely different from that in which they would consider human interests. In section 4 I will argue that treating nonhuman animals comparatively worse than humans in cases in which their interests are equally important for each of them is unjustified. I will claim that it is a form of speciesism. In light of this, in section 5, I will argue that this presents a serious objection to the way in which the interests of animals are considered in cases such as the aforementioned. I will claim that their supporters assume a speciesist viewpoint. Next, in section 6, I will consider the claim that an intervention such as this one could be actually good for nonhuman animals even if we would never carry it out if humans were affected. I will argue that the issue has not been really researched and that there are reasons to doubt this claim. Then, in section 7, I will consider the claim that without apex predators herbivores will end up disappearing from places such as the Highlands. And in section 8 I will claim that this argument is inconsistent with the practice of farming. After that, in section 9, I consider some potential consequences for other animals due to the trophic cascade that the reintroduction of wolves might produce. In section 10 I will introduce another argument by pointing out that there are strong reasons to doubt our common assumptions regarding the aggregate wellbeing of animals. I will consider some facts regarding this that have been presented by Yew-Kwang Ng and Alan Dawrst, which may lead us to conclude that the suffering of nonhuman animals outweighs their wellbeing. Then, in section 11, I will consider whether we may have other reasons to think that this intervention brings about a positive outcome. This might be so according to a biocentric or an environmental holistic viewpoint. I will claim that none of these views can be considered compelling ones. Next, in section 12, I will claim that none of this drives us to reject intervention in nature. Rather, I will argue that it gives us strong reasons to intervene for the sake of the reduction of the harms nonhuman animals suffer. Finally, section 13 concludes.</p>
<p align="left"></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><b><font size="4" face="Arial"><font size="4" face="Arial">2. The Ecology of Fear: The Effects of Wolf Reintroduction on Elk and De</font></font><font size="4" face="Arial"><font size="4" face="Arial">e</font></font><font size="4" face="Arial"><font size="4" face="Arial">r</font></font></b></font></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">Reintroduction of wolves is often advocated because it is seen as something good in itself (see for instance Mech 1995). It is often believed that restoring ecosystems previously existing is something </font></font></font>environmentally valuable (for a criticism of this view, see Shelton 2004). However, there are other reasons why their reintroduction has been defended. In the Scottish Highlands this measure has been debated recently on the claim that the red deer population has grown too much and is causing significant damage to the local vegetation by grazing.</p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">It has been claimed that the reintroduction of wolves would reverse this process. This claim is based on conclusions drawn from what happened in Yellowstone National Park in the USA in the last</font> <font face="Georgia">decades, where wolf reintroduction was carried out in 1995 and 1996. The last wolves originally living in this park in Yellowstone had been killed by 1926. However, after much debate, seventy years later 31 </font></font></font>Mackenzie Valley wolves taken from Canada were brought to the park. Since then, their numbers have grown up to 124 in 2008 (Smith et al. 2009). Many people find it aesthetic to have wolves back in Yellowstone, and this was one of the reasons why they were reintroduced. But this measure was also carried out in an attempt to restore the trophic chain preexisting the elimination of wolves in the park some decades earlier. The reason for this was that, in the absence of wolves, elk were free to move around in the park and flourish, even though for decades humans hunted them in huge numbers. And it was been argued that they were “overgrazing” some of the park areas. This claim was seriously disputed (Yellowstone National Park, National Park Service 2009). But, environmentalists were nevertheless worried about this because elk were grazing one particular plant. They were eating the young aspen shoots before they grew up, so these trees were not reproducing. For this reason, after much discussion, reintroducing the wolves was assumed to be the only reliable way to stop this process.</p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">What are the grounds for this? How can wolves prevent ungulates from eating the tree shoots? Of course, one way is by killing them and thus reducing their number—it is estimated that around 22 elk per wolf are killed each year in the park (White et al. 2005, 36), and that since wolf reintroduction, the northern Yellowstone elk herd has declined by around 50% or more (Smith 2005, 23; White et al. 2005, 35–36). However, the key factor here is something else. It is fear. If wolves are around, their potential victims fear grazing in open meadows, since these are places in which wolves can see them much more easily. So they have to hide in the woods and get their food from bushes and low tree branches (see Ripple and Larsen 2000; Ripple and Beschta 2007; see also Preisser et al. 2005). That is the reason why the resultant biotic relations that arise from this have received the name “ecology of fear”. And the landscape resulting from this, in which even though there are herbivores living in the area they do not</font> <font face="Georgia">graze in open fields, has been called “landscape of fear” (Laundre, J. W. et al. 2010).</font></font></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">Now, the way in which herbivores are harmed by this seems clear. The harm that is inflicted on them is not reduced to their killing, but includes their suffering as well. Fear can be an extremely distressing feeling. And this is not the only way in which they are harmed by the reintroduction of wolves. They also get poorer nourishment as a result of it. This, again, has been observed in Yellowstone: because the elk no longer dare to feed out of the woods, their nutrition had been notably worse since the arrival of the wolves (Christianson and Creel 2010). (In fact, this was, together with the killings, one reason why their population declined. Elk are weaker and more liable to die for other reasons, and they have less offspring [Creel et al. 2009]). We can thus conclude that this kind of measure imposes significant harm on the herbivores who are subjected to an ecology of fear. We could also assume that, on the other hand, this measure benefits wolves. But this would be a controversial claim. Reintroductions do not benefit the actual wolves that are captured, transported and released into an unknown environment. They would be better off if they were left alone in the places they came from (unless they were starving there, or being harmed in some other way). We could nevertheless say that the measure would benefit those wolves who would exist in the future. To make this claim, however, we need to assume an impersonal conception of the good according to which we are benefiting future beings by making it possible that they would exist (a view that entails, for instance, that if we do not have children we are failing to do something good—at least in some respect—for some potential beings). This is a very controversial claim. At any rate, considering the numbers of ungulates and wolves involved (recall that an average of 22 elk per wolf were killed each year in Yellowstone), it seems clear that even if we accept this claim we will still have to conclude that the harm the measure imposes on some animals clearly overshadows the benefits it may bring to others.</font></font></font></p>
<p align="left"></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><b><font size="4" face="Arial"><font size="4" face="Arial">3. A Clearly Different Consideration of Interests</font></font></b></font></font></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">The reintroduction of wolves is never met without significant controversy. Many people strongly oppose it. But the arguments for this do not have to do with the interests of nonhuman animals.</font></font></font></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">Farmers of neighboring areas are some of those who most strongly object to the reintroduction of wolves. They complain that the wolves might kill some of the animals they keep on their property. Of course, their concern is not the good of these animals (after all, they are being raised to be eventually sent by the farmers themselves to be killed). Rather, it is clear that the interest that the farmers have in not having the wolves around is an economic interest. Together with them, hunters often oppose these measures, in order to have more ungulates available for them to hunt. (Alleged concern for wolf attacks on humans is also sometimes expressed as a reason against their reintroduction. However, these attacks are so extremely rare that this seems to be an argument that is simply used by those who oppose the presence of wolves for the other reasons mentioned above, rather than something that may actually be of concern to them).</font></font></font></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">Now, if we compare the weight of the different interests involved there is an obvious contrast. An interest in not gaining some more money or in getting some entertainment in killing animals is clearly </font></font></font></font>less significant than an interest in not losing one’s life (either by the action of a wolf or by a human hunter). And it is also inferior to an interest in not being subjected to continuous fear and in not being forced to be malnourished. However, the former can be crucial in stopping these measures from being carried out, while the latter are not given any consideration whatsoever. Complaints by farmers and <font face="Georgia" style="font-family: Georgia;">hunters are usually taken seriously, while concern for the wellbeing of nonhuman animals is not even regarded as a serious concern. How can this be? The answer is obvious. The different interests involved in the issue are not being considered according to the weight they actually have for those who possess them. Rather, they are assessed in accordance to whether or not they are possessed by humans. It is</font> <font face="Georgia" style="font-family: Georgia;">clear that if humans, rather than ungulates, were killed and caused to suffer, reintroduction of wolves would not be even discussed. This entails that at least one of the following statements is right:</font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">a. Wolf reintroduction would be a good measure even if a number of humans were killed, terrified and starved due to it.</font></font></font></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">b. Wolf reintroduction may be considered unacceptable because of the ways in which it harms the animals they hunt.</font></font></font></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">c. The interests of humans and nonhumans have to be considered in completely different ways.</font></font></font></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">For most people, (a) cannot be considered acceptable. This includes those theorists who have defended what has been called the land ethic and other environmentalist viewpoints (see for instance </font></font></font></font>Callicott 1990, 103; 2000, 211). If we grant this to be right, we are left with the question of whether it is (b) or (c) we must accept. In order to examine this, I will now consider whether claim (c) can be justified.</p>
<p></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><b><font size="4" face="Arial"><font size="4" face="Arial">Questioning Anthropocentric Speciesism</font></font></b></font></font></font></font></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">The view that humans’ interests must be taken into account in ways in which nonhumans’ ones need not be considered has been put forward in several different ways. Its defenses can be grouped into five general categories. First of all, this idea is often taken for granted, or assumed to be right by mere definition. It is claimed that it should be obvious that humans’ interests should count for more than </font></font></font></font></font><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">nonhumans’ ones. This view offers no argument in support of the claim it is defending. But there are other ways in which this perspective can be defended. For instance, it is sometimes claimed that we should assume it because humans have an ontological status higher than that of other animals, or because humans are God’s chosen species (see Aristotle 1998, 1254a–1256b; Reichmann 2000). These claims appeal to intrinsic features or to relations whose existence cannot be verified, nor falsified by any means. There is no way in which we may</font> <font face="Georgia">verify that all humans and no other animal have these features or relations, because there is no way in which we can test whether</font> <i><font face="Georgia">anyone</font></i> <font face="Georgia">at all can have them. In this way, these claims are similar to definitional ones. They just assume in some way that humans have some sort of privileged status, which is what they would need to prove. So they fail to justify the idea that human interests are morally more important than nonhumans are. But, apart from these ones, there are other ways in which the predominance of human interests has been defended. It has been also </font></font></font></font></font>claimed that humans have certain features (consisting, basically, of certain intellectual capacities), which no nonhuman animal possesses. And it has been maintained that those features are the</p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">ones that should determine that someone must be morally considered (see, for instance, Descartes 1932; or, in more recent times, Carruthers 1992). Besides, it has been argued in other cases </font></font></font></font></font>that humans have some special relations of solidarity, sympathy or power in which nonhuman animals are not engaged, and that it is this that determines whether or not we should morally consider them (see, for instance, Whewell 1852, 223). However, as many of those who have worked in animal ethics have pointed out, these arguments fail to draw a line separating humans from nonhumans. There are many humans such as infants and those with cognitive disabilities who lack the mentioned intellectual capacities. And there are also humans who are alone and powerless, and thus fail to have the relations considered to be relevant according to these arguments. This means that if we want to <font face="Georgia" style="font-family: Georgia;">defend the moral consideration of all human beings, we cannot assume the moral relevance of criteria that exclude nonhumans. This argument may drive us to reject the idea that these criteria are morally relevant, something which we may also conclude by means of a different argument, if we consider what follows. Having certain capacities or relations is something that can make us liable to be harmed or benefited in certain ways. But it is not what determines that we can be harmed or benefited</font> <i style="font-family: Georgia;"><font face="Georgia">as such</font></i><font face="Georgia" style="font-family: Georgia;">. This is determined,</font> <font face="Georgia" style="font-family: Georgia;">rather, by the fact that we are sentient beings, who can have positive and negative experiences. Hence,</font> <i style="font-family: Georgia;"><font face="Georgia">if</font></i> <font face="Georgia" style="font-family: Georgia;">we want to make our decisions according to what can be good or bad for those who may be affected by them, we need to consider what is relevant for them to be harmed </font>or benefited. If we accept this argument based on an appeal to relevance, we will reject any criteria for moral consideration which differs from sentiency. Hence, I conclude that all the defenses of the predominance of human interests fail, so we cannot consider this view to be justified. If this is right, we must conclude that such a position is a form of speciesist discrimination.</p>
<p align="left"></p>
<p align="left"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia"><font face="Georgia">The complete paper is available here -<br/> <a href="http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1114&context=bts">http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1114&context=bts</a></font></font></font></font></font></p>Killing Animals That Don't Fit In: Moral Dimensions of Habitat Restoration - by Jo-Ann Shelton.tag:arzone.ning.com,2011-11-26:4715978:BlogPost:734472011-11-26T11:37:01.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<p>"I am not suggesting that we abandon our desire to conserve other species, but rather that we develop a system of values which would accommodate the interests of all animals, not just those to which we choose to give preference in our own particular decade or century.<br></br><br></br>The reasons for shooting bison and shooting feral sheep are similar in that both species were targeted for eradication because they violated our idea of what a particular landscape should look like, and our preference…</p>
<p>"I am not suggesting that we abandon our desire to conserve other species, but rather that we develop a system of values which would accommodate the interests of all animals, not just those to which we choose to give preference in our own particular decade or century.<br/><br/>The reasons for shooting bison and shooting feral sheep are similar in that both species were targeted for eradication because they violated our idea of what a particular landscape should look like, and our preference for how the land should be used. Thus, although we may believe that our attitudes toward the natural world have undergone a fundamental conversion, and that we are now more sensitive to the interests of other species, we are actually following a very old paradigm: we exterminate, without moral reservation, any species we determine to be a "misfit".<br/>(Jo-Ann Shelton).<br/><br/><a href="http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=bts">http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=bts</a></p>The Meat Eaters: Would the controlled extinction of carnivorus species be a good thing? - by Jeff McMahantag:arzone.ning.com,2011-02-27:4715978:BlogPost:218902011-02-27T18:07:35.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<div class="post-1414 post type-post hentry category-participants category-animals category-current-controversies category-humans tag-animals tag-humans tag-morality tag-responsibility tag-species" id="post-1414"><div class="post"><h1>The Meat Eaters</h1>
