Animal Rights Zone

Fighting for animal liberation and an end to speciesism

Transcript of David Sztybel's ARZone Guest Chat ~ Part 1

 

Transcript of David Sztybel's ARZone Guest chat

15 January 2011 at:

5pm US Eastern Time

10pm UK Time and

16 January 2011 at:

8am Australian Eastern Standard Time

 

Part 1

 

Carolyn Bailey:

ARZone would like to welcome Dr. David Sztybel today, as our Live Chat Guest.

 

David is a Canadian ethicist who specialises in animal ethics. He is a vegan, and has been an animal rights activist for more than 22 years. David has attained his Ph. D. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto (1994-2000) as well as his M.A. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto (1992-94) his B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto (1986-91) and a B. Ed. in English and Social Studies from the University of Toronto (2005-2006)

 

David has published numerous articles pertaining to the liberation of all sentient beings and has lectured at the University of Toronto, Queen's University, and Brock University.

 

David has developed a new theory of animal rights which he terms "best caring," as outlined in "The Rights of Animal Persons.” Criticizing conventional theories of rights, based in intuition, traditionalism or common sense, compassion, Immanuel Kant's theory, John Rawls' theory, and Alan Gewirth's theory, David devises a new theory of rights for human and nonhuman animals.

 

David maintains his blog site at http://davidsztybel.blogspot.com/ and a very informative website at: http://sztybel.tripod.com/home.html

 

David is looking forward to engaging ARZone members today in reference to topics ranging from his literature to his position on animal rights and welfare.

 

Please join with me in welcoming David to ARZone today.

 

Welcome, David!

 

Will:

Hello

 

Jason Ward:

Good day David!!!

 

Brooke Cameron:

Welcome, David!

 

David Sztybel:

Hi there, Will and others!

 

Tim Gier:

Hello (again) David!

 

Kate:

Hello David. Thanks for being here.

 

Eduardo Terrer:

Hello, David

 

Erin:

Helloooo

 

Fina:

Hello

 

Adam Weissman:

Hi, David

 

Barbara DeGrande:

Welcome

 

Mangus O’Shales:

hi, Dr. S

 

Sky:

Hi

 

Brandon Becker:

Thanks for being here today!

 

David Sztybel:

G'day Jason, hi again Tim, Kate, Eduardo, Erin, Fina, Adam, Barbara, Mangus, Sky, and Brandon

 

Carolyn Bailey:

Before we begin, I’d like to request that members refrain from interrupting David during the chat session, and utilise the open chat, at the completion of David’s pre-registered questions, for any questions or comments you have.

 

I’d now like to ask Brooke Cameron to ask David his first question, when you’re ready, Brooke.

 

Brooke Cameron:

Hi David, thanks very much for being here! In your opinion, who is an abolitionist, and why?

 

David Sztybel:

Hi there, Brooke.  Thank you very kindly for the warm welcome. This is an important question. So you’ve provoked something of a lecture! Indeed, the following brief essay (as essays go!) is also relevant for addressing questions 2, 6, 11, 13, 14, 15. So I hope you do not mind the considerable length, but I am very serious about these and related questions.

 

As many people know, Professor Gary L. Francione’s core website is entitled “The Abolitionist Approach.” He is implying that his approach alone qualifies as abolitionist. Now by abolition he explicitly refers to abolishing the property status of animals, just like 19th century (and earlier) advocates pushed against humans-as-property, ie, slavery.

 

However, it is important to be clear that by property status, Francione means more than:

 

(1) being legally owned. It is also associated with

 

(2) being treated literally as if one is an object or thing by denying that one has a mind, feelings, or interests as the Cartesians (followers of Rene Descartes) maintain;

 

(3) being figuratively treated as a thing by conceding that animals have minds and feelings but by treating them in a way AS IF they are beings without interests, through a disregarding of interests;

 

(4) being treated as if one is a mere means, tool, resource, instrument, or slave whose value can be reduced to that of a commodity (again disregarding interests);

 

(5) being subjected to unnecessary suffering (again disregarding a specific interest).

 

So an animal eradicated as a “pest” is not anyone’s property or tool but is being treated as in (2) possibly, but certainly as in (3) to (5).

 

Vegans may have legal ownership but refuse other dimensions of animals-as-property in Francione’s sense. Not all conditions need apply since many exploiters grant that animals have feelings as well. This model can be compared to symptoms of a disease, all of which are had in full-blown form but not all of which are needed to make the diagnosis.

 

This is my interpretation of Francione’s not-property theory, identifying five conditions which he does not clearly set out in this manner. It is I who am interpreting the fact that each condition disregards interests. I newly distinguish between literally and figuratively treating animals as objects; and I use my own disease-symptom comparison for the purposes of clarification.

 

Really Francione seems to be getting at speciesism here. He favours the abolition of speciesism. So do I. I am a vegan animal rightist and I advocate that individuals should transform suitably. I advocate the most possible abolition of speciesism.

 

On the legislative front, Francione advocates either:

 

(1) no action (which seems to be his current recommendation);

 

(2) securing proto-rights (Tom Regan’s term that Francione has adopted) that fully secure an animal’s interest, such as freedom of movement or bodily integrity;

 

(3) abolishing a whole area of animal exploitation, such as testing drugs on animals.

 

I however agree with (3), since it would be great to ban, say, animal circus acts, but disagree otherwise since we can make progress for animals by lessening speciesism, say, by seeing that farmed animals are given 70% freedom of movement rather than 100%. I argue that aiming for 100% protection of this interest would be giving animals the freedom of movement found on animal rights sanctuaries, and contemporary companies and the government or both are just not going to pay for that.

