Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account by Christine Korsgaard

[Spencer Lo]

Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account
Christine Korsgaard

Please click this link to view and read the .pdf: Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account.

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[Tim Gier]

Thanks, Spencer, for making this work available on ARZone. It strikes me on first reading as simply one of the best things I've encountered in quite some time on the "animal question". I will be sure to read it again.

Korsgaard's thinking about of self-consciousness seems to me to be right on target and her thoughts on 'good' as 'good for someone' also seem correct. I will quote here an entire paragraph of the piece, as it seems eminently sensible to me. This paragraph comes after Korsgaard has acknowledged that other animals are incapable of giving their informed consent to be used as a means. She writes:

I suppose someone might conclude that since we can’t get their consent, we should try to avoid interacting with the other animals at all. But this is not an option as conditions stand at present, for the fate of most animals will inevitably be determined by what human beings do. And in any case, I see no reason to take such an extreme position. We may interact with the other animals as long as we do so in ways to which we think it is plausible to think they would consent if they could— that is, in ways that are mutually beneficial and fair, and allow them to live something reasonably like their own sort of life. If we provide them with proper living conditions, I believe, their use as companion animals, aides to the handicapped and to the police, search-and-rescue workers, guards, and perhaps even as providers of wool, dairy products, or eggs, might possibly be made consistent with this standard. But it is not plausible to suppose a nonhuman animal would consent to being killed before the term of her natural life is over in order to be eaten or because someone else wants the use of her pelt, and it is not plausible to think she would consent to be tortured for scientific information.

It is not impossible that humans beings can use other animals in ways that are respectful of what is good for them; all use of other animals is not necessarily the use of them as "mere means". It is not necessarily the case that the only ethically justified position in regard to other animals must be veganism.

Coincidentally, I've been reading the work of Richard Kraut, who also develops the idea of 'good for someone' and whom Korsgaard mentions in her footnotes. I recommend his books (What is Good and Why: The ethics of well-being and Against Absolute Goodness) to anyone who may be interested in thinking on these things. 

[Carolyn Bailey]

"We may interact with the other animals as long as we do so in ways to which we think it is plausible to think they would consent if they could— that is, in ways that are mutually beneficial and fair, and allow them to live something reasonably like their own sort of life. If we provide them with proper living conditions, I believe, their use as companion animals, aides to the handicapped and to the police, search-and-rescue workers, guards, and perhaps even as providers of wool, dairy products, or eggs, might possibly be made consistent with this standard." 

Is the author suggesting that other animals would, if they could, consent to giving away the milk that is naturally produced to feed their babies? When I was feeding my baby, my body adjusted perfectly to the amount of milk my baby required. I believe all mothers' bodies do the same. It is ridiculous to suggest that there is "leftover" milk to share around from the body of any breastfeeding mother, and even more ridiculous to suggest that a mother would consent to sharing her baby's food with others. 



Tim Gier said:

Thanks, Spencer, for making this work available on ARZone. It strikes me on first reading as simply one of the best things I've encountered in quite some time on the "animal question". I will be sure to read it again.

Korsgaard's thinking about of self-consciousness seems to me to be right on target and her thoughts on 'good' as 'good for someone' also seem correct. I will quote here an entire paragraph of the piece, as it seems eminently sensible to me. This paragraph comes after Korsgaard has acknowledged that other animals are incapable of giving their informed consent to be used as a means. She writes:

I suppose someone might conclude that since we can’t get their consent, we should try to avoid interacting with the other animals at all. But this is not an option as conditions stand at present, for the fate of most animals will inevitably be determined by what human beings do. And in any case, I see no reason to take such an extreme position. We may interact with the other animals as long as we do so in ways to which we think it is plausible to think they would consent if they could— that is, in ways that are mutually beneficial and fair, and allow them to live something reasonably like their own sort of life. If we provide them with proper living conditions, I believe, their use as companion animals, aides to the handicapped and to the police, search-and-rescue workers, guards, and perhaps even as providers of wool, dairy products, or eggs, might possibly be made consistent with this standard. But it is not plausible to suppose a nonhuman animal would consent to being killed before the term of her natural life is over in order to be eaten or because someone else wants the use of her pelt, and it is not plausible to think she would consent to be tortured for scientific information.

It is not impossible that humans beings can use other animals in ways that are respectful of what is good for them; all use of other animals is not necessarily the use of them as "mere means". It is not necessarily the case that the only ethically justified position in regard to other animals must be veganism.

Coincidentally, I've been reading the work of Richard Kraut, who also develops the idea of 'good for someone' and whom Korsgaard mentions in her footnotes. I recommend his books (What is Good and Why: The ethics of well-being and Against Absolute Goodness) to anyone who may be interested in thinking on these things.