</div>
<div class="post"><div style="float: right; padding: 15px;"><br></br><a href="http://www.sympoze.com/">Sympoze</a></div>
</div>
<div class="post-bodycopy clearfix"><h4>Would the controlled extinction of carnivorous species be a good…</h4>
</div>
</div>
<div class="post-1414 post type-post hentry category-participants category-animals category-current-controversies category-humans tag-animals tag-humans tag-morality tag-responsibility tag-species" id="post-1414"><div class="post"><h1>The Meat Eaters</h1>
</div>
<div class="post"><div style="float: right; padding: 15px;"> <br/><a href="http://www.sympoze.com/">Sympoze</a></div>
</div>
<div class="post-bodycopy clearfix"><h4>Would the controlled extinction of carnivorous species be a good thing?</h4>
<p>by <strong><a href="http://philosophy.rutgers.edu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=114&Itemid=210">Jeff McMahan</a></strong><br/>Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University</p>
<p>Viewed from a distance, the natural world often presents a vista of sublime, majestic placidity. Yet beneath the foliage and hidden from the distant eye, a vast, unceasing slaughter rages. Wherever there is animal life, predators are stalking, chasing, capturing, killing, and devouring their prey. Agonized suffering and violent death are ubiquitous and continuous. This hidden carnage provided one ground for the philosophical pessimism of Schopenhauer, who contended that “one simple test of the claim that the pleasure in the world outweighs the pain…is to compare the feelings of an animal that is devouring another with those of the animal being devoured.”</p>
<p>The continuous, incalculable suffering of animals is also an important though largely neglected element in the traditional theological “problem of evil” — the problem of reconciling the existence of evil with the existence of a benevolent, omnipotent god. The suffering of animals is particularly challenging because it is not amenable to the familiar palliative explanations of human suffering. Animals are assumed not to have free will and thus to be unable either to choose evil or deserve to suffer it. Neither are they assumed to have immortal souls; hence there can be no expectation that they will be compensated for their suffering in a celestial afterlife. Nor do they appear to be conspicuously elevated or ennobled by the final suffering they endure in a predator’s jaws. Theologians have had enough trouble explaining to their human flocks why a loving god permits them to suffer; but their labors will not be over even if they are finally able to justify the ways of God to man. For God must answer to animals as well.</p>
<p>If I had been in a position to design and create a world, I would have tried to arrange for all conscious individuals to be able to survive without tormenting and killing other conscious individuals. I hope most other people would have done the same. Certainly this and related ideas have been entertained since human beings began to reflect on the fearful nature of their world — for example, when the prophet Isaiah, writing in the 8th century B.C.E., sketched a few of the elements of his utopian vision. He began with the abandonment of war: “They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation.” But human beings would not be the only ones to change; animals would join us in universal veganism: “The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and the little child shall lead them. And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young ones shall lie down together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox.” (Isaiah 2: 4 and 11: 6–7)</p>
<p>Isaiah was, of course, looking to the future rather than indulging in whimsical fantasies of doing a better job of Creation, and we should do the same. We should start by withdrawing our own participation in the mass orgy of preying and feeding upon the weak.</p>
<p>Our own form of predation is of course more refined than those of other meat-eaters, who must capture their prey and tear it apart as it struggles to escape. We instead employ professionals to breed our prey in captivity and prepare their bodies for us behind a veil of propriety, so that our sensibilities are spared the recognition that we too are predators, red in tooth if not in claw (though some of us, for reasons I have never understood, do go to the trouble to paint their vestigial claws a sanguinary hue). The reality behind the veil is, however, far worse than that in the natural world. Our factory farms, which supply most of the meat and eggs consumed in developed societies, inflict a lifetime of misery and torment on our prey, in contrast to the relatively brief agonies endured by the victims of predators in the wild. From the moral perspective, there is nothing that can plausibly be said in defense of this practice. To be entitled to regard ourselves as civilized, we must, like Isaiah’s morally reformed lion, eat straw like the ox, or at least the moral equivalent of straw.</p>
<p>But ought we to go further? Suppose that we could arrange the gradual extinction of carnivorous species, replacing them with new herbivorous ones. Or suppose that we could intervene genetically, so that currently carnivorous species would gradually evolve into herbivorous ones, thereby fulfilling Isaiah’s prophecy. If we could bring about the end of predation by one or the other of these means at little cost to ourselves, ought we to do it?</p>
<p>I concede, of course, that it would be unwise to attempt any such change given the current state of our scientific understanding. Our ignorance of the potential ramifications of our interventions in the natural world remains profound. Efforts to eliminate certain species and create new ones would have many unforeseeable and potentially catastrophic effects..</p>
<p>Perhaps one of the more benign scenarios is that action to reduce predation would create a Malthusian dystopia in the animal world, with higher birth rates among herbivores, overcrowding, and insufficient resources to sustain the larger populations. Instead of being killed quickly by predators, the members of species that once were prey would die slowly, painfully, and in greater numbers from starvation and disease.</p>
<p>Yet our relentless efforts to increase individual wealth and power are already causing massive, precipitate changes in the natural world. Many thousands of animal species either have been or are being driven to extinction as a side effect of our activities. Knowing this, we have thus far been largely unwilling even to moderate our rapacity to mitigate these effects. If, however, we were to become more amenable to exercising restraint, it is conceivable that we could do so in a selective manner, favoring the survival of some species over others. The question might then arise whether to modify our activities in ways that would favor the survival of herbivorous rather than carnivorous species.</p>
<p>At a minimum, we ought to be clear in advance about the values that should guide such choices if they ever arise, or if our scientific knowledge ever advances to a point at which we could seek to eliminate, alter, or replace certain species with a high degree of confidence in our predictions about the short- and long-term effects of our action. Rather than continuing to collide with the natural world with reckless indifference, we should prepare ourselves now to be able to act wisely and deliberately when the range of our choices eventually expands.</p>
<p>The suggestion that we consider whether and how we might exercise control over the prospects of different animal species, perhaps eventually selecting some for extinction and others for survival in accordance with our moral values, will undoubtedly strike most people as an instance of potentially tragic hubris, presumptuousness on a cosmic scale. The accusation most likely to be heard is that we would be “playing God,” impiously usurping prerogatives that belong to the deity alone. This has been a familiar refrain in the many instances in which devotees of one religion or another have sought to obstruct attempts to mitigate human suffering by, for example, introducing new medicines or medical practices, permitting and even facilitating suicide, legalizing a constrained practice of euthanasia, and so on. So it would be surprising if this same claim were not brought into service in opposition to the reduction of suffering among animals as well. Yet there are at least two good replies to it.</p>
<p>One is that it singles out deliberate, morally-motivated action for special condemnation, while implicitly sanctioning morally neutral action that foreseeably has the same effects, as long as those effects are not intended. One plays God, for example, if one administers a lethal injection to a patient at her own request in order to end her agony, but not if one gives her a largely ineffective analgesic only to mitigate the agony, though knowing that it will kill her as a side effect. But it is hard to believe that any self-respecting deity would be impressed by the distinction. If the first act encroaches on divine prerogatives, the second does as well.</p>
<p>The second response to the accusation of playing God is simple and decisive. It is that there is no deity whose prerogatives we might usurp. To the extent that these matters are up to anyone, they are up to us alone. Since it is too late to prevent human action from affecting the prospects for survival of many animal species, we ought to guide and control the effects of our action to the greatest extent we can in order to bring about the morally best, or least bad, outcomes that remain possible.</p>
<p>Another equally unpersuasive objection to the suggestion that we ought to eliminate carnivorism if we could do so without major ecological disruption is that this would be “against Nature.” This slogan also has a long history of deployment in crusades to ensure that human cultures remain primitive. And like the appeal to the sovereignty of a deity, it too presupposes an indefensible metaphysics. Nature is not a purposive agent, much less a wise one. There is no reason to suppose that a species has special sanctity simply because it arose in the natural process of evolution.</p>
<p>Many people believe that what happens among animals in the wild is not our responsibility, and indeed that what they do among themselves is none of our business. They have their own forms of life, quite different from our own, and we have no right to intrude upon them or to impose our anthropocentric values on them.</p>
<p>There is an element of truth in this view, which is that our moral reason to prevent harm for which we would not be responsible is weaker than our reason not to cause harm. Our primary duty with respect to animals is therefore to stop tormenting and killing them as a means of satisfying our desire to taste certain flavors or to decorate our bodies in certain ways. But if suffering is bad for animals when we cause it, it is also bad for them when other animals cause it. That suffering is bad for those who experience it is not a human prejudice; nor is an effort to prevent wild animals from suffering a moralistic attempt to police the behavior of other animals. Even if we are not morally <em>required</em> to prevent suffering among animals in the wild for which we are not responsible, we do have a moral <em>reason</em> to prevent it, just as we have a general moral reason to prevent suffering among human beings that is independent both of the cause of the suffering and of our relation to the victims. The main constraint on the permissibility of acting on our reason to prevent suffering is that our action should not cause bad effects that would be worse than those we would prevent.</p>
<p>That is the central issue raised by whether we ought to try to eliminate carnivorism. Because the elimination of carnivorism would require the extinction of carnivorous species, or at least their radical genetic alteration, which might be equivalent or tantamount to extinction, it might well be that the losses in value would outweigh any putative gains. Not only are most or all animal species of some instrumental value, but it is also arguable that all species have intrinsic value. As Ronald Dworkin has observed, “we tend to treat distinct animal species (though not individual animals) as sacred. We think it very important, and worth a considerable economic expense, to protect endangered species from destruction.” When Dworkin says that animal species are sacred, he means that their existence is good in a way that need not be good <em>for</em> anyone; nor is it good in the sense that it would be better if there were more species, so that we would have reason to create new ones if we could. “Few people,” he notes, “believe the world would be worse if there had always been fewer species of birds, and few would think it important to engineer new bird species if that were possible. What we believe important is not that there be any particular number of species but that a species that now exists not be extinguished by us.”</p>
<p>The intrinsic value of individual species is thus quite distinct from the value of species diversity. It also seems to follow from Dworkin’s claims that the loss involved in the extinction of an existing species cannot be compensated for, either fully or perhaps even partially, by the coming-into-existence of a new species.</p>
<p>The basic issue, then, seems to be a conflict between values: prevention of suffering and preservation of animal species. It is relatively uncontroversial that suffering is intrinsically <em>bad for</em> those who experience it, even if occasionally it is also instrumentally good for them, as when it has the purifying, redemptive effects that Dostoyevsky’s characters so often crave. Nor is it controversial that the extinction of an animal species is normally instrumentally bad. It is bad for the individual members who die and bad for other individuals and species that depended on the existence of the species for their own well-being or survival. Yet the extinction of an animal species is not necessarily bad for its individual members. (To indulge in science fiction, suppose that a chemical might be introduced into their food supply that would induce sterility but also extend their longevity.) And the extinction of a carnivorous species could be instrumentally good for all those animals that would otherwise have been its prey. That simple fact is precisely what prompts the question whether it would be good if carnivorous species were to become extinct.</p>
<p>The conflict, therefore, must be between preventing suffering and respecting the alleged sacredness — or, as I would phrase it, the <em>impersonal</em> value — of carnivorous species. Again, the claim that suffering is bad for those who experience it and thus ought in general to be prevented when possible cannot be seriously doubted. Yet the idea that individual animal species have value in themselves is less obvious. What, after all, <em>are</em> species? According to Darwin, they “are merely artificial combinations made for convenience.” They are collections of individuals distinguished by biologists that shade into one another over time and sometimes blur together even among contemporaneous individuals, as in the case of ring species. There are no universally agreed criteria for their individuation. In practice, the most commonly invoked criterion is the capacity for interbreeding, yet this is well known to be imperfect and to entail intransitivities of classification when applied to ring species. Nor has it ever been satisfactorily explained why a special sort of value should inhere in a collection of individuals simply by virtue of their ability to produce fertile offspring. If it is good, as I think it is, that animal life should continue, then it is instrumentally good that some animals can breed with one another. But I can see no reason to suppose that donkeys, as a group, have a special impersonal value that mules lack.</p>
<p>Even if animal species did have impersonal value, it would not follow that they were irreplaceable. Since animals first appeared on earth, an indefinite number of species have become extinct while an indefinite number of new species have arisen. If the appearance of new species cannot make up for the extinction of others, and if the earth could not simultaneously sustain all the species that have ever existed, it seems that it would have been better if the earliest species had never become extinct, with the consequence that the later ones would never have existed. But few of us, with our high regard for our own species, are likely to embrace that implication.</p>
<p>Here, then, is where matters stand thus far. It would be good to prevent the vast suffering and countless violent deaths caused by predation. There is therefore one reason to think that it would be instrumentally good if predatory animal species were to become extinct and be replaced by new herbivorous species, provided that this could occur without ecological upheaval involving more harm than would be prevented by the end of predation. The claim that existing animal species are sacred or irreplaceable is subverted by the moral irrelevance of the criteria for individuating animal species. I am therefore inclined to embrace the heretical conclusion that we have reason to desire the extinction of all carnivorous species, and I await the usual fate of heretics when this article is opened to comment.</p>
<p><span class="st_sharethis"><span class="stButton"><span class="chicklets sharethis"> </span></span></span></p>
</div>
<div class="post"></div>
<div class="post"></div>
<div class="post">September 18th, 2010 | Tags <a rel="tag" href="http://onthehuman.org/tag/animals/">animals</a>, <a rel="tag" href="http://onthehuman.org/tag/humans/">humans</a>, <a rel="tag" href="http://onthehuman.org/tag/morality/">morality</a>, <a rel="tag" href="http://onthehuman.org/tag/responsibility/">responsibility</a>, <a rel="tag" href="http://onthehuman.org/tag/species/">species</a> | Category: <a rel="category tag" href="http://onthehuman.org/category/participants/" title="View all posts in Participants">Participants</a>, <a rel="category tag" href="http://onthehuman.org/category/animals/" title="View all posts in animals">animals</a>, <a rel="category tag" href="http://onthehuman.org/category/current-controversies/" title="View all posts in current controversies">current controversies</a>, <a rel="category tag" href="http://onthehuman.org/category/humans/" title="View all posts in humans">humans</a></div>
</div>The Abolitionist Project - by David Pearcetag:arzone.ning.com,2011-02-12:4715978:BlogPost:202092011-02-12T11:38:28.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<h2>THE ABOLITIONIST PROJECT</h2>
<br></br>
<h3>INTRODUCTION</h3>
This talk is about suffering and how to get rid of it.<br></br>I predict we will abolish suffering throughout the living world. <br></br>Our descendants will be animated by gradients of genetically preprogrammed well-being that are orders of magnitude richer than today's peak experiences.