 

So advocating 100% protection will be defeated in any contemporary legislature, resulting in no lessening of speciesism whatsoever. By contrast, my approach would lessen speciesism more by securing the maximum degree of protection of animals’ interests that is available. So both Francione and myself aim for the abolition of animals’ property status, which I think is much more clearly termed speciesism the way Francione uses these terms, but we differ in our approach.

 

And you can see, Brooke, that I maintain that my approach eradicates more speciesism, in practice, than his. I also maintain that it is illegitimate for Francione to call his THE abolitionist approach, as if there is only one.

 

Allow me to quote my most recent blog entry on that from December 9, 2010: [My blog, On the Road to Liberation, is found at:http://davidsztybel.blogspot.com/]   “…it is philosophically and grammatically nonsensical for Gary Francione and the Francionists to deny that people such as me are abolitionists. My philosophy aims for the abolition of speciesism, animals as property or slaves. Philosophically, anyone who aims for abolition is an abolitionist. Grammatically, it is unintelligible because the same rule holds for accurate grammarians. On dictionary.com the definition of the suffix “-ist” is as follows: ‘a suffix of nouns, often corresponding to verbs ending in –ize or nouns ending in –ism, that denote a person who practices or is concerned with something, or holds certain principles, doctrines, etc.: apologist, dramatist, machinist, novelist, realist, socialist, Thomist.” Now we are plainly dealing here with abolitionism. Abolitionist in my case and those who are like-minded denotes being concerned with something, and indeed adhering to a principle, namely abolition, making the –ist label not only permissible but grammatically inevitable.

 

Now the 19th century abolitionists only meant to abolish slavery, not racism. But that original intent was insufficient. We need to abolish racism and speciesism alike.

 

Notice how I used the term “Francionist.” This is a significant note for this discussion in general. I quote from my blog entry for August 30, 2010 on the term, Francionism: “Note that Francione in the past has objected to the term ‘Francionism’ but I am tired of pandering to this particular preference. For it does not seem justifiable. It could only be objectionable if perhaps it is insulting, but ‘Marxism’ is not that, for example. Or Francione said ‘Francionism’ overly makes it appear as though the debate is about him in particular. However, that is not accurate. The term merely identifies a set of view associated with him, and therefore is as legitimate as ‘Marxism.’ His form of abolitionism in fact really needs to be distinguished from other forms such as that of Joan Dunayer. Failing to do so would in effect unduly associate ALL abolitionism with Francione, which is not the case but which he actively promotes by vainly calling his strategy ‘the abolitionist approach,’ as though there is only one. Ironically, calling his work ‘the abolitionist approach’ without distinguishing, by name, his brand of it would even more seek to make the relevant ideas about Francione, as opposed to any other theorists.

 

I suspect that the coy fluttering aside of ‘Francionism’ is merely false modesty, then, given that he seeks to encompass ALL abolitionism. Or so his use of ‘the’ here logically implies. Marxism is not about Marx hardly at all and Francionism is certainly not about Francione. It is actually ODD that Francione thinks that using the term would indicate that the debate is about him. The only name that Francione provides for his views is ‘the abolitionist approach,’ and since that is inaccurate, we need another one, and Francionism will do nicely since it is both accurate and distinctive.” Even ‘fundamentalist’ which I use does not only mean Francionist kinds, since Dunayer is more of a fundamentalist than he is as I defend elsewhere.

 

So in short, abolitionists agree on the end of abolition, however that is defined, but disagree on the means or the way of getting there. Or so my opinion goes, and you asked. But you asked for a justification as to who is an abolitionist. I have given philosophical, grammatical reasons, but also an objection against Francione trying to arrogate the term pretty much solely to himself and those who substantially enough happen to agree with him. Francione himself refers to people like me as “new welfarists,” but in my work I outline how I do not match even ONE of his five criteria of who counts as a new welfarist. I quote the following from my MIRROR PRODUCTION (short form) of “Animal Rights Law”: Francione outlines five supposed characteristics of “new welfarists”:

 

(1) they favour abolishing animal usage so long as animal interests are not devalued due to speciesism;

 

(2) they believe that animal rights cannot provide a practical agenda for seeking abolition;

 

(3) animal welfare campaigns are identical to traditional welfarist tactics;

 

(4) most new welfarists see their measures as causally related to abolishing animal exploitation; and

 

(5) new welfarists believe there is no moral or logical inconsistency in “reinforcing an instrumentalist view of animals.”

 

Although these five characteristics are meant to embody people such as myself, none of them apply at all to my version of animal rights pragmatism. For I favour simply choosing the best of inevitably speciesist legislative options for the short-term contrary to (1), so there is an acceptance that speciesism on the part of others cannot be avoided.

 

Francione also supports speciesist options, e.g., banning dehorning of cattle. That still leaves eating the cattle and abusing them in other ways.

 

Contrary to (2), animal rights is very much part of my practical agenda in dealing with individuals and explicitly as a long-term legislative goal. As against (3), my advocating abolition is not “identical” to traditionalists who wholly approve of speciesist animal “welfare” and do not advocate animal rights. Contradicting (4), I argue in favour of “welfarist” laws being CONDUCIVE to animal rights in some cases, never as simply “causing” animal rights laws. Finally, with respect to (5), I openly acknowledge that animal “welfare” laws are logically different from animal rights laws.

 

The term “new welfarist” has caused ever so much needless division, alienation, lack of communication, and so on. If ultimately I aim to TRANSCEND animal welfare as I explicitly do, it does not seem accurate or fair to label me overall as a “welfarist” since ultimately I aim for abolition, or indeed animal liberation, above all. Also, take the label “new.” It is so inaccurate as well. Henry S. Salt, in Victorian times, e.g., in his book, ANIMALS’ RIGHTS CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS, in late Victorian England, argues both for animal rights in the legislative long-term and animal “welfare” laws in the short term.