<p>First, I'm going to outline why it's <i>technically</i> feasible to abolish the biological substrates of any kind of unpleasant experience -…</p>
<h2>THE ABOLITIONIST PROJECT</h2>
<br/>
<h3>INTRODUCTION</h3>
This talk is about suffering and how to get rid of it.<br/>I predict we will abolish suffering throughout the living world. <br/>Our descendants will be animated by gradients of genetically preprogrammed well-being that are orders of magnitude richer than today's peak experiences.
<p>First, I'm going to outline why it's <i>technically</i> feasible to abolish the biological substrates of any kind of unpleasant experience - psychological pain as well as physical pain.<br/>Secondly, I'm going to argue for the overriding <i>moral</i> urgency of the abolitionist project, whether or not one is any kind of ethical utilitarian.<br/>Thirdly, I'm going to argue why a revolution in biotechnology means it's going to happen, albeit not nearly as fast as it should.</p>
<p> </p>
<h3>1: WHY IT IS TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE</h3>
Sadly, what <i>won't</i> abolish suffering, or at least not on its own, is socio-economic reform, or exponential economic growth, or technological progress in the usual sense, or any of the traditional panaceas for solving the world's ills. Improving the external environment is admirable and important; but such improvement can't recalibrate our hedonic treadmill above a genetically constrained ceiling. Twin studies confirm there is a [partially] heritable set-point of well-being - or ill-being - around which we all tend to fluctuate over the course of a lifetime. This set-point varies between individuals. [It's possible to <i>lower</i> our hedonic set-point by inflicting prolonged uncontrolled stress; but even this re-set is not as easy as it sounds: suicide-rates typically go down in wartime; and six months after a quadriplegia-inducing accident, studies<sup><a href="http://www.abolitionist.com/darwinian-life/happiness.html">1</a></sup> suggest that we are typically neither more nor less unhappy than we were before the catastrophic event.] Unfortunately, attempts to build an ideal society can't overcome this biological ceiling, whether utopias of the left or right, free-market or socialist, religious or secular, futuristic high-tech or simply cultivating one's garden. Even if <i>everything</i> that traditional futurists have asked for is delivered - eternal youth, unlimited material wealth, morphological freedom, superintelligence, immersive VR, molecular nanotechnology, etc - there is no evidence that our subjective quality of life would on average significantly surpass the quality of life of our hunter-gatherer ancestors - or a New Guinea tribesman today - in the absence of reward pathway enrichment. This claim is difficult to prove in the absence of sophisticated neuroscanning; but objective indices of psychological distress e.g. suicide rates, bear it out. <i>Un</i>enhanced humans will still be prey to the spectrum of Darwinian emotions, ranging from terrible suffering to petty disappointments and frustrations - sadness, anxiety, jealousy, existential angst. Their biology is part of "what it means to be human". Subjectively unpleasant states of consciousness exist because they were genetically adaptive. Each of our core emotions had a distinct signalling role in our evolutionary past: they tended to promote behaviours which enhanced the inclusive fitness of our genes in the ancestral environment.<br/>
<p>So if manipulating our external environment alone can never abolish suffering and malaise, what <i>does</i> technically work?</p>
<p>Here are three scenarios in ascending order of sociological plausibility:</p>
<p> </p>
<blockquote><b>a) wireheading <br/>b) utopian designer drugs<br/>c) genetic engineering</b> and - what I want to focus on - the impending <b>reproductive revolution</b> of designer babies<p><b>a)</b> Recall <b>wireheading</b> is direct stimulation of the pleasure centres of the brain via implanted electrodes. Intracranial self-stimulation shows no physiological or subjective tolerance i.e. it's just as rewarding after two days as it is after two minutes. Wireheading doesn't harm others; it has a small ecological footprint; it banishes psychological and physical pain; and arguably it's a lot less offensive to human dignity than having sex. Admittedly, lifelong wireheading sounds an appealing prospect only to a handful of severe depressives. But what are the <i>technical</i> arguments against its adoption?</p>
<p>Well, wireheading is not an evolutionarily stable solution: there would be selection pressure against its widespread adoption. Wireheading doesn't promote nurturing behaviour: wireheads, whether human or non-human, don't want to raise baby wireheads. <i>Uniform</i>, indiscriminate bliss in the guise of wireheading or its equivalents would effectively bring the human experiment to an end, at least if it were adopted globally. Direct neurostimulation of the reward centres destroys informational sensitivity to environmental stimuli. So assuming we want to be smart - and become smarter - we have a choice. Intelligent agents can have a motivational structure based on gradients of ill-being, characteristic of some lifelong depressives today. Or intelligent agents can have our current typical mixture of pleasures and pains. Or alternatively, we could have an informational economy of mind based entirely on [adaptive] gradients of cerebral bliss - which I'm going to argue for.</p>
<p>Actually, this dismissal of wireheading may be too quick. In the far future, one can't rule out offloading <i>everything</i> unpleasant or mundane onto inorganic supercomputers, prostheses and robots while we enjoy uniform orgasmic bliss. Or maybe not orgasmic bliss, possibly some other family of ideal states that simply couldn't be improved upon. But that's speculative. Whatever our ultimate destination, it would be more prudent, I think, to aim for both superhappiness and superintelligence - at least until we understand the full implications of what we are doing. There isn't a moral urgency to maximizing superhappiness in the same way as there is to abolishing suffering.</p>
<p>[It's worth noting that the offloading option assumes that inorganic computers, prostheses and robots don't - or at least needn't - experience subjective phenomenal pain even if their functional architecture allows them to avoid and respond to noxious stimuli. This absence of inorganic suffering is relatively uncontroversial with existing computers - switching off one's PC doesn't have ethical implications, and a silicon robot can be programmed to avoid corrosive acids without experiencing agony if it's damaged. It's debatable whether any computational system with a classical von Neumann architecture will ever be interestingly conscious. I'm sceptical; but either way, it doesn't affect the offloading option, unless one argues that the subjective texture of suffering is functionally essential to <i>any</i> system capable of avoiding harmful stimuli.]</p>
<p><b>b)</b> The second technical option for eradicating suffering is futuristic <b>designer drugs</b>. In an era of mature post-genomic medicine, will it be possible rationally to design truly ideal pleasure-drugs that deliver lifelong, high-functioning well-being without unacceptable side-effects? "Ideal pleasure drugs" here is just a piece of shorthand. Such drugs can in principle embrace cerebral, empathetic, aesthetic and perhaps spiritual well-being - and not just hedonistic pleasure in the usual one-dimensional and amoral sense. <br/>We're <i>not</i> talking here about recreational euphoriants, which simply activate the negative feedback mechanisms of the brain; nor the shallow, opiated contentment of a Brave New World; nor drugs that induce euphoric mania, with its uncontrolled excitement, loss of critical insight, grandiosity and flight of ideas. Can we develop true wonderdrugs that deliver sublime well-being on a sustainable basis, recalibrating the hedonic treadmill to ensure a high quality of life for everyone?</p>
<p>A lot of people recoil from the word "drugs" - which is understandable given today's noxious street drugs and their uninspiring medical counterparts. Yet even academics and intellectuals in our society typically take the prototypical dumb drug, ethyl alcohol. If it's socially acceptable to take a drug that makes you temporarily happy and stupid, then why not rationally design drugs to make people perpetually happier and smarter? Presumably, in order to limit abuse-potential, one would want any ideal pleasure drug to be akin - in one limited but important sense - to nicotine, where the smoker's brain finely calibrates its optimal level: there is no uncontrolled dose-escalation.</p>
<p>There are of course all kinds of pitfalls to drug-based solutions. Technically, I think these pitfalls can be overcome, though I won't try to show this here. But there is a deeper issue. If there weren't something fundamentally wrong - or at least fundamentally inadequate - with our existing natural state of consciousness bequeathed by evolution, then we wouldn't be so keen to change it. Even when it's not unpleasant, everyday consciousness is <i>mediocre</i> compared to what we call peak experiences. Ordinary everyday consciousness was presumably adaptive in the sense it helped our genes leave more copies of themselves on the African savannah; but why keep it as our default-state indefinitely? Why not change human nature by literally repairing our genetic code?</p>
<p>Again, this dismissal of pharmacological solutions may be too quick. Arguably, utopian designer drugs may always be useful for the <i>fine-grained</i> and readily reversible control of consciousness; and I think designer drugs will be an indispensable tool to explore the disparate varieties of conscious mind. But wouldn't it be better if we were all <i>born</i> with a genetic predisposition to psychological superhealth rather than needing chronic self-medication? Does even the most ardent abolitionist propose to give cocktails of drugs to all children from birth; and then to take such drug cocktails for the rest of our lives?</p>
<p><b>c)</b> So thirdly, there are <b>genetic</b> solutions, embracing both somatic and germline therapy.<br/>By way of context, today there is a minority of people who are always depressed or dysthymic, albeit to varying degrees. Studies with mono- and dizygotic twins confirm there is a high degree of genetic loading for depression. Conversely, there are some people who are temperamentally optimistic. Beyond the optimists, there is a very small minority of people who are what psychiatrists call hyperthymic. Hyperthymic people aren't manic or bipolar; but by contemporary standards, they are always exceedingly happy, albeit sometimes happier than others. Hyperthymic people respond "appropriately" and adaptively to their environment. Indeed they are characteristically energetic, productive and creative. Even when they are blissful, they aren't "blissed out".</p>
<p><b><i>Now what if, as a whole civilisation, we were to opt to become genetically hyperthymic - to adopt a motivational system driven entirely by adaptive gradients of well-being? More radically, as the genetic basis of hedonic tone is understood, might we opt to add multiple extra copies of hyperthymia-promoting genes/allelic combinations and their regulatory promoters - not abolishing homeostasis and the hedonic treadmill but shifting our hedonic set-point to a vastly higher level?</i></b></p>
<p>Three points here:<br/>First, this genetic recalibration might seem to be endorsing another kind of uniformity; but it's worth recalling that happier people - and especially hyperdopaminergic people - are typically responsive to a broader range of potentially rewarding stimuli than depressives: they engage in more exploratory behaviour. This makes getting stuck in a sub-optimal rut less likely, both for the enhanced individual and posthuman society as a whole.</p>
<p>Secondly, universal hyperthymia might sound like a gigantic experiment; and in a sense of course it is. But <i>all</i> sexual reproduction is an experiment. We play genetic roulette, shuffling our genes and then throwing the genetic dice. Most of us flinch at the word "eugenics"; but that's what we're effectively practising, crudely and incompetently, when we choose our prospective mates. The difference is that within the next few decades, prospective parents will be able to act progressively more rationally and responsibly in their reproductive decisions. Pre-implantation diagnosis is going to become routine; artificial wombs will release us from the constraints of the human birth-canal; and a revolution in reproductive medicine will begin to replace the old Darwinian lottery. The question is not whether a reproductive revolution is coming, but rather what kinds of being - and what kinds of consciousness - do we want to create?</p>
<p>Thirdly, isn't this reproductive revolution going to be the prerogative of rich elites in the West? Probably not for long. Compare the brief lag between the introduction of, say, mobile phones and their world-wide adoption with the 50 year time-lag between the introduction and world-wide adoption of radio; and the 20 year lag between the introduction and world-wide penetration of television. The time-lag between the initial introduction and global acceptance of new technologies is shrinking rapidly. So of course is the price.</p>
<p> </p>
</blockquote>
Anyway, one of the advantages of genetically recalibrating the hedonic treadmill rather than abolishing it altogether, at least for the foreseeable future, is that the <i>functional</i> analogues of pain, anxiety, guilt and even depression can be preserved without their nasty raw feels as we understand them today. We can retain the functional analogues of discontent - arguably the motor of progress - and retain the discernment and critical insight lacking in the euphorically manic. Even if hedonic tone is massively enhanced, and even if our reward centres are physically and functionally amplified, then it's still possible <i>in principle</i> to conserve much of our existing preference architecture. If you prefer Mozart to Beethoven, or philosophy to pushpin, then you can still retain this preference ranking even if your hedonic tone is hugely enriched.<br/>
<p>Now personally, I think it would be better if our preference architecture were radically changed, and we pursued [please pardon the jargon] a "re-encephalisation of emotion". Evolution via natural selection has left us strongly predisposed to form all manner of dysfunctional preferences that harm both ourselves and others for the benefit of our genes. Recall Genghis Khan: “The greatest happiness is to scatter your enemy, to drive him before you, to see his cities reduced to ashes, to see those who love him shrouded in tears, and to gather into your bosom his wives and daughters.”</p>
<p>Now I'm told academia isn't quite that bad, but even university life has its forms of urbane savagery - its competitive status-seeking and alpha-male dominance rituals: a zero-sum game with many losers. Too many of our preferences reflect nasty behaviours and states of mind that were genetically adaptive in the ancestral environment. Instead, wouldn't it be better if we rewrote our own corrupt code? I've focused here on genetically enhancing hedonic tone. Yet mastery of the biology of emotion means that we'll be able, for instance, to enlarge our capacity for <i>empathy</i>, functionally amplifying mirror neurons and engineering a sustained increase in oxytocin-release to promote trust and sociability. Likewise, we can identify the molecular signatures of, say, spirituality, our aesthetic sense, or our sense of humour - and modulate and "over-express" their psychological machinery too. From an information-theoretic perspective, what is critical to an adaptive, flexible, intelligent response to the world is not our absolute point on a hedonic scale but that we are informationally sensitive to differences. Indeed information theorists sometimes simply <i>define</i> information as a "difference that makes a difference".</p>
<p>However, to stress again, this re-encephalisation of emotion is optional. It's technically feasible to engineer the well-being of all sentience <i>and</i> retain most but not all of our existing preference architecture. The three technical options for abolishing suffering that I've presented - wireheading, designer drugs and genetic engineering - aren't mutually exclusive. Are they exhaustive? I don't know of any other viable options. Some transhumanists believe we could one day all be scanned, digitized and uploaded into inorganic computers and reprogrammed. Well, perhaps, I'm sceptical; but in any case, this proposal doesn't solve the suffering of existing organic life unless we embrace so-called destructive uploading - a Holocaust option I'm not even going to consider here.</p>
<p> </p>
<h3>2: WHY IT SHOULD HAPPEN</h3>
Assume that within the next few centuries we will acquire these Godlike powers over our emotions. Assume, too, that the <i>signalling</i> function of unpleasant experience can be replaced - either through the recalibration argued for here, or through the offloading of everything unpleasant or routine to inorganic prostheses, bionic implants or inorganic computers - or perhaps through outright elimination in the case of something like jealousy. Why should we all be abolitionists?<br/>
<p><i>If</i> one is a <b>classical utilitarian</b>, then the abolitionist project follows: it's Bentham plus biotechnology. One doesn't have to be a classical utilitarian to endorse the abolition of suffering; but all classical utilitarians should embrace the abolitionist project. Bentham championed social and legislative reform, which is great as far as it goes; but he was working before the era of biotechnology and genetic medicine.</p>
<p>If one is a scientifically enlightened <b>Buddhist</b>, then the abolitionist project follows too. Buddhists, uniquely among the world's religions, focus on the primacy of suffering in the living world. Buddhists may think that the Noble Eightfold Path offers a surer route to Nirvana than genetic engineering; but it's hard for a Buddhist to argue in principle against biotech if it works. Buddhists focus on relieving suffering via the extinction of desire; yet it's worth noting this extinction is technically optional, and might arguably lead to a stagnant society. Instead it's possible both to abolish suffering <i>and</i> continue to have all manner of desires.</p>
<p>Persuading followers of <b>Islam</b> and the <b>Judeo-Christian</b> tradition is more of a challenge. But believers claim - despite anomalies in the empirical evidence - that Allah/God is infinitely compassionate and merciful. So if mere mortals can envisage the well-being of all sentience, it would seem blasphemous to claim that God is more limited in the scope of His benevolence.</p>
<p>Most contemporary philosophers aren't classical utilitarians or Buddhists or theists. Why should, say, an <b>ethical pluralist</b> take the abolitionist project seriously?<br/>Here I want to take as my text Shakespeare's</p>
<p><i>"For there was never yet philosopher <br/>That could endure the toothache patiently"</i><br/>[<i>Much Ado About Nothing</i>, Scene Five, Act One (Leonato speaking)]</p>
<p>When one is struck by excruciating physical pain, one is always shocked at just how frightful it can be.<br/>It's tempting to suppose that purely "psychological" pain - loneliness, rejection, existential angst, grief, anxiety, depression - can't be as atrocious as extreme physical pain; yet the reason over 800,000 people in the world take their own lives every year is mainly psychological distress. It's not that other things - great art, friendship, social justice, a sense of humour, cultivating excellence of character, academic scholarship, etc - aren't valuable; but rather when intense physical or psychological distress intrudes - either in one's own life or that of a loved one - we recognize that this intense pain has immediate <i>priority</i> and <i>urgency</i>. If you are in agony after catching your hand in the door, then you'd give short shrift to someone who urged you to remember the finer things in life. If you're distraught after an unhappy love affair, then you don't want to be tactlessly reminded it's a beautiful day outside.</p>
<p>OK, while it lasts, extreme pain or psychological distress has an urgency and priority that overrides the rest of one's life projects; but so what? When the misery passes, why not just get on with one's life as before?<br/>Well, natural science aspires to "a view from nowhere", a notional God's-eye view. Physics tells us that no here-and-now is privileged over any other; all are equally real. Science and technology are shortly going to give us Godlike powers over the entire living world to match this Godlike perspective. I argue that so long as there is any sentient being who is undergoing suffering similar to our distress, that suffering should be tackled with the same priority and urgency as if it were one's own pain or the pain of a loved one. With power comes complicity. Godlike powers carry godlike responsibilities. Thus the existence of suffering 200 years ago, for instance, may indeed have been terrible; but it's not clear that such suffering can sensibly be called "immoral" - because there wasn't much that could be done about it. But thanks to biotechnology, now there is - or shortly will be. Over the next few centuries, suffering of any kind is going to become optional.</p>
<p>If you're <i>not</i> a classical ethical utilitarian, the advantage of recalibrating the hedonic treadmill rather than simply seeking to maximise superhappiness is that you are retaining at least a recognizable descendant of our existing preference architecture. Recalibration of the hedonic treadmill can be made consistent with your existing value scheme. Hence even the ill-named "<b>preference utilitarian</b>" can be accommodated. Indeed control over the emotions means that you can pursue your existing life projects more effectively. <br/>And what about the alleged character-building function of suffering? "That which does not crush me makes me stronger”, said Nietzsche. This worry seems misplaced. Other things being equal, enhancing hedonic tone strengthens motivation - it makes us psychologically more robust. By contrast, prolonged low mood leads to a syndrome of learned helplessness and behavioural despair.</p>
<p>I haven't explicitly addressed the value nihilist - the <b>subjectivist</b> or ethical sceptic who says all values are simply matters of opinion, and that one can't logically derive an "ought" from an "is". <br/>Well, let's say I find myself in <i>agony</i> because my hand is on a hot stove. That agony is intrinsically motivating, even if my conviction that I ought to withdraw my hand doesn't follow the formal canons of logical inference. If one takes the scientific world-picture seriously, then there is nothing ontologically special or privileged about <i>here-and-now</i> or <i>me</i> - the egocentric illusion is a trick of perspective engineered by selfish DNA. If it's wrong for me to be in agony, then it is wrong for anyone, anywhere.</p>
<p> </p>
<h3>3: WHY IT WILL HAPPEN</h3>
OK, it's technically feasible. A world without suffering would be wonderful; and full-blown paradise-engineering even better. But again, so what? It's technically feasible to build a thousand-metre cube of cheddar cheese. Why is a pain-free world going to happen? Perhaps it's just wishful thinking. Perhaps we'll opt to retain the biology of suffering indefinitely<sup><a href="http://www.abolitionist.com/multiverse.html">2</a></sup>.<br/>
<p>The counterargument here is that whether or not one is sympathetic to the abolitionist project, we are heading for a <b>reproductive revolution</b> of designer babies. Prospective parents are soon going to be choosing the characteristics of their future children. We're on the eve of the Post-Darwinian Transition, not in the sense that selection pressure will be any less severe, but evolution will no longer be "blind" and "random": there will no longer be natural selection but unnatural selection. We will be choosing the genetic makeup of our future offspring, selecting and designing alleles and allelic combinations <i>in anticipation of</i> their consequences. There will be selection pressure against nastier alleles and allelic combinations that were adaptive in the ancestral environment.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, this isn't a rigorous argument, but imagine you are choosing the genetic dial-settings for mood - the hedonic set-point - of your future children. What settings would you pick? You might not want gradients of lifelong superhappiness, but the overwhelming bulk of parents will surely want to choose happy children. For a start, they are more fun to raise. Most parents across most cultures say, I think sincerely, that they want their children to be happy. One may be sceptical of parents who say happiness is the <i>only</i> thing they care about for their kids - many parents are highly ambitious. But other things being equal, happiness signals success - possibly the ultimate evolutionary origin of why we value the happiness of our children as well as our own.</p>
<p>Of course the parental choice argument isn't decisive. Not least, it's unclear how many more generations of free reproductive choices lie ahead before radical antiaging technologies force a progressively tighter collective control over our reproductive decisions - since a swelling population of ageless quasi-immortals can't multiply indefinitely in finite physical space. But even if centralised control of reproductive decisions becomes the norm, and procreation itself becomes rare, the selection pressure against primitive Darwinian genotypes will presumably be intense. Thus it's hard to envisage what future social formations would really allow the <i>premeditated</i> creation of any predisposition to depressive or anxiety disorders - or even the "normal" pathologies of unenhanced consciousness.</p>
<h3>Non-Human Animals</h3>
So far I've focused on suffering in just one species. This restriction of the abolitionist project is parochial; but our anthropocentric bias is deeply rooted. Hunting, killing, and exploiting members of other species enhanced the inclusive fitness of our genes in the ancestral environment. [Here we are more akin to chimpanzees than bonobos.] So unlike, say, the incest taboo, we don't have an innate predisposition to find, say, hunting and exploiting non-human animals wrong. We read that Irene Pepperberg's parrot, with whom we last shared a common ancestor several hundred million years ago, had the mental age of a three-year-old child. But it's still legal for so-called sportsmen to shoot birds for fun. If sportsmen shot babies and toddlers of our own species for fun, they'd be judged criminal sociopaths and locked up.<br/>
<p>So there is a contrast: the lead story in the news media is often a terrible case of human child abuse and neglect, an abducted toddler, or abandoned Romanian orphans. Our greatest hate-figures are child abusers and child murderers. Yet we routinely pay for the industrialized mass killing of other sentient beings so we can eat them. We eat meat even though there's a wealth of evidence that functionally, emotionally, intellectually - and critically, in their capacity to suffer - the non-human animals we factory-farm and kill are equivalent to human babies and toddlers.</p>
<p>From a notional God's-eye perspective, I'd argue that morally we should care just as much about the abuse of functionally equivalent non-human animals as we do about members of our own species - about the abuse and killing of a pig as we do about the abuse or killing of a human toddler. This violates our human moral intuitions; but our moral intuitions simply can't be trusted. They reflect our anthropocentric bias - not just a moral limitation but an intellectual and perceptual limitation too. It's not that there are no differences between human and non-human animals, any more than there are no differences between black people and white people, freeborn citizens and slaves, men and women, Jews and gentiles, gays or heterosexuals. The question is rather: are they <i>morally</i> relevant differences? This matters because morally catastrophic consequences can ensue when we latch on to a real but morally irrelevant difference between sentient beings. [Recall how Aristotle, for instance, defended slavery. How could he be so <i>blind</i>?] Our moral intuitions are poisoned by genetic self-interest - they weren't designed to take an impartial God's-eye view. But greater intelligence brings a greater cognitive capacity for empathy - and <i>potentially</i> an extended circle of compassion. Maybe our superintelligent/superempathetic descendants will view non-human animal abuse as no less abhorrent than we view child abuse: a terrible perversion.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>True or not, surely we aren't going to give up eating each other? Our self-interested bias is too strong. We like the taste of meat too much. Isn't the notion of global veganism just utopian dreaming?<br/>Perhaps so. Yet within a few decades, the advent of genetically-engineered vatfood means that we can enjoy eating "meat" tastier than anything available today - without any killing and cruelty. As a foretaste of what's in store, the <i>In Vitro</i> Meat Consortium was initiated at a workshop held at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences in June 2007. Critically, growing meat from genetically-engineered single cells is likely to be <i>scalable</i> indefinitely: its global mass consumption is potentially cheaper than using intact non-human animals. Therefore - assuming that for the foreseeable future we retain the cash nexus and market economics - cheap, delicious vatfood is likely to displace the factory-farming and mass-killing of our fellow creatures.</p>
<p>One might wonder sceptically: are most people really going to eat gourmet vatfood, even if it's cheaper and more palatable than flesh from butchered non-human animals?<br/>If we may assume that vatfood is marketed properly, yes. For if we discover that we prefer the taste of vat-grown meat to carcasses of dead animals, then the moral arguments for a cruelty-free diet will probably seem much more compelling than they do at present.</p>
<p>Yet even if we have global veganism, surely there will still be terrible cruelty in Nature? Wildlife documentaries give us a very Bambified view of the living world: it doesn't make good TV spending half an hour showing a non-human animal dying of thirst or hunger, or slowly being asphyxiated and eaten alive by a predator. And surely there has to be a food chain? Nature is cruel; but predators will always be essential on pain of a population explosion and Malthusian catastrophe?</p>
<p>Not so. <i>If</i> we want to, we can use depot contraception<sup><a href="http://www.abolitionist.com/reprogramming/mammals.html">3</a></sup>, redesign the global ecosystem, and rewrite the vertebrate genome to get rid of suffering in the rest of the natural world too. For non-human animals don't need liberating; they need <i>looking after</i>. We have a duty of care, just as we do to human babies and toddlers, to the old, and the mentally handicapped. This prospect might sound remote; but habitat-destruction means that effectively all that will be left of Nature later this century is our wildlife parks. Just as we don't feed terrified live rodents to snakes in zoos - we recognize that's barbaric - will we really continue to permit cruelties in our terrestrial wildlife parks because they are "natural"?</p>
<p>The last frontier on Planet Earth is the ocean. Intuitively, this might seem to entail too complicated a task. But the <a href="http://www.abolitionist.com/exponential.html">exponential</a> growth of computer power and nanorobotic technologies means that we can in theory comprehensively re-engineer the marine ecosystem too. Currently such re-engineering is still impossible; in a few decades, it will be computationally feasible but challenging; eventually, it will be technically trivial. So the question is: will we actually do it? <i>Should</i> we do it - or alternatively should we conserve the Darwinian status quo? Here we are clearly in the realm of speculation. Yet one may appeal to what might be called <i>The Principle Of Weak Benevolence</i>. Unlike the controversial claim that superintelligence entails superempathy, The Principle Of Weak Benevolence <i>doesn't</i> assume that our technologically and cognitively advanced descendants will be any more morally advanced than we are now.</p>
<p>Let's give a concrete example of how the principle applies. If presented today with the choice of buying either free-range or factory-farmed eggs, most consumers will pick the free-range eggs. If battery-farmed eggs are 1 penny cheaper, most people will still pick the cruelty-free option. No, one shouldn't underestimate human malice, spite and bloody-mindedness; but most of us have at least a <i>weak</i> bias towards benevolence. If any non-negligible element of self-sacrifice is involved, for example if free-range eggs cost even 20 pence more, then sadly sales fall off sharply. My point is that if - and it's a big if - the sacrifice involved for the morally apathetic could be made non-existent or trivial, then the abolitionist project can be carried to the furthest reaches of the living world.</p>
<p><small><a target="_blank" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Pearce_(philosopher)">David Pearce</a><br/>(2007 plus <a href="http://www.abolitionist.com/multiverse.html">1</a> & <a href="http://www.abolitionist.com/reprogramming/index.html">2</a>)</small></p>
<p> </p>