 

So Francione, seemingly ignorant of such history, cannot be identifying any “new” form of welfarism unless of course he means that Victorian-era things are really “new.” Take their fashion-sense for example (just kidding).8-)  

 

You asked “why?” with respect to abolitionist approaches. Francione has denied that myself and my cohort are abolitionists, presumably because he thinks his approach works towards abolition and mine does not. I will try to show the exact reverse of what he is telling you. Here I will have to reteach why Sztybelian abolitionism, if you will, is much better than Francionist abolition. [I know, I know, when will this wind-bag just give it up and come to the point already!!!]  :-* Sorry for the length, but you asked!

 

This reteaching will also be relevant to answering other questions in this chat, such as the one from Eduardo Terrer. I have never taught my abolitionist approach as justifiable and better than Francione’s in this way before, and I do so for both clarity and argumentative strength.

 

So the main respect in which Francione’s abolitionism differs from mine is that he would advocate, short of full animal rights in the law, protecting a whole interest of an animal (this can be thought of as winning one animal right at a time, although he never puts matters this way and instead calls this winning “proto-rights” after Tom Regan, which makes sense because one cannot fully respect one animal right without honouring all or most of the others too). So he would say that 100% of the interest in liberty of movement must be honoured in a law, whereas I would say 70% of that would be OK if that is the best we can do. Realistically, he is asking animals be given recognition for their interests equivalent to what they would receive on an animal rights sanctuary (solely with respect to the interest in question though). Who is going to pay for that? Corporations? Government? He never considers this, but I have argued all along that neither will, obviously, in a capitalist society. Therefore his kind of bill would be utterly defeated and replaced with “welfarist” bills or nothing at all. It would be a wasted legislative campaign. (Although it might have some educative value.) Just as full animal rights are unrealistic for the legislative short-term, as everyone agrees, so winning almost a whole animal right or proto-right is equally unrealistic.

 

He has not cured the problem of being unrealistic, but merely splintered it by focusing on one animal interest at a time rather than all of them at once, as it were. I argue in much more detail about protecting whole interests versus the “welfarist” approach of protecting only degrees of interests in my paper, “Animal Rights Law”

 

http://sztybel.tripod.com/arlaw.pdf

 

One thing that is not part of this debate are three things that are absolutely identical in my approach and his:

 

(1) Animal rights and vegan activism, which is good in many ways but will also help build up democratic potential for animal rights laws, as I would put it;

 

(2) Never opting for cosmetic changes in the law. That is both unethical because duplicitous and not furthering moral goals, but more ineffective than no legal change at all because it will further entrench animal misery and give people the illusion that real change has occurred

 

(3) Banning entire areas of animal exploitation. He would of course go for that and I am all over that as well. Good examples are prohibiting animal circus acts and marine mammal shows in England, and banning fox hunting, also in the U.K.

 

Now Francione states in his book, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER, that one can reasonably abstain from legislative advocacy at this time, and that is the approach he favours on his website: focus on vegan education, for example, instead. He calls animal rights an “outsider” position from the legislative process, whereas I demonstrate otherwise in my animal rights, abolitionist approach, although we both agree that animal rights are not forthcoming in contemporary laws.

 

The two key areas for this debate are ETHICS and EFFECTIVENESS. I will both justify my own approach in terms of these, and show that Francionism is no better than but usually much worse than my own, depending which facet one focuses on. Let’s start with ethics, since that is the core of the animal rights movement, after all. These questions are not simple, but complex matters, which will be reflected in my evaluating my many criteria rather than just one or a few.

 

ETHICS

Let us see if we can agree on criteria for evaluating legislative proposals ethically. I will compare for example my advocating controlled gas killing of chickens versus Francione opposing any such change, or only proto-rights. My approach means the birds:

 

(1) are not electroshocked into unconsciousness; that must hurt;

 

(2) would not be left conscious, as they often are after shocking, when they are dipped into a scalding tank for de-feathering

 

(3) would not be left conscious and terrified of what they see and experience before and while their throats are cut, which would also be painful and not perfectly instantaneous I believe.

 

Francione’s approach clearly means torture along the lines noted above (and more no doubt). Now this presumably comes under ‘bodily integrity,’ an interest Francione designates as fitting for a right (I would say a right to welfare; it is obvious why Francione resists that term, although having your body intact is not nearly enough to be doing well or OK physically AND mentally). A measure fully respecting bodily integrity would be the birds not being killed at all or would only come with full animal rights. We’d have a LONG time to wait for that. Other reforms he opposes include larger cage sizes instead of living their whole lives in unbearably minimal enclosures often with no room even to move about or stretch a wing, not providing water to thirsty cows in slaughterhouses, among other cruel deprivations that he would deliberately prolong, which to me is morally obscene because also cruel, but let me set about justifying that opinion. [I say this but bear no personal animosity here; I know people have their reasons.]

 

Anyway, here are the ethical criteria for evaluating such controlled gas killing. Any given legislative measure (whether “welfarist”, proto-rights, or just lack of action deliberately taken as a choice):

 

ETHICS CRITERIA

(1) must have positive significance for animals

 

(2) must not endorse animal exploitation

 

(3) must not exhibit overall complicity with that which is morally wrong

 

(4) must avoid speciesism as much as possible

 

(5) must avoid a conflict with animal rights theory as much as possible

 

(6) must, in the absence of any truly ideal conditions by law, resolve a dilemma choice in a manner that can be reasonably viewed as salvaging the most possible good in the given context.

 

(7) must secure, as much as possible, a just and decent share of good for animals

 

(8) must realize what is really best for animals at the given time, if the best that is conceivable or imaginable is not possible to realize in the time frame in quest

 

(9) must view animals as ends in themselves, not mere means (to use philosopher Immanuel Kant’s influential phrasing)

 

(10) must not permit unnecessary suffering

 

(11) must afford a model that can progressively grow into animal rights

 

(12) must be as conducive as possible towards animal rights laws in the long-term since animal rights is a moral goal

 

(13) must be as consistent as possible with the principle of equal consideration

 

(14) must be self-consistent and avoid any charges of hypocrisy

 

(15) must be sustainable even in light of the fact that we would abolish child abuse entirely, not make it “kinder”

 

(16) must at least allow for individual kindness towards animals.

 

I hope people find these criteria agreeable. If not, so much the worse for someone’s position ethically, I would have to say, although I cannot argue for that here. Instead, I am depending on what many animal rights people would agree with. Some of the criteria are not sufficient to formulate animal rights by themselves, but would still be agreed with in conjunction with an animal rights philosophy even by Francionists as I read them. The same goes with the following criteria for evaluating effectiveness of legislative proposals, before we get down to business and actually apply both sets of criteria to this debate:

 

EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA

The measure:

 

(1) must be regarded as meaningful not only semantically but especially in terms of significance to the animals themselves

 

(2) must not be positively futile to advocate

 

(3) will provide the strongest possible protection for animals

 

(4) must provide benefits that no other pro-animal measure, legislative or other, can result in

 

(5) will provide the greatest possible inroad against speciesism

 

(6) will be positively or most conducive towards adopting animal rights in the law

 

(7) will not lead to such complacency with animal treatment that undermines achieving animal rights in the law or even makes it futile to aim for such laws

 

(8) must be achievable as one criteria of success

 

(9) should not lead to such increases in animal product consumption that would make the measure have an overall negative impact on animals or their rights (EIGHT) again!

 

(10) must pass a reasonable test period to see if the given strategy is successful animal law

 

(11)  should ideally be illustrated to be successful with a real-world example, or at least a plausible hypothetical example

 

(12) must overcome Gary L. Francione’s seven or so supposed reasons why animal “welfarist” laws cannot work in principle.

 

OK, now let’s apply our criteria. (I would defend them in a later work.)

 

APPLYING ETHICS CRITERIA LEGEND:

SZTYBEL = mine and PETA’s and most animal activists’ endorsement of controlled gas killing of chickens (see above), using my framework

 

FRANCIONE DON’T = his advocating abstaining from legislative reform, his actual position

FRANCIONE DO = his proto-rights theory of supposedly acceptable incremental reforms

 

(1)   must have positive significance for animals.

 

SZTYBEL: If actions are to have any positive significance at all, it must be in relation to sentient beings. That is because, simply, nothing is significant to any nonsentient being. That is why toasters do not have rights. But we also cannot ultimately act for things such as rights, abolition, or speciesism. These ideals do not care about anything. But we can act for animal rights for the sake of sentient beings, and that is the best caring framework. By contrast, Francionism tries to act for abolition or animal rights even when that is at odds with what is really best for sentient beings in the LEGISLATIVE short-term. The best that is really possible is the best that can actually be accomplished. What is ideally, conceptually or imaginably best may not be possible, by contrast, except in the long-term. We can and should promote animal rights and veganism in the short-term, but cannot expect to pass laws to that effect. The best caring approach aims for animal rights law for the long-term, and the best that is really possible for animal law, that is for sentient beings, in the short-term. In controlled gas killing the three benefits for animals are all of positive significance to the chickens.

 

FRANCIONE DON’T: Also advocates animal rights law for long-term, but is missing the three items of positive significance.

 

FRANCIONE DO: He has no recommendations for proto-rights since this is a matter of suffering, and he does not recognize a right not to suffer unnecessarily. He does however support avoiding unnecessary suffering. See item (10).

 

(2)   must not endorse animal exploitation

 

SZTYBEL: I do not endorse animal slaughter. Nor does PETA. Anyone who knows us knows this. Other people do and that is why chicken slaughter persists. But we urge lawmakers to offer animals the best relief they can in the short-term since our long-term goal of abolition is not now realizable.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Exploitation means ill-using someone, or using them in such a way that involve harm or injustice. Francione’s do- nothing approach on this front (though he actively promotes veganism) means more (dire) exploitation because more harm, and also a greater degree of injustice occurs.

FRANCIONE DO: Again, no solutions, worse exploitation.

 

(3)   must not exhibit overall complicity with that which is morally wrong

 

SZTYBEL: My ultimate principle of moral rightness is best caring for sentient beings. Seeking animal rights as best that is really possible in the long-term and the best that is really possible in the short-term is obligatory. Improved slaughter is perfectly consistent with this standard.

 

FRANCIONE DON’T: He upholds animal rights, anti-speciesism as fundamental principles that are intuited, or held with no reason. Yet a reason is available, what is best for sentient beings.

But that standard condemns Francionist do-nothingism legislatively.

FRANCIONE DO: Francionists are complicit with what is morally wrong, that is, the state allowing what is avoidably and atrociously worse for birds. Again they have no solution here.

 

(4)   must avoid speciesism as much as possible

 

SZTYBEL: I am an anti-speciesist. Every time discrimination occurs due to species or species-characteristics, that is wrong. One type of speciesism is being unconcerned with avoidable animal suffering, unlike in the case of humans. Best caring would restrict against this in the short-term legislatively.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Allows more speciesist discrimination by permitting the unnecessary suffering, contrary to Francione’s own professed principles.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto, since no solutions here.

 

(5)   must avoid a conflict with animal rights theory as much as possible

 

SZTYBEL: Aims for animal rights in the long-term. Since rights theory is justified by best caring, short-term relief is justifiable. Rights in the law are only really possible in the long-term, as pretty much everyone agrees. If animals have a right to be precluded unnecessary suffering, as I would argue is a requirement of anti-speciesism, then Francione is more at odds with this right than my more humane law. Think of all of the interests protected by rights. Now picture that we can respect those interest entirely or by degrees. My model affords a DEGREE of protection and Francione’s none, so my model more closely approximates animal rights than his model, which disregards animals’ interests more than mine.