<center><p><br/><a href="http://www.abolitionist.com/index.htm"><img height="92" width="100" src="http://www.abolitionist.com/swan.jpg" alt="ABOLITIONIST.COM" border="0"/></a></p>
</center>The Animal Rights Movement: Time for a Major Shifttag:arzone.ning.com,2011-01-04:4715978:BlogPost:164382011-01-04T08:47:30.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 18pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The Animal Rights Movement: Time for a Major Shift</span></b><span style="font-family: 'Arial', 'sans-serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 9.5pt;"> </span></p>
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Backfire: the movement’s mistakes have failed…</span></b></p>
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 18pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The Animal Rights Movement: Time for a Major Shift</span></b><span style="font-family: 'Arial', 'sans-serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 9.5pt;"> </span></p>
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Backfire: the movement’s mistakes have failed nonhuman animals</span></b></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">A recent poll has shown that the public is much more supportive of the use of</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">nonhuman animals now than it used to be in the past (the survey was carried out by</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">YouGov for the Daily Telegraph). Around 70% of those questioned claimed that testing new medical treatments on nonhumans before they were tested on humans is acceptable. This shows a shift on the view that the public used to have on this issue, since past polls had shown much closer to 50-50 results on the issue.</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">In light of these results, Colin Blakemore, chief executive of the Medical Research</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Council, has claimed that this was clearly showing what he called “a radical shift” in the British public opinion, and that, accordingly, “the tide has turned". The media have reported this with headings such as “Animal activist campaign backfires”, “Animal rights: backlash”, “Are animal rights activists terrorists?” and other similar ones. What we are witnessing now, for the first time since the movement started in the sixties and seventies, is that the movement isn't advancing but going backwards.</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">This is the most worrying news that the movement could have received. But the</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">saddest part of the story is that this poll’s results are not due to the movement being</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">vigorously attacked from outside. Rather, the upsetting true is that it is due to ourselves, to animal rights activists, that we have ended up reaching a situation such as this. It is because of the strategies and campaigns that the animal rights movement has followed that we have got to this ruinous point.</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">How can this be so? We can point at two important reasons for it:</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">1) The animal rights movement has been trying to further its case by means that</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">society strongly rejects.</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">2) The animal rights movement has not taken efforts in trying to explain to the</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">public the arguments that ground its position.</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The reason has not been, then, that animal right activists have not been properly</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">devoted to their cause. Animal rights campaigners have worked hard and full heartedly, giving the best of themselves to the cause. In order to succeed we must nevertheless analyse the results of our actions.</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"> </p>
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Why violent actions have put the public against the movement</span></b></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The poll results have been also conclusive in another point. 77% of the interviewed</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">defended that it is correct to term animal right activists ‘terrorists’, and only 15% said it was not. This is not strange, according to the kind of activities that have been carried out in the name of the movement. Most of the public condemn the use of violence, even when it’s carried out in support of causes that they will otherwise support. And, by violence, the public do not only understand the infliction of physical harm to individuals, but also things such as threatening attitudes or destruction of property. Maybe we can question such a view, perhaps we can certainly engage on philosophical discussions about what is or is not</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">violence, but that isn’t the question at all. The problem is that, regardless of whether we consider that such attitudes are violent or not, the public</span> <i><span style="font-family: 'Times-Italic', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">do</span></i> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">consider them violent, and</span> <i><span style="font-family: 'Times-Italic', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">do</span></i> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">oppose it. It’s not that they have a certain dislike for them: rather they very firmly oppose them and consider them absolutely unacceptable. The poll has also shown this. Most of the people (93%) defended the right to hold peaceful demonstrations, but also the overwhelming majority opposed damaging property (95%) and harassing those who</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">work in labs by calling them abusers (81%).</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">So we can understand how is it that by carrying out activities that are considered</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">violent we are generating a profound opposition against the movement among the</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">public. The numbers are clear as they could be: the majority see animal rights activists as terrorists. This is an extremely serious problem, since in today's climate being considered a terrorist is one of the worst things one can be if one would wish to have the slightest influence on society. It could be claimed that this is due to a campaign aimed at criminalising animal rights activism. We can maybe try to blame “the media” or some other forces that support the use of animals for having spread such a view of animal rights activists. But it’s quite obvious that it hasn’t been difficult for them to do so. The kind of activism that has been carried out (involving threats, aggressions, destruction of facilities and the lot) is the kind of activism that many among the public would label as vandalism to say the least and terrorism if continued in an organised manner. So no wonder the media has depicted this kind of activism with such terms.</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"> </p>
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">There has been no explanation to the public of the arguments</span></b> <b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">against speciesism</span></b></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Britain along with Sweden and maybe some other country, is possibly the place</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">where activism for nonhumans is more developed. In spite of that, most of the public</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">ignore the very reasons why we should reject discrimination against those who are not member of the human species. The very word</span> <i><span style="font-family: 'Times-Italic', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">speciesism</span></i> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">is unknown to most of the public. This is startling, to say the least. How can it be that a movement that is so well known in the UK has not been able to explain its case?</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Animal rights propaganda very seldom includes any explanation of why all those</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">who are able to feel suffering and joy should have their interest equally considered. No reason is given as to why discrimination against someone based on mere group</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">membership is wrong. The result of this is that the public don’t know these arguments. They often think that we defend nonhumans because we find them cute or because we are sentimental. So whenever animal rights claims mean that any human interest is set back (as it happens with the interest in wearing certain kind of clothes, tasting certain “foods”, and the like) this is seen as outlandish. It wouldn’t be so if they understood the basis for equality among all sentient beings.</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"> </p>
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Why we should focus on convincing the public</span></b></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Sometimes public opinion is dismissed by some activists. The argument for doing so is that we should focus on winning a ‘war’ against ‘animal abusers’. This entails a deep confusion. Such assumption is based on the idea that there’s a small group of people (those who breed, experiment on or kill nonhumans themselves) who are abusing them because the rest of the society let them do so. And this is the most mistaken view of the problem that could be imagined. The actual truth is completely different from this.</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Those who directly, physically harm the animals (those who work or own a farm, slaughterhouse, circus or animal experimentation lab) do so simple because the public demands that this is done. People eat the flesh of nonhuman animals, wear their skins, like watching shows in which they perform, and so on. The wants of the public means that some people are required to exploit nonhumans so that these wants can be met. If all the companies that use nonhuman animals were closed down by activists then new ones would be set up because the public want them to exist. Moreover, when we write “the public” we can read the overwhelming majority of humanity. So it’s most of humanity that, whether directly or indirectly, is to blame for the use of nonhumans. Those who buy meat or leather are those responsible for the exploitation of nonhuman animals. If no one bought these products then no animals would be killed for such purposes. So what trying to run a ‘war’ against ‘animal abusers’ would really imply is nothing short than running a war against the overwhelming majority of humanity. Such a war is obviously impossible to win. If we want to help nonhuman animals we need to convince people not to use them. Most of those who use nonhumans have never really reflected on whether they have a justification to discriminate against nonhumans. –one example of this can be found in the case of philosopher Tom Regan, a man well known</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">for defending the recognition of rights for nonhumans, who previously and</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">unquestioningly ate meat, went fishing and worked as a butcher–.</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">According to this, we can easily infer what goes on in the specific case of so-called</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">“animal experimentation” (i.e., experimentation on nonhuman animals but not on</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">human animals). Those who perform experiments on nonhumans do so because we live in a society in which there is a demand for such experimentation. The paradigm in current biomedicine research is based on such experiments and there are laws requiring it. The underlying idea is, as it has been said before by those who oppose speciesism, that we live in a society that discriminates against nonhumans simply because they aren’t members of the same species we are. This is why the claim that those who perform experiments on nonhuman animals are evil, sadistic people can’t be taken seriously by the public. The reason is simple: it’s not just a simplistic vision, it’s plain wrong. Those who perform ‘animal experimentation’ don’t do so because they are ‘sadistic animal abusers’: they do it because the public want them to do it. So if we want to bring an end to experiments of this sort we need, therefore, to convince people to oppose them. Unfortunately, there’s no other way. There are no shortcuts. The survey results have been crystal clear: violent tactics not only don’t further the cause: they make it much more difficult to defend. An example of all this can be found in another news item that has appeared in the media recently:</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"> </p>
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Blair’s support of experimentation on nonhumans</span></b></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">In a move without precedence, British Prime Minister Tony Blair has signed a</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">manifesto in favour of animal experimentation. Nothing of the like had taken place</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">before. It could be said that this means that a public representative, who is meant to</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">stand on behalf of all the citizens of his nation, instead of being impartial gives his</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">support to a particular position (the one defending animal experimentation). We must in any case reflect on what this is showing to us. Mr. Blair wouldn’t have given his support to animal experimentation if he wasn’t confident that this was a political stance worth taking. If animal experimentation was publicly questioned in a significant way, or if those who denounce it had the sympathies of the public, Blair would never have supported it. If he has done so, it’s because he has considered that the political costs that he would get from it are certainly less that the advantages he would get (especially in a</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">situation such as the present one, in which his popularity has dropped to the minimum). As the poll we already commented on shows, this</span> <i><span style="font-family: 'Times-Italic', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">is</span></i> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">the case, whether we like it or not. Certainly many of us will strongly reject a position such as Blair’s. But many among the public will not. The sad thing with this is that it could have been otherwise if they hadn’t been driven to see those opposing animal experiments as violent fanatics and instead they had been informed about the arguments opposing speciesism.</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"> </p>