FRANCIONE DON’T: At odds with anti-speciesist rights as above.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto

 

(6) must, in the absence of any truly ideal conditions by law, resolve a dilemma choice in a manner that can be reasonably viewed as salvaging the most possible good in the given context.

 

SZTYBEL: Dilemma theory is applicable in any case in which ideal conditions are impossible, so one must choose a course of action that is unideal. It would normally be morally wrong to leave someone to burn in a building if one could save the person, but not ethically mistaken if one can only rescue one person from the fire, a classic example that Francione himself uses. In dilemmas it is most caring to salvage the most good. My approach plainly does this, whereas Francione’s results in less good and more positive harms to the chickens.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Chooses the dilemma option that is less good and more harmful for animals.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto

 

(7) must secure, as much as possible, a just and decent share of good for animals

 

SZTYBEL: Again, picture all the interests of animals. They are closer to a just and decent concern with avoidable suffering on my model than on Francione’s, which is farther away from full respect for this interest. Just because speciesists also speak of unnecessary suffering does not mean that anti-speciesists should not also aim for this. Indeed Francione aims for this he says, but he does not do as he says.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Farther away from just and decent treatment.

FRANCIONE DO: Ditto

 

(8) must realize what is really best for animals at the given time, if the best that is conceivable or imaginable is not possible to realize in the time frame in question.

 

SZYTBEL: See above. Also, respecting 80% of an interest is really better than respecting an interest not at all, or advocating 100% respect for the interest knowing that would be defeated as a law-proposal.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Animals remain further from what is best for them. Francione writes: “I agree with [Peter—DS] Singer that it would be better for ‘food’ animals if we adopted true ‘free-range’ farming and discontinued factory farming.” (INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, p. 145) Yet he actively resists what is best for sentient beings out of idol worship, to use a metaphor, of ideas such as rights, resisting so many anti-factory-farming legal measures.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto

 

(9) must view animals as ends in themselves, and not as a mere means (to use philosopher Immanuel Kant’s influential phrasing)

 

SZTYBEL: By this, Kant means persons should not be exploited, or we should not disregard the interests of others if we use them or their services (e.g., exploiting a worker). On my model there is less disregard for animals’ interest in not suffering. There is no BETTER regard for interests than seeking the best for someone that is possible at that time, and that is precisely what my best caring affords.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: Animals get less treated as ends in themselves, or with dignity, and more as a mere means, or with blatant disregard for their interests. Animals get treated as mere means I in other ways on Francione’s framework:

 

(a) He asks whether helping these chickens will conduce towards animal rights law eventually. Thus the birds are considered as a mere means towards a distant goal; my approach does not do this because it considers present-day animals as ends-in-themselves as much as possible

 

 

(b)  He approves of laws, such as banning dehorning, that still would treat animals as mere means (so would mine, but I am MINIMIZING this, and can justify it, unlike Francione)

 

(c ) He says we should realize that animal “welfarist” laws lead to complacency (discussed under effectiveness); the logical implication is that keeping conditions cruel makes people less complacent, thus using animals as a mere means towards the end of checking complacency

 

(d) he acts ultimately for mere things as rights, abolition, using animals or sentient beings as mere means towards these because their interests are degraded and not addresse not addressed out of “service” to these ideals— not that they care about anything; animals become subordinated to a concern with abstractions

 

(10) must not permit unnecessary suffering

 

SZTYBEL: Plainly animals would suffer less as I explained.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Francionism leads to more suffering. He champions the principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering but oddly only considers this principle in terms of abolishing animal exploitation. He does not consider unnecessary suffering that can be curbed with “welfarist” laws although that is a key component of this debate. He fails to consider this only because he cannot win on this point, even conceivably. His approach tolerates much, much more animal suffering by advocating no change or else unrealistic proto-rights that equally result in nothing.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto

 

(11) must afford a model that can progressively grow into animal rights

 

SZTYBEL: Again, there are an array of interests that rights protect. Securing a degree of respecting interests under “welfarism” brings us closer to higher degrees of respect or even the full respect that rights involve.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: His approach of course can grow into animal rights, although it leaves us farther away from that full respect for interests in the legislative short-term, which is probably a very long time or even the rest of history if we never achieve animal rights laws (I prefer to remain optimistic however).

 

(12) Must be as conducive as possible towards animal rights laws in the long-term since animal rights is a moral goal SZTYBEL: see effectiveness discussion. But ending up with nothing as in this example is again more far short of rights.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: see effectiveness discussion

 

(13) must be as consistent as possible with the principle of equal consideration

 

SZTYBEL: Animal “welfarism” brings animal suffering closer to parity with consideration for humans as the suffering is negated. Humans are supposed to have their unnecessary suffering negated, although this is far from always true in practice. I advocate a much fuller form of equal consideration for the long-term, as Francione does too.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: Farther from being at parity with the consideration of suffering in a non-speciesist manner. Advocating equal consideration for animals in the legislative short-term does not win such consideration. Francione would claim that in the human case we would not embrace reformist measures. But if a vegan animal rightist were unjustly imprisoned, and we could not free him or her, we should support making sure he or she gets access to vegan food, which is not always the case, at least adequately. That is reforming the injustice, not abolishing it. Dehorning being banned as he says also regulates cattle-destruction, not abolishing it too, which makes Francione a mammoth hypocrite. I can say that without prejudice or ill will, but just as a descriptive fact.

 

(14) must be self-consistent and avoid any charges of hypocrisy

 

SZTYBEL: All of my findings are consistent with the best caring principle.