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">An antispeciesist, vegan movement is needed</span></b></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">The defence of nonhumans could have been carried out in a very different way.</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">There are two areas in which there is a lot still to be done. One has been already</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">commented upon: the arguments against speciesism should be communicated to the public, it’s necessary to create a public debate about them. The other has to do with what the public can more directly do against the use of nonhumans: veganism. Although the way in which people can more directly oppose the use of nonhumans is by stopping taking part in it, campaigns aimed at changing public minds regarding this have been substituted by those trying to introduce new ‘animal welfare’ laws or closing down certain companies. These do not mean a reduction in the number of nonhumans that are being used, but only some small changes concerning how they are treated or where they are exploited –if a lab is closed down, then the experiments that it performed will be done elsewhere–.</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"><span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Veganism should occupy a central place in our agenda. And veganism can be</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">promoted by many means which don’t imply putting the public against us.</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">This should affect in particular the practice that, by far kills more animals, which is,</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">without any doubt, fishing. Not so-called “sport fishing”, or angling, but commercial</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">fishing. The number of nonhumans that are used for ‘animal experimentation’ is</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">certainly huge, but it’s rendered little if compared with the number of animals that are</span> <span style="font-family: 'Times-Roman', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 12pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">killed in slaughterhouses. But even the number of animals who die in slaughterhouses is also rendered little if compared with the number of those who die because they are fished for being eaten –we must remember that the number of, say, sardines or cods that are needed for getting the same amount of flesh to be eaten that can be obtained by killing, say, a cow, is certainly significant–. In contrast with this, very little has been done to convince the public to give up fish-eating, especially if compared with the efforts that have been spent to oppose other areas of animal slavery, such as, for instance, animal experimentation. All this, in spite of the clear figures brought by a comparison of the number of the animals that die due to both practices. As we have commented, the movement is now in a very worrying situation not because we have been unlucky or because we have been strongly countered, but rather because of the kind of actions we’ve been doing ourselves. According to this, the good news is that we can change this situation by making a shift on the kind of activism that is carried out. An antispeciesist and strongly pro-veganism movement is necessary. We can make a change. And we need to do it. To be more exact: nonhuman animals need that we do it.</span></p>
<p style="background: white;"> </p>
<p style="background: white;"><b><span style="font-family: 'Times-Bold', 'serif'; color: #333333; font-size: 13.5pt; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;">Rights for Animals</span></b></p>An Unequal Right to Life – by Joan Dunayer, New-Speciesist Philosophy, SPECIESISM pages 94 – 98tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-15:4715978:BlogPost:152292010-12-15T10:30:55.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<div><p></p>
<p></p>
<p></p>
<p>An Unequal Right to Life – by Joan Dunayer, New-Speciesist Philosophy, Speciesism, pages 94 – 98</p>
<p>Pluhar doesn’t accord all sentient beings – or even all mammals and birds – an equal right to life, She writes, “It is morally preferable for a human to kill and eat a fish than to slaughter and barbecue a chicken (let alone a calf, a monkey, or another human). It is also better to eat clams than fish.” Especially given that a calf’s remains will feed a human…</p>
</div>
<div><p></p>
<p></p>
<p></p>
<p>An Unequal Right to Life – by Joan Dunayer, New-Speciesist Philosophy, Speciesism, pages 94 – 98</p>
<p>Pluhar doesn’t accord all sentient beings – or even all mammals and birds – an equal right to life, She writes, “It is morally preferable for a human to kill and eat a fish than to slaughter and barbecue a chicken (let alone a calf, a monkey, or another human). It is also better to eat clams than fish.” Especially given that a calf’s remains will feed a human considerably longer than a chicken’s or clam’s, such an ordering certainly isn’t equality. Once again, this is an old-fashioned hierarchy of animals. Why is it worse to kill a human or monkey than to kill a chicken? Pluhar claims that the answer lies not in animals’ intelligence but their “capacity TO CARE about what happens” to them. At the same time, she belittles chickens’ intelligence and indicates that they DO care what happens to them: “One does not have to be tremendously bright to prefer pecking corn to having your head chopped off.” Despite her denial, Pluhar’s hierarchy is based on human-like intelligence: animals who ostensibly possess more of that intelligence are more entitled to live.</p>
<p>Regan, too, values humans more than other animals. Forced to choose between saving a human and saving a nonhuman, we should save the human, he says. Why? “The sources of satisfaction available to most humans are at once more numerous and varied than those available to animals [sic].” In other words, human lives are richest.</p>
<p>Regan imagines four normal adult humans and one dog in a lifeboat that can support only four individuals. If anyone is to survive, someone must go overboard. In Regan’s view, it would be morally right to kill the dog because life offers more “opportunities for satisfaction” to humans than to dogs. As discussed earlier, that premise is speciesist and lacks factual support. A dog may have MORE opportunities for satisfaction than a human. Some dogs have a sense of smell three million times more sensitive than ours. We can’t even imagine the richness of their olfactory experience. If canine pleasures do tend to be simpler than human ones, they may easily be more satisfying and abundant.</p>
<p>Like Singer, Regan contends that this view is “not speciesist” because it isn’t based solely on species membership. It’s speciesist because it’s based on the assumption that human lives ordinarily have more value than nonhuman ones. The difference between the old-speciesist view that the life of any human matters more than the life of any dog and Regan’s view that the life of a NORMAL human matters more than the life of any dog is one of degree, not kind.</p>
<p>As expressed by Gary Francione, “our intuition” tells us that we “should” save a human over a dog if we know nothing about the two individuals except their species. “We regard it as morally preferable to choose the human over the animal [sic],” he writes. Saving the human accords with “our absolute preference for the human.” I have no such absolute preference, and I don’t regard saving humans “morally preferable.” All sentient beings are equal, so saving the dog is just as moral as saving the human.</p>
<p>Francione compares choosing the human in “all” such situations to a physician’s choosing to give the only available pint of lifesaving blood to a healthy human rather than a terminally ill one. The analogy isn’t apt. Life expectancy is morally relevant in choosing between two individuals (at least, between two humans, whose sense of time we can most easily surmise); species per se is not.</p>
<p>Nonhuman emancipation wouldn’t mean that “we will no longer be required to save the human,” Francione comments. Required to save the human? Yes that view is compatible with nonhuman emancipation. However, it isn’t compatible with animal equality. It’s speciesist. We aren’t morally obligated to choose the dog. It would be perfectly moral to flip a coin.</p>
<p>According to Regan, “no reasonable person” would disagree with saving a human rather than a dog. What’s more, he considers it morally right to save one human rather than a MILLION dogs. What happened to his insistence that all subjects of a life equally possess basic moral rights? Apparently, that doesn’t apply with regard to the most basic of all: the right to life.</p>
<p>Regan’s inegalitarian right to life also clashes with his statements about innocence and guilt. “The murder of the innocent is wrong even when the victims do not suffer,” he states; only the guilty forfeit their inherent “right not to be harmed.” A dog is innocent. Is the same true of most human adults? Humans who eat flesh are parties to an “unjust practice,” Regan notes. Because he believes that birds and mammals are persons, he must believe that humans who eat flesh from slaughtered birds and mammals are parties to murder. If, in a crisis, I don’t know the extent of a human’s guilt (for example I don’t know if they eat flesh) and I possess no other morally relevant information regarding the particular dog and human, I have no solid basis for saving a dog rather than a human, or vice versa. However, whereas a dog is innocent, an adult human is likely to be guilty., involved in the unjustly inflicted suffering and death of nonhumans. Therefore, by Regan’s own standards the dog is the lifeboat occupant most entitled to live. (The same would apply to Pluhar’s human, monkey, chicken, fish, and clam: if the human is guilty, any of the other animals are more, not less, entitled to live.)</p>
<p>Someone might object that human flesh-eaters aren’t guilty because, although they do wrong, they aren’t AWARE of doing wrong: they’ve been enculturated to regard flesh-eating as morally acceptable. Most human adults who eat flesh know that it comes form killed animals. Most also know that they can be healthy without eating flesh. They eat flesh because they want to and their society allows them to. They knowingly participate in needless harm, so I consider them morally accountable.</p>
<p>Anyone who regards such flesh-eaters as innocent would have to regard Americans who owned human slaves and Germans who participated in the Holocaust as innocent. Like most humans who eat flesh, these wrongdoers were indoctrinated to participate in systemic abuse. Further, Germans who refused to participate risked imprisonment, torture, and death. What perils confront humans who refuse to eat flesh? Not “fitting in” with flesh-eaters? If most members of a society condone harm, that doesn’t exonerate the participants. If it did, most crimes against humanity couldn’t be viewed as crimes. The Nuremberg Trials would have been unjustified acts of revenge.</p>
<p>Rowlands shares Regan’s views on innocence and guilt: wrongdoing can reduce someone’s “moral entitlements” and warrant “punishment.” Nevertheless, he too believes that humans are more entitled to live than dogs. In fact, he calls it “ridiculous,” “absurd,” and not “sane” to consider killing a dog as wrong as killing a human. Faced with a situation in which we can save only a human or a dog, “we all know that the right thing to do is save the human.” I’m living proof of THAT statement’s falsehood.</p>
<p>In addition to being, in general, more innocent than humans, nonhumans within human society are less free to determine their own fate. If a dog WERE in a lifeboat, it would be extremely unlikely that their choice placed them in that desperate situation. Most likely, some human would be responsible for the dog’s being present. This is further reason to consider it right to save the dog over a human.</p>
<p>If however, we have no personal information on any of the lifeboat occupants, we simply must choose. Because all sentient beings are equal, we’re perfectly entitled to save the dog over any of the humans. It’s no more acceptable to kill a healthy dog than it is to kill a healthy human. Indeed, for the reasons I’ve given (innocence versus guilt, as well as the dogs lack of choice), it might be less acceptable.</p>
<p>If Regan believes that humans have a greater right to life than other animals because they have more “opportunities for satisfaction,” then, to be logically consistent, he must also believe that the most intelligent human in the boat has a greater right to life than any of the other humans.</p>
<p>Regan states, “All subjects-of-a-life, including all those nonhuman animals who qualify, have equal inherent value.” However, he espouses views inconsistent with that principle.</p>
<p></p>
<p>Unlike old-speciesists, new-speciesists endorse basic rights for SOME nonhuman animals, those ostensibly most similar to humans. To new-speciesists, the moral rights of humans trump the same rights of nonhumans.</p>
<p>New-speciesists see animalkind as a hierarchy with humans on top. Assessing superiority in human-biased ways, they consider most humans superior to all nonhumans. Typically they rank chimpanzees, dolphins, and other select nonhuman mammals higher than other nonhumans. They also rank mammals above birds; birds above reptiles, amphibians, and fishes; and vertebrates above invertebrates.</p>
<p>As Sapontzis notes, moral progress occurs when egalitarian views replace such hierarchical ones. Supposed superiority isn’t relevant to basic rights. A superior aptitude for technology, verbal language, or anything else doesn’t entitle someone to greater moral consideration or greater legal protection.</p>
<p>In terms of their right to justice, all sentient beings are equal. Intentional harm to a moth or crab is no less wrong than intentional harm to an innocent human. All animals not only have a moral right to life and freedom from abuse; they have an EQUAL right.</p>
</div>"The Bible Says So" - by Joan Dunayer SPECIESISM, Old-Speciesist Philosophy, pages 11-12tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-12-05:4715978:BlogPost:149332010-12-05T01:17:38.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<div><p></p>
<p></p>
<p>"The Bible Says So" - by Joan Dunayer SPECIESISM, Old-Speciesist Philosophy, pages 11-12</p>
<p></p>
<p>Many Christians believe that nonhumans exist for human use because the Bible says so. As expressed by one man, "God put us in charge over animals."</p>
<p>Saying that humans are entitled to dominion over nonhumans doesn't make it so. (Some sexist men likewise claim that men are entitled to dominion over women.) Humans wrote the Bible, so it isn't surprising that the…</p>
</div>
<div><p></p>
<p></p>
<p>"The Bible Says So" - by Joan Dunayer SPECIESISM, Old-Speciesist Philosophy, pages 11-12</p>
<p></p>
<p>Many Christians believe that nonhumans exist for human use because the Bible says so. As expressed by one man, "God put us in charge over animals."</p>
<p>Saying that humans are entitled to dominion over nonhumans doesn't make it so. (Some sexist men likewise claim that men are entitled to dominion over women.) Humans wrote the Bible, so it isn't surprising that the Bible glorifies humans and gives them license to exploit other animals. Given that the Bible sanctions HUMAN enslavement, we hardly can expect it to censure nonhuman enslavement. In addition to being sexist, tribalistic, and otherwise biased against particular human groups, the Bible is speciesist.</p>
<p>Genuine arguments are based on evidence and reasoning. People who look to the Bible for their beliefs have a fundamentally irrational worldview. Christian old-speciesists have absorbed the human-aggrandizing myths that "Creation" culminated in humans, "God" made humans in "His" image, and Jesus (human and male) was divine. In Christianity, humans are more god-like than other animals. They're God's "children," whereas other animals are merely his "creatures." Extremely human-centred and hierarchical, Christian doctrine is incompatible with animal equality.</p>
<p>At best, old-speciesists who base their beliefs on the Bible have some sense of noblesse oblige toward nonhumans. They feel a condescending benevolence but not respect. They see other animals as inferiors in need of control or care rather than equals entitled to justice. In their paternalistic and proprietary view, God the Father gave nonhumans to his children, humans. Nonhumans are human property, the opposite of individuals with rights.</p>
<p>Christian old-speciesists display Christianity's bias against nonhuman animals. Like the Bible, they maintain a sharp moral divide between humans and all other animals. (They would say "humans and animals," which is logically equivalent to "blacks and humans" or "women and humans.")</p>
<p>Many religious speciesists deny human-nonhuman kinship. It discomfits them to think of HOMO SAPIENS as one animal species among millions and downright alarms them to see themselves as animals, primates and apes.</p>
<p>Nonhuman apes are more closely related to humans than to monkeys. If nonhuman apes and monkeys are primates, so are we. Biologists now classify gibbons, orangutans, bonobos, chimpanzees, AND HUMANS as apes. African nonhuman apes (gorillas, bonobos, and chimpanzees) share a more recent common ancestor with humans than with Asian nonhuman apes (gibbons, and orangutans). If gorillas and orangutans are apes, we are too. Genetically, bonobos and chimpanzees are closer to humans than to either orangutans or gorillas. They share about 96.4 percent of their genes with orangutans, 97.7 percent with Gorillas and 98.4 percent with humans. We belong in the same genus (Homo or Pan) as bonobos and chimpanzees. But old-speciesists prefer to think of humans in splendid isolation.</p>
<p>Having failed to evolve beyond the myths of former centuries, many old-speciesists don't believe in evolution. As expressed by one sport hunter, evolution indicates human "kindredship" with "animals," so anyone who believes in evolution could conclude that killing nonhumans "constitutes murder." He decided not to believe in evolution. That way he can have his gun and use it, too.</p>
<p>Anxious to maintain feelings of superiority and preserve a human monopoly on moral and legal rights, old-speciesists grossly exaggerate human uniqueness. To varying degrees, all animal species overlap physically and mentally. At the same time, each animal is unique.</p>