 

FRANCIONE: Pays lip service to opposing unnecessary suffering, antispeciesism, but when it comes down to cases he allows more suffering which is allowed to occur by government for speciesist reasons. He opposes a law to provide water to thirsty cows in slaughterhouses because it leaves a speciesist practice (RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER p. 208-) and involves a conflict with rights theory (RAIN p. 211). Yet he approves laws to ban dehorning, which equally leave speciesist practices that conflict with rights theory. Plain hypocrisy.

 

(15) must be sustainable even in light of the fact that we would abolish child abuse entirely, not make it “kinder” SZTYBEL: I would abolish child abuse. But asking for normal treatment of animals just leads to their abuse, unlike in the disanalogous case of children.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: His proposals such as banning dehorning would only abolish the abuse by degrees too. And the torture of the chickens plainly involve worse abuse of these birds, further highlighting his basic hypocrisy.

 

(16) must at least allow for individual kindness towards animalsSZTYBEL: Full freedom on this score.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: Says we can help thirsty cows in slaughterhouses out of a consideration of their welfare (individuals at the micro level as he calls it), [I know this is like the speech  of the Ents in the LORD OF THE RINGS, although I did not take as long to say "hello"] but cannot help them with laws at the macro level. But macro laws address each individual affected by them, and individuals going to stockyards is a macro phenomenon.

 

(17) consistent with non-violence

FRANCIONE: Does not address the violence often done to birds of electroshocking, scalding alive, being hung upside down, and being killed in a cut-throat manner while fully conscious.

SZTYBEL: Makes an inroad in this specific form of violence against nonhuman animals.

 

I conclude that Francionists are immoral inasmuch as they are inconsistent with all of the above principles to the fullest possible degree. He does no worse than my approach on items 2, 11, and 15, but in all other cases is patently further from satisfying the given moral ideal.

 

** David regrets writing the above sentence as it may have offended. That was not his intention and would like it known if he could change it, he would, to:

 

I conclude that Francionism is at odds with the best kind of moral principles for sentient beings insofar as it is inconsistent with the above ethical principles.  **

 

APPLYING EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA

 

The measure:

 

(1)   must be regarded as meaningful not only semantically but especially in terms of significance to the animals themselves

 

SZTYBEL: Meaningful relief for birds in 3 aspects, even though Francione dogmatically writes: “The status of animals as property renders meaningless our claim that we reject the status of animals as things.” Welfarist measures reject animals as mere things since their suffering is avoided, although they are not FULLY respected through imperfect laws. FRANCIONE: No meaningful relief for the chickens.

 

(2)   must not be positively futile to advocate

 

SZTYBEL: Not futile. PETA has won this provision with some companies, etc.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Doing nothing to affect the case is certainly futile from the birds’ point of view.

FRANCIONE DO: If one advocates fulfilling a right in effect that is futile. But again he can have no solution to this or offers none.

 

(3)   will provide the strongest possible protection for animals

 

SZTYBEL: A higher degree of protection offered in 3 aspects. FRANCIONE: There is nothing weaker than no additional protection at all.

 

(4)   must provide benefits that no other pro-animal measure, legislative or other, can result in

 

SZTYBEL: This is a key point. Those chickens in the slaughterhouse can ONLY get relief through legislation, not through education, talk shows, or whatever. Exploiters will only treat the birds differently if laws are enforced to that effect.

FRANCIONE: Utterly misses a key opportunity to help these birds, and endless other animals who suffer needlessly.

 

(5)   will provide the greatest possible inroad against speciesism See above under ethics part.

(6) will be positively or most conducive towards adopting animal rights in the law

 

SZTYBEL: I do not claim that animal “welfarist” laws CAUSE abolition, as Francione claims “new welfarists” believe. “Welfarist” laws CONDUCE towards animal rights though, because they affect society and make it kinder. Animal rights seems ridiculous and contemptible in an unkind society. China has few vegans and animal rights sympathizers, and so less democratic potential for animal rights as I would put it. However, animal rights is both interesting and plausible enough in a kinder society. To disagree here, the Francionist would have to say that kinder laws do not contribute to a kinder society, even though everyone is supposed to look to the law, that it is more or equally likely to have animal rights in a crueller culture. Both theses are ludicrous. Also, people can be convinced of animal rights without animal rights laws, as is proven every day. FRANCIONE: Leaves bird cruelty, which is not maximally conducive towards a kinder society and hence animal rights law.

 

(7) will not lead to such complacency with animal treatment that undermines achieving animal rights in the law or even makes it futile to aim for such laws

 

SZTYBEL: It is qualitatively worse to be content with a miserable state of affairs than a better one. Quantitatively, “welfarism” conduces more towards animal rights. A concern to always get the best for animals counts against complacency, as does the best caring dictum that “welfare” is really animal ILLFARE. (see “The Rights of Animal Persons”). That is nothing to be smug about. It is implied by Francionists  that “welfarist” laws will retard or prevent animal rights laws, but it all depends on human motivation. If there is enough motivation, then we will eventually pass such laws. If there will be insufficient motivation, then we will never have animal rights and we should aim for the best we can get for animals all the same. If we are unsure, it is one of the above, and that again means “welfarism”. FRANCIONE: If we achieved his more stringent proto-rights, this would inspire even more complacency, since people would say it is almost as if animals have rights. Again, it treats animals as a mere means to keep them miserable so that people will be less complacent.

 

(8)must be achievable as one criteria of success

 

SZTYBEL: OK

FRANCIONE: Well, nothing is always “achievable”; proto-rights now are not as discussed above.

 

(9)should not lead to such increases in animal product consumption that would make the measure have an overall negative impact on animals or their rights

 

SZTYBEL: I show that overall my approach leads to less suffering and death even if there is a temporary spike in animal product consumption if we consider the long-term. [see http://sztybel.tripod.com/pragmatism.pdf for details]Less cruel meat is more expensive, denting consumption. FRANCIONE: His proto-rights would boost consumption even more since people would be more satisfied with them.

 

(10)  must pass a reasonable test period to see if the given strategy is successful animal law

 

SZTYBEL: The test period is not over for animal rights pragmatism. It’s too soon to tell what will work best. We need both animal “welfarism” in the short-term and animal rights in the long-term, and we do not need to “wait” to know this.

FRANCIONE: The test is over because it is convenient for him to say so.  Or at least he gives no reason why else.

 

(11)    should ideally be illustrated to be successful with a real-world example, or at least a plausible hypothetical example Let’s use Sweden this time. It has banned anti-biotics and so factory farming. Hogs have more room, better surroundings, time outdoors, less stress, straw bedding, no farrowing crates, and toys.

 

SZTYBEL: Obviously better for the pigs.

FRANCIONE: Has nothing to say except usual dogmatic pronouncements that we cannot have animal “welfare” and so forth, that it is still speciesist, etc., but see above discussion.

 

(12)    must overcome Gary L. Francione’s seven or so supposed reasons why animal “welfarist” laws cannot work in principle

FRANCIONE:

 

1. will not result in good for animals only their more efficient exploitation

2. only property owners’ interests will be considered

3. property cannot have legal relations with owners

4. if animals have no market value, they have no value at all

5. a pen cannot have rights against its owner, neither can we balance the interests of animals against property owners

6. there is a presumptions owner look after their animals

7. Legal wrangles: laws not adjudicated in animals’ favour; minor penalties; lack of enforcement; needing to prove cruel intent; many species of animals exempt

 

SZTYBEL:

1. Not in Sweden

2. Not in Sweden

3. Apparently not in Sweden

4. Not in Sweden

5. Pens have no interests, animals do, and their interests are respected to a considerable degree in Sweden

6. Not in Sweden

7. All these can be avoided and did not stop Swedes from really accomplishing something

 

(13) be a worthwhile use of time, money, and other resources to help animals

SZTYBEL: These reforms are the only thing that can help billions of animals who  need help today, yesterday and in the future, who as argued above, cannot be helped in any other way. Not all activists need work on this, but only those so inclined who are suited to the task, who can and probably would do other things as well.

FRANCIONE: No investment in relief for these chickens, so a moot point.


CONCLUSION

 

Thanks for your patience. I say there is no mere difference of opinion here. I think can show that Francione is just plain wrong in what he says about ethics and effectiveness. I don’t think everyone will agree, but it is easier to dismiss my claims than to refute them. My case keeps getting more refined, and I keep finding more faults with Francione’s, and he never addresses them. My arguments have been around for years and no one has really put a dent in them, to the best of my learning. I hope this explains why I am a more consistent and effective abolitionist than are Francione and the Francionists.

 

Brooke Cameron:

Wow, thanks for taking my question so seriously, and replying with such detail! May I ask a really quick follow up please?

 

David Sztybel

That is kind of you to see. Clearly the little box was meant to constrain windbags like me. But please, what is on your mind, Brooke?

 

Roger Yates

go Brooke

 

Brooke Cameron

David, is it that you are essentially saying that you'd be happy if Gary Francione's site was called Animal Rights: An Abolitionist Approach, rather than THE Abolitionist Approach?

 

David Sztybel

Yes, I think that would be perfect. More accurate, and more respectful of other abolitionists such as Joan Dunayer, and, I even think, myself.

 

Brooke Cameron:

Thanks, David. I agree.

 

David Sztybel

Cool, thanks to you.


Part 2 of the ARZone chat with David Sztybel continues here:

 

http://arzone.ning.com/profiles/blogs/transcript-of-david-sztybels-1

 

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Comment by Eduardo Terrer on January 25, 2011 at 9:46

Hola:
Creo que deberíamos posponer el debate hasta que yo sepa expresarme mejor en inglés.No he cometido petición de principio. No he mencionado que usted no sea ético.Usted dice que es complicado rescatar animales. Estoy de acuerdo.
¿Pero sabe usted otra cosa?Es más dificil hacer veganos. La gente se esfuerza en promover el veganismo y hay muy pocos resultados. Nadie dice que es imposible o una utopía lograr un mundo vegano.No obstante, usted comenta que lo que planteo es una utopía. Me parece correcto afirmar que rescatar todos los animales es una utopía. Pero hacer un mundo vegano, quizás, también sea una utopía.Es extraño que no comentemos nunca acerca de eso, sobre si es o no utópico lograr un mundo vegano.
Las limitaciones técnicas, la ética... veo que no entendemos lo mismo de esto. La ética nos dice que hacer. Las limitaciones técnicas nos impiden hacerlo. Las diferentes estrategias nos ayudan a superar las limitaciones.El resultado no es el más ético, si no el técnicamente más ético.
Pero tenga en cuenta usted que está opinando asumiendo unas limitaciones técnicas insalvables (lo está llamando usted utopía) y, por tanto, está dando una opinión sobre lo técnicamente más ético un poco tendenciosa.
El ejemplo de los humanos no lo ha entendido. Hablo de una industria de explotación, como la de no-humanos, pero con humanos.Hablo de unas vidas con unas vivencias emocionales que usted, y yo, podemos entender perfectamente, y por tanto podemos entender qué es relevante para dichas vidas.Ese es el objetivo del ejemplo, establecer una diferencia entre nuestra forma de asumir que los del ahora van a morir todos, o si, por el contrario, asumiríamos que unos pocos que se salvasen sería relevante y merecería la pena.
Respecto a la cola de un cerdo, sí, es doloroso. Pero si ese cerdo fuese a vivir 15 años, entonces no tendría importancia. Tendría opciones para ser feliz.
El dolor es negativo, por supuesto. Pero estar privado en una jaula, morir siendo un niño, etc... creo que esos son condicionantes que hacen que el dolor sea algo insignificante. El estado emocional de alguien no depende de un dolor puntual.