</div>Raw Robin by Robin Lanetag:arzone.ning.com,2010-11-08:4715978:BlogPost:139842010-11-08T12:20:20.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Raw Robin</font></font></font></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000" face="Calibri" size="3">by Robin Lane…</font></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt"></p>
<p style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000"><font size="3"><font face="Calibri">Raw Robin</font></font></font></span></b></p>
<p style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000" size="3" face="Calibri">by Robin Lane</font></span></p>
<p style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000" size="3" face="Calibri">When I became a vegan, back in 1982, veganism was considered weird and vegan products were few and far between. I remember, in 1983, getting very excited about vegan choc ices and, whilst we now take so many vegan products for granted, back then it was really special. Although there were very few brands of soya milk available, we were able to buy “one cup” size containers, which were very handy, and something we can’t get now. As a new and isolated vegan, it was very much a learning process. For instance, I didn’t realise that caseinate was a dairy product and so I was quite happily using dairy milk “substitutes” for the first few months.</font></span></p>
<p style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000" size="3" face="Calibri">In 1985, I became interested in following a fruitarian diet, having been in touch with the late Wilfred Crone. At that time in my life, I was a none-too-healthy vegan, living on toasted sosmix sandwiches, drinking an excessive amount of alcohol and taking too many drugs. I only managed to follow the fruit diet for a month before I gave it up.</font></span></p>
<p style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000" size="3" face="Calibri">The year 1999 turned out to be a turning point for both myself and Alison who run CALF (Campaign Against Leather and Fur). During the summer of that year, we attended a London Vegans talk given by the long-term rawfoodist, Dr. Douglas Graham. We immediately adopted an 80% raw food diet, gave up alcohol, sugar, coffee and margarine and, over the next few months, increased our raw food intake.</font></span></p>
<p style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000" size="3" face="Calibri">By the beginning of the year 2000, Alison was eating a 95% raw vegan diet and I began to follow a fruitarian diet. One year later, I am 95% raw food fruitarian diet, and I am both very healthy and very happy. We have joined a local vegan/raw food group where we continually sample delicious desserts, our most recent being a raw food, fruitarian trifle with pine nut “cream”!</font></span></p>
<p style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000" size="3" face="Calibri">Yours, for a very fruitful life,</font></span></p>
<p style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000" size="3" face="Calibri">Robin Lane, London, England</font></span></p>
<p style="MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 10pt" class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US" xml:lang="EN-US"><font color="#000000" size="3" face="Calibri">(Page 276 of Vegan Stories, published in 2002 by The Vegan Society -</font> <a href="http://www.vegansociety.com/"><font color="#0000FF" size="3" face="Calibri">www.vegansociety.com</font></a> <font color="#000000" size="3" face="Calibri">)</font></span></p>“Humane” Wounding and Killing - by Joan Dunayer, Victims Mistaken for Game, Animal Equality: Language and Liberation, pages 45 - 48tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-10-26:4715978:BlogPost:131552010-10-26T08:30:00.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<div><font size="2">Understatements and outright lies conceal hunting’s cruelty. Hunters don’t “always” shoot with “perfect” skill, hunting spokesman Jim Posewitz says. Hunters routinely fail to kill cleanly. They aim too low or too far back. They shoot birds so birds so distant that shotgun pellets lack sufficient force to kill on impact. They fire at mammals who are running or are partly concealed. On one Tennessee hunt, a European wild boar cornered by dogs suffered hits from at least five…</font></div>
<div><font size="2">Understatements and outright lies conceal hunting’s cruelty. Hunters don’t “always” shoot with “perfect” skill, hunting spokesman Jim Posewitz says. Hunters routinely fail to kill cleanly. They aim too low or too far back. They shoot birds so birds so distant that shotgun pellets lack sufficient force to kill on impact. They fire at mammals who are running or are partly concealed. On one Tennessee hunt, a European wild boar cornered by dogs suffered hits from at least five shooters. Each of three times that bullets knocked him down, the boar struggled to his feet. Before he died, he was shot thirteen times.</font></div>
<div class="mbl notesBlogText clearfix"><div><p><font size="2">“There will be times when the first shot is not instantly fatal,” Posewitz continues. A brain shot that kills instantly is rare in gun hunting and virtually nonexistent in bowhunting. Most hunters of large mammals don’t aim for the head, but the heart-lung area. Unconsciousness and death are rapid (but not immediate) only if a gunshot or arrow ruptures the heart or aorta.</font></p>
<p><font size="2">According to bowhunter Stewart Edward White, an arrow that strikes a nonhuman animal anywhere, including the belly, causes “prompt death.” After a shot to the heart-lung area, bowhunters generally wait at least half an hour before tracking, to allow time for the wounded animal to die from blood loss. After a belly shot they wait eight to twelve hours. Animals who escape with lesser arrow wounds commonly die, over days or weeks, from painful bacterial infection. The Californian Department of Fish and Game has denied that arrow wounding is “inhumane.”</font></p>
<p><font size="2">At least half of the elks and white-tailed deer shot with arrows go unretrieved, studies indicate. Bowhunter Clare Conley saw a bowhunting companion shoot a doe through the neck. After waiting an hour, the hunters began to follow her trail. Pools of blood marked places where she had collapsed before stumbling on. “At last we found her,” Conley relates. “She was dying, She was on her knees and hocks. Her ears . . . were sagging. Her head was down, Her nose was in her blood.” From 15 feet (4.6m) away, the Class A archer who had wounded aimed at her head, and missed. “Somehow the doe lurched up. Stumbling, bounding, crashing blindly into the brush,” she disappeared. The hunters never found her. Bowhunter Glenn Helgeland dismisses bowhunting’s “supposed inefficiencies and cruelties.”</font></p>
<p><font size="2">To Helgeland the belief that an arrow causes pain is “baloney, mostly.” Another bowhunter has described the pain that an arrow inflicts as “slight” about the same as a clap on the shoulder.” Really? When Conley shot a rabbit through the chest, she screamed, stumbled, and jumped until Conley stomped her to death.</font></p>
<p><font size="2">A bullet to the heart-lung area “feels like a bee sting,” a deer hunter contends. As humans can attest, having ribs broken or the chest wall penetrated is excruciating. An animal gun-shot in the lungs suffers intense pain and suffocates when the lungs collapse or fill with blood.</font></p>
<p><font size="2">An animal shot anywhere other than the brain, heart or a major blood vessel endures prolonged suffering, especially if left wounded (as are an estimated one-fifth of white-tailed deer hit with shotgun slugs). One hunter recalls a young buck shot in the spine. Bleating loudly, the buck dragged himself through the snow by his forelegs. One of his hind legs dangled by a tendon. A hunting proponent denies “the ‘cruelty’ involved in hunting deer.”</font></p>
<p><font size="2">A belly shot causes extreme pain. Gut-shot mule deer and prong-horn antelopes have dragged their stomach and intestines along the ground. His abdomen shot open, a desert bighorn ram attempted to jump a cactus. The spines caught his exposed stomach and yanked it out. When a white-tailed buck was shot in the stomach by bowhunter Ted Nugent, his entrails fell out. But, say Nugent and Helgeland, gut-shot nonhumans only “feel sick.”</font></p>
<p><font size="2">Shot, up close, by a “game ranch” bowhunter, a tame Corsican ram jumped when the first arrow pierced his rump. A second struck his back; a third one of his rear legs. The ram started to limp away, but two more arrows hit him in the rump, knocking him down. The ram managed to rise. Dripping blood, he ran to a wire fence that prevented escape. With arrows sticking out of him, he stood shaking, gazing beyond the fence. A sixth arrow pierced his belly. Still he stood, shaking and looking out. Then he collapsed. He kept thrashing, trying to stand. Finally the bowhunter borrowed a rifle and shot the ram from 4 feet (1.2 m) away. Five minutes more the ram thrashed. He was still alive when the shooter began to yank the arrows from his body. At last, with a long, slow exhalation, he died. White calls bowhunting, even by beginners, “humane.”</font></p>
<p><font size="2">Bird hunter Vance Bourjaily, too, contends that “hunting is humane.” Along with the pain of being shot, many wounded birds suffer slow death by starvation or gangrene. Studies indicate that more than one-forth of mourning doves and bobwhite quails shot by hunters go unretrieved, and more than one third of ducks.</font></p>
<p><font size="2">Before a British-style foxhunt, hunters block fox holes and other burrows to increase the chances that a hunted fox will run to exhaustion. Pursued by about 35 hounds, the fox initially runs fastest; but, bred for stamina, the hounds gain as the fox weakens. The chase may last for more than two hours. By the end, some foxes can only drag themselves. According to the U.K.’s Countryside Alliance, in hunts “all foxes are either humanely dispatched or escape without injury.” A fox caught by hounds is ripped apart. As inadvertently witnessed by a horrified woman in 1998, a fox running from hounds was “covered in blood,” a huge gaping hole” in her side. Caught once more, the fox screamed as she was “torn apart.” A fox who flees into a burrow is dug out and either shot or tossed alive to the hounds. Or, still inside, the fox is attacked by terriers sent below; the underground fight, in which the terriers too may be badly wounded or killed, usually ends with the foxes death. In 1999 a fox overtaken by hounds was bitten on his neck and rump before he escaped down a rabbit hole. Hunting opponents rescued the fox, whom they named Copper, and took him to a veterinarian. Without treatment Copper would have died from shock, the veterinarian reported. Each year in the U.K. thousands of red foxes die in foxhunts; numerous others may escape only to die from wounds or shock. Red foxes live in stable, loving family groups; the death of one red fox strongly affects others. Summer-autumn foxhunting targets cubs several months old. Spring foxhunting frequently kills one or both parents of nursing cubs. Normally the father brings the mother food. If he is killed, she and the cubs are less likely to survive. If the mother is killed, the cubs starve. Supporters call foxhunting “humane.”</font></p>
<p><font size="2">Coupling HUMANE with any sport hunting – any chasing, wounding, or killing for fun – empties HUMANE of meaning.</font></p>
</div>
</div>Open rescue of five hens from a farm with 160,000 animals in Spain.tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-10-25:4715978:BlogPost:131332010-10-25T15:21:34.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<div><h2 class="uiHeaderTitle">Open rescue of five hens from a farm with 160,000 animals in Spain.</h2>
</div>
<div class="clearfix"><div class="mbs uiHeaderSubTitle lfloat fsm fwn fcg">by <a href="http://www.facebook.com/AnimalEquality"><font color="#3B5998">Animal Equality</font></a> on Monday, 25 October 2010 at 16:14</div>
<div class="uiHeaderSubActions rfloat"></div>
</div>
<div class="mbl notesBlogText clearfix"><div><p>Animal Equality activists have rescued five hens from a farm…</p>
</div>
</div>
<div><h2 class="uiHeaderTitle">Open rescue of five hens from a farm with 160,000 animals in Spain.</h2>
</div>
<div class="clearfix"><div class="mbs uiHeaderSubTitle lfloat fsm fwn fcg">by <a href="http://www.facebook.com/AnimalEquality"><font color="#3B5998">Animal Equality</font></a> on Monday, 25 October 2010 at 16:14</div>
<div class="uiHeaderSubActions rfloat"></div>
</div>
<div class="mbl notesBlogText clearfix"><div><p>Animal Equality activists have rescued five hens from a farm containing 160,000 animals on Monday 16 September.</p>
<p></p>
<p>After entering one of the sheds via an unlocked door and without having to use any type of force, the activists removed five hens, who were later examined by a vet. One of them had to be operated on to remove a huge mass from her head resulting from an old eye infection. Another hen is currently receiving veterinary treatment but is out of danger.</p>
<p></p>
<p>These animals were being subjected to a process called a forced molt, in which through severe food restriction - including going for days without eating - and in total darkness, their bodies are shocked into a new cycle of egg-laying.</p>
<p></p>
<p>These one-and-a-half-year-old animals have spent the last eleven months trapped behind bars without being able to see the sun. They are suffering from various nutritional deficiencies and some of them also have liver damage due to the high protein content of their food which is given in order to increase the weight of their eggs.</p>
<p></p>
<p>The Animal Equality Open Rescue Team has recorded these images because we believe it is essential that society has access to what happens inside places like these so they have the ability to think about how the animals must feel.</p>
<p></p>
<p>This rescue was carried out on a farm with battery cages similar to the 'enriched cages' which will obligatory from 2012 onwards throughout the European Union. Nevertheless, on 'free-range' farms, hens are still deprived of their freedom and used as mere resources for human benefit, and finally all of them are sent to the slaughterhouse at a fraction of their natural lifespan.</p>
<p></p>
<p>In Spain, more than 47 million hens are victims of this system which exists to satisfy the demand for eggs. Eggs that we do not even need. In the UK the figure is 32 million. The same number of male chicks - their brothers - are also victims of this consumption. Often forgotten they do not even register in official statistics. On every type of farm, male chicks are killed, either ground up alive or gassed, because they do not lay eggs and they are not profitable for any other purpose.</p>
<p></p>
<p>Animal Equality rescues animals not only to help these particular individuals, but also to get society to reflect and stop seeing the other animals with which we share the planet as being at our disposal, as resources we can make a profit from.</p>
<p></p>
<p>As in all open rescues we carry out, we always come away filled with a sensation of sadness and impotence when we have to close the door and leave behind the thousands of other animals who will suffer their whole lives only to end up with their throats slit in a slaughterhouse.</p>
<p></p>
<p>We are simply unable to rescue all the animals on farms, in slaughterhouses, or laboratories. Ending this ongoing animal holocaust depends on each one of us, it depends on removing our financial support from all of it, in all its forms.</p>
<p></p>
<p>Living as vegans means we free those animals who were going to be forced to suffer and die for our demands, and builds a base of support for a world that is more equal for all, regardless of the species we belong to.</p>
<p></p>
<p>Towards the abolition of animal slavery.</p>
<p></p>
<p>OpenRescue.net</p>
<p>RescateAbierto.org</p>
<p></p>
<p>Vídeo: Karol Orzechowski Photos: Jo-Anne McArthur</p>
<p></p>
<p></p>
<div class="photo photo_none"><div class="photo_img"><a href="http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=446787914076&set=o.148532575191364"><img style="WIDTH: 420px" class="img" src="http://sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ak-ash2/hs385.ash2/66359_446787914076_220873174076_5549303_6555333_n.jpg"/></a></div>
<div class="caption">This is Olivia. Missing an eye due to an old infection, and with a deformed beak, she is now on a sanctuary being cared for by vegans where she will live the rest of her life.</div>
</div>
<p></p>
<br/></div>
</div>"Wildlife Conservation" Laws by Joan Dunayer (extract from SPECIESISM)tag:arzone.ning.com,2010-02-01:4715978:BlogPost:42542010-02-01T19:09:08.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
"The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and other "wildlife conservation" laws are old-speciesist. They afford some protection to species and other groups but no rights to individual nonhumans.<br />
The MMPA is designed to protect "species and population stocks," not individuals. It expresses "concern for the health and safety of dolphin populations," not dolphin individuals. Like fishers, hunters, and trappers, the MMPA refers to nonhuman individuals as if they…
"The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and other "wildlife conservation" laws are old-speciesist. They afford some protection to species and other groups but no rights to individual nonhumans.<br />
The MMPA is designed to protect "species and population stocks," not individuals. It expresses "concern for the health and safety of dolphin populations," not dolphin individuals. Like fishers, hunters, and trappers, the MMPA refers to nonhuman individuals as if they were species: kill "any species of whale" ("a whale of any species" would be correct.) The MMPA's framers weren't thinking in terms of nonhuman individuals even when referring to the killing of individual whales.<br />
The MMPA doesn't forbid injuring and killing; it sets limits on injuring and killing. For example, it maintains a quota on tuna fishers' collateral killing of dolphins. According to the MMPA, the government may allow the intentional killing of individual seals who eat salmons (whom humans want to eat).<br />
The MMPA's goal is to keep marine mammal populations at levels conducive to maximum human exploitation. For instance, the MMPA limits the killing of North Pacific fur seals to the extent necessary to keep herds "at their optimum sustainable population" - optimal for humans. The MMPA also allows U.S. sport hunters to kill polar bears in Canada and import their body parts as trophies, provided that Canada maintains hunting quotas designed to keep the "affected population stock at a sustainable level."<br />
Imagine a human law equivalent to the MMPA - say, the Native American Protection Act. Because Native Americans constitute a small minority, they would be protected at the level of their various group populations. However, a certain number of individual Native Americans could be killed with impunity. The government would be concerned about the health and safety of the Navajo, Onondaga, and other Native American populations, not individual Native Americans. The goal would be to keep group populations at "optimum sustainable" levels - optimal for other Americans. The government could allow the intentional killing of individual Chinooks who catch and eat salmons (whom other Americans want to catch and eat). Also, U.S. citizens could sport-hunt Inuits in Canada and import their body parts as trophies. In the 18th century, European-Americans did sport-hunt Native Americans and display their body parts.<br />
Like the MMPA, the ESA is aimed at preserving nonhuman groups. It too refers to the possession, sale, transport, and killing of "species," not individuals. The ESA promotes the "conservation" of "depleted" species, because of their "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value" to U.S. citizens, not because nonhumans have any rights or value of their own.<br />
Imagine a comparable Endangered Ethnicity Act (EEA). The act would be aimed at "conserving" low-population ethnic groups, such as Bedouins and Jews, because of their esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to other humans. The EEA would specify how many Bedouins and Jews could be killed and under what circumstances. Members of highly populous ethnic groups, such as the Chinese, could be killed in any number (until their population became small).<br />
If we applied the ESA's principles to humans as a species, it would be legal to kill any number of humans until the human population was greatly reduced. Individual humans would have no rights.<br />
Without laws like the MMPA and ESA, how would we protect species from extinction? By protecting every member of those species - that is, by according rights to nonhuman individuals. As ethicist Bernard Rollin has commented, "A species is a collection of morally relevant individuals." Protect the individuals, and you've protected the species."ANIMAL EQUALITY: Language and Liberation by Joan Dunayer. Style Guidelines. Countering Speciesismtag:arzone.ning.com,2010-01-06:4715978:BlogPost:20002010-01-06T18:39:38.000ZKate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥhttps://arzone.ning.com/profile/KateGOVEGANandNobodyGetsHurt
<u><b>STYLE GUIDELINES</b></u><br />
<u><i>COUNTERING SPECIESISM</i></u><br />
<br />
<b>MANNER OF PRESENTATION</b><br />
<br />
<b>Use ...</b><br />
<br />
narration (nonhuman biography and slices of life) to convey a sense of individual nonhuman lives<br />
<br />
vivid description of particular nonhumans and their experiences to help readers or listeners visualize their situation and empathize<br />
<br />
actual examples of mistreatment to illustrate general facts about nonhuman oppression<br />
<br />
<b>Avoid ...</b><br />
<br />
strictly theoretical discussion of…
<u><b>STYLE GUIDELINES</b></u><br />
<u><i>COUNTERING SPECIESISM</i></u><br />
<br />
<b>MANNER OF PRESENTATION</b><br />
<br />
<b>Use ...</b><br />
<br />
narration (nonhuman biography and slices of life) to convey a sense of individual nonhuman lives<br />
<br />
vivid description of particular nonhumans and their experiences to help readers or listeners visualize their situation and empathize<br />
<br />
actual examples of mistreatment to illustrate general facts about nonhuman oppression<br />
<br />
<b>Avoid ...</b><br />
<br />
strictly theoretical discussion of nonhuman-animal abuse<br />
<br />
exclusively generic or abstract reference to nonhuman animals (all members of some category or the "average"<br />
member)<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>SENTENCE STRUCTURE</b><br />
<br />
<b>Use ...</b><br />
<br />
syntax that makes nonhuman animals the grammatical subject, especially if they're the primary actors or<br />
victims<br />
<br />
word order that gives nonhuman animals a sentence's most emphatic position: beginning or end<br />
<br />
word order that frequently places nonhumans before humans (nonhuman and human animals; the cat and her human companion Steve)<br />
<br />
<b>Avoid ...</b><br />
<br />
syntax that buries nonhuman animals inside a list, dependent clause, or prepositional phrase<br />
<br />
syntax that equates nonhuman beings with inanimate things (The tornado destroyed a barn and ten cows)<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>WORD CHOICES</b><br />
<br />
<b>Animalkind</b><br />
<br />
<b>Use ...</b><br />
<br />
animals to include all creatures (human and nonhuman) with a nervous system<br />
<br />
mammals, primates, and apes to include humans<br />
<br />
persons, individuals, others, and people to include nonhumans<br />
<br />
the same vocabularly for nonhumans and humans (pigs and humans eat rather than feed; the bodies of dead sheep or humans are corpses not carcasses; like women, female dogs and cats have ovariohysterectomies rather than are spayed)<br />
<br />
parallel forms for humans and nonhumans (nonhuman and human animals; humans and dogs instead of human beings and dogs, mankind and dogs, or man and dogs)<br />
<br />
<b>Avoid ...</b><br />
<br />
expressions that elevate humans above other animals (human kindness: the rational species; the sanctity of human life)<br />
<br />
human-nonhuman comparisons that patronize nonhumans (almost human; Chimpanzees have many human characteristics)<br />
<br />
hierarchical references to animals (lower animals; subhuman; inferior)<br />
<br />
dismissive just, mere, only, and even before animal terms (a mere beetle; They're just animals)<br />
<br />
pejorative nonhuman-animal metaphors and similes (bitch; to parrot; eat like a pig)<br />
<br />
the imprecise, demeaning terms beast, brute, and dumb animal<br />
<br />
terms that portray nonhumans relatively free of human control and genetic manipulation as dangerous or inferior (wild animals; mongrel; mutt)<br />
<br />
category labels that vilify nonhumans (vermin; pests; trash fish)<br />
<br />
category labels that depict nonhuman animals in a particular situation as animals of a particular type (lab animal; poultry; companion animal)<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Nonhuman thought and feeling</b><br />
<br />
<b>Use ...</b><br />
<br />
words that directly attribute thought and feeling to nonhuman animals (understand; joy; eager)<br />
<br />
verbs that imply nonhuman emotion and intention (romped instead of leaped about; fled instead of ran)<br />
<br />
connnecting words that invest nonhuman action with purpose (bounded in for his supper; jumps onto the windowsill so that she can look outside: barked because someone rang the doorbell)<br />
<br />
strong words for intense nonhuman feelings (severe suffering; love rather than affection; pain rather than discomfort)<br />
<br />
<b>Avoid ...</b><br />
<br />
overqualified reference to nonhuman thought and feeling (seemed to recognise; as if she felt pain; This behaviour might indicate lonliness)<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Nonhuman Individuals</b><br />
<br />
<b>Use ...</b><br />
<br />
he for a male animal, she for a female, and she/he or he/she for a hermaphrodite - not it<br />
<br />
she or he for a particular individual of unknown gender (Whenever I see a turtle on the road, I move them to safety; If another hawk comes, let's watch them through binoculars; One of the puppies [among males and females) already had their vaccinations)<br />
<br />
a singular sex-specific pronoun when a singular indefinite term, such as any or each, refers to group members of the same sex (Every cow stayed close to her calf; Any cock who tried to escape had his neck wrung; Each earthworm struggled when she/he was pierced by the hook)<br />
<br />
they when a singular indefinite term refers to members of a group that includes individuals of different sexes or unknown sex (Neither deer [a buck and a doe] recovered from their wounds; Each alligator had so little space that they barely could move)<br />
<br />
who (not that, which or what) for any sentient beings<br />
<br />
anybody/anyone, everybody/everyone, nobody/no one, and somebody/someone (not anything, everything, nothing, or something) for any sentient beings<br />
<br />
relational references to nonhuman animals after possessive pronouns (my cat companion, not my cat; our canary friends, not our canaries)<br />
<br />
personal names for nonhuman animals (Sally; Max)<br />
<br />
the most specific nontechnical way of referring to a particular nonhuman (Toby the horned toad rather than a horned toad; a beagle rather than a dog; an albino rat rather than a Sprague-Dawley rat)<br />
<br />
language that correctly distinguishes nonhuman individuals from their groups (killed a member of an endangered species, not killed an endangered species; captured birds of 22 species, not captured 22 species of birds<br />
<br />
inflected animal plurals in preference to uninflected (many fishes rather than many fish; five trouts rather than five trout; three quails rather than three quail)<br />
<br />
plural forms of words for individual animals in preference to collective nouns (the chickens instead of the flock; free-living nonhumans instead of wildlife; the ants instead of the colony)<br />
<br />
number (not amount) references to living animals how many geese, not how much geese; catch three catfishes, not catch eight pounds of catfish; some of the cows, not part of the herd)<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Avoid ...</b><br />
<br />
language that replaces nonhuman animals with a site (poisoned the fish tank; pig farms that experience disease)<br />
<br />
reference to living animals as if they were remains (raise beef; trophy hunter; fur trapper)<br />
<br />
reference to remains as if they were living animals (milk-fed veal; grain-fed beef; a turkey in reference to turkey remains)<br />
<br />
terms that equate nonhuman animals with insentient things (the oyster crop; reference to mice as research tools; reference to sharks as killing machines)<br />
<br />
commodity references to nonhuman animals livestock; surplus dogs and cats; reference to male chicks as egg-industry byproducts)<br />
<br />
language that conveys a proprietary view of nonhuman animals (fisheries; wildlife conservation; Vandals killed the zoo's falcon)<br />
<br />
reference to nonhumans as human-created (build a better cow; genetically engineered mice; trout production)<br />
<br />
terms that negate animal's uniqueness (replacement lambs; standardized dogs; reference to nonhumans as renewable resources)<br />
<br />
reference to all members of a group as if they were a single animal (the woodpecker for all woodpeckers; the silverfish for silverfishes in general)<br />
<br />
<b>Speciesist Abuse</b><br />
<br />
<b>Use ...</b><br />
<br />
everyday language free of jargon (stab with a large hook, not gaff; breaking the neck, not cervical dislocation)<br />
<br />
moralistic language (murder, cruelty, speciesism), not morally detached language such as that of economics, experimentation or recreation<br />
<br />
political terms with legal implications (animal rights; justice; personhood)<br />
<br />
equally strong words for human and nonhuman suffering or death (extreme, tragic or terrible)<br />
<br />
wording that keeps nonhuman animals in view (Many pigs died, not Mortality was high; The trapped fox struggled, not Struggling occured<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Avoid ...</b><br />
<br />
expressions that trivialize violence toward nonhuman animals (kill two birds with one stone; have other fish to fry)<br />
<br />
euphemisms for abuse (fur farming; animal agriculture; biomedical research for vivisection)<br />
<br />
euphemisms for animal-derived products (leather; sausage; veal)<br />
<br />
understatements about nonhuman suffering and death (Zoos may not be ideal homes; Hunters don't always aim perfectly)<br />
<br />
positive words in reference to abuse (farm-animal welfare; humane treatment in reference to vivisection; eucational in reference to aquaprisons or zoos)<br />
<br />
oxymorons (humane slaughter; necessary evil; shooting preserve; responsible breeding)<br />
<br />
terms that naturalize the unnatural (habitat for a cage; wildlife center for a zoo; naturalist for someone who studies imrisoned nonhumans)<br />
<br />
terms that disguise killing as protection (shelter for a facility where healthy nonhumans are killed; wildlife refuge for a place where hunting or fishing is allowed)<br />
<br />
words that glamorize inbreeding (thoroughbreds; purebred dogs; improved turkeys)<br />
<br />
language that blames nonhuman victims (an orangutan who escapes from a zoo and stubbornly resists recapture; elephants punished for rebelling against circus enslavement)<br />
<br />
expressions that imply nonhuman victimizationis natural and acceptable (work like a horse; human guinea pig; treated us like animals)<br />
<br />
wording that portrays nonhumans as willing victims (monkeys who participate in experiments and give their lives; a captured octopus who took up residence in an aquaprison)<br />
<br />
over- terms that implicitly sanction less-rampant killing and less-extreme coercion (overhunt; overfish; overwork a horse<br />
<br />
language that depicts choice as necessity (necessary evil in reference to vivisection; carnivores or predators in reference to humans)<br />
<br />
reference to abusers as protectors (animal lover in reference to a vivisector; animal welfarist in reference to a cattle enslaver)<br />
<br />
punning or other wordplay that invites people to smirk at atrocities (the title They Eat Horses, Don't They? or You Can Lead a Horse to Slaughter for an article on horse slaughter; the slogan Don't Gobble Me or Thanksgiving Is Murder on Turkeys intended to protest turkeys' mass murder)<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>PUNCTUATION</b><br />
<br />
<b>Use ...</b><br />
<br />
quotation marks around euphemisms (predator "control" for the killing of predators; "discipline" for beatings; "collection" for capture)<br />
<br />
quotation marks around language that reduces animals to things (the crab "harvest"; "depleted" fish "stocks"; the use of mouse "models")<br />
<br />
quotation marks arounf terms that indirectly denigrate nonhuman animals ("brutal"; "animal instinct"; "bestiality")<br />
<br />
<b>Avoid ...</b><br />
<br />
scare-quotes around accurate terms for speciesist abuse ("torture"; "enslavement"; "genocide")<br />
<br />
scare-quotes around words that acknowledge nonhuman thought and feeling ("grief"; "happiness"; "realized")<br />
<br />
quotation marks around a nonhuman animal's personal name ("Billie" the golden hamster) unless the name is contemptuous