 

-------------------------------------

 

Hello 

I think we should postpone the debate until I know to express myself better in English. 
I have not made the request in principle. I have not mentioned that you are not ethical. 
You say it is difficult to rescue animals. I agree. 

But do you know something else? 
It is harder to do vegans. People strive to promote veganism and there are very few results. Nobody said it was impossible to achieve utopia or a vegan world. 
However, you said that my point is a utopia. It seems fair to say that all animal rescue is a utopia. But making a vegan world, perhaps, is a utopia. 
It is strange that there never talked about it, whether or not it is unrealistic to achieve a vegan world. 

Technical limitations, ethics ... I do not understand the same about this. Ethics tells us to do. Technical limitations prevent us from doing so. Different strategies will help to overcome the limitations.
The result is not more ethical, if not the most technically unethical. 

But keep in mind you're reviewing assuming insurmountable technical limitations (it is calling you wishful thinking) and, therefore, is giving an opinion on what is technically a bit more ethical bias. 

The example of humans do not understand. I'm talking about an industry of exploitation, such as non-humans, but human. 
I speak of lives with you about emotional experiences, and I can understand perfectly, and therefore we can understand what is relevant to those lives. 
That is the purpose of example, to differentiate between the way we now assume that's all going to die, or if, on the contrary, we would assume that a few to be saved would be relevant and worthwhile. 

With respect to the tail of a pig, it is painful. But if that pig was to live 15 years, then it would not matter. Options would be happy. 

Pain is not, of course. But being private in a cage, died as a child, etc ... I think those are conditions that make the pain is insignificant. Someone's emotional state not dependent on a sore spot.

Comment by David Sztybel on January 25, 2011 at 8:03
P.S. If someone came up and chopped off one of your fingers with a sharpened garden shear, that would not be an "insignificant nuance" in your life, but one of your worst injuries ever, and possibly traumatic. It is no different with choppiing off pigs' tails. And that is only ONE insult of factory farming.
Comment by David Sztybel on January 25, 2011 at 7:18

Hola, Eduardo,

 

Again you say I am weaving in the technical with the ethical. However, I perceive that we just have different standards as to what counts as ethical. I can see how someone might say that the really ethical way to treat animals is to have them live on anti-speciesist sanctuaries, and that settings of truly wicked exploitation of animals are simply unethical. That is the case with factory farming. However, my criterion of ethical treatment in the case of animal legislation is securing what is best for each and every animal at any given point of time. By this criterion of ethics, getting maximum protection for animals against speciesist cruelties, such as the insults of factory farming is indeed ethical, although the result is not "ideal ethics," but merely "pragmatic ethics," or making the best of an unideal situation. Your insisting that this is not ethical thinking seems to be based on YOUR ethic, but evidently yours differs from mine. To avoid begging the question, or asserting without justification, you would need to show that your ethic is justified and mine is not. I argue that it is not easy to do better than seeking what is really best for sentient beings. I'm not sure how there could be anything better, in fact.

 

I do not understand at all when I read from your translated comment: "I said that if we did it forever, no one would be vegan for the technical difficulties of achieving a vegan world." 

 

I do not concede that part of a population being vegan has no relation to the rest. It only seems that way if you ignore the big picture. In the larger frame, there are fewer people in the general population to convert.

 

Yes, I would have to agree that it is more "ethically ideal" to rescue everyone, and to rescue an individual than merely to relieve that individual's suffering under exploitation. However, we need to distinguish between what is conceivably or imaginably best or ethical, and what is really best. If I do not have the option to rescue many animals from exploitation, then it is not a "really better" option to propose saving them all if it is not a real option at all. Utopian ideals are only realizable in utopia.

 

Yes, I would not help a human just by relieving cruelty, I would seek to liberate them. But you see, that is because it is really possible to win that for humans. It is not now or soon possible to do that with nonhumans, hence the relevant difference. It is not because I am a speciesist that I am seeking to do what is really best for animals in a non-ideal fashion, but because better is impossible for the near-term.

 

I think it is cruel to dismiss reforms such as abolishing factory farming as "only insignificant nuances," a comment like what Francione said in response to Newkirk (see my blog discussion of that if you like). They are NOT so to the animals, even if they are to you. Now THAT could make a person cry, although not me...

Comment by David Sztybel on January 25, 2011 at 7:02
It is very sweet that Eduardo's heartfelt reasoning brought tears to Kate's eyes. I sense that Eduardo's concern is very sincere, passionate, and intelligent. I will now try to address that which I understand from his message, which I fear is not 100% due to my limitations.
Comment by Kate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥ on January 23, 2011 at 22:38

Hola Eduardo. Muchas gracias por perseverar y continuar añadir sus comentarios sabio y útil.

Siento que a veces podemos sentir frustración debido a las diferencias de nuestros idiomas.

Creo que tu último comentario es muy clara y elocuentemente escrito. De hecho, la manera lógica y clara que explicar esto es tan profundo y significativo que algo extraño sucede, hay lágrimas en mis ojos. Reconozca que tiene una forma avanzada de la comprensión de estos problemas, y es tan útil para mirar estos temas desde una perspectiva diferente, técnicas de anti-especista. Muchas gracias.
Espera que David se quiere continuar esta conversación, es muy útil. Considera que se trata de la conversación más interesante y útil en todo en este momento.

Hi Eduardo. Thank you very much for persevering and continuing to add your wise and helpful comments. I feel that sometimes we feel frustrated because of differences in our languages. I think your last comment is very clear and eloquent writing. In fact, your clear and logical way to explain this is so deep and meaningful that something strange happens, there are tears in my eyes. I recognize that this is an advanced form of understanding of these problems and is so useful to look at these issues from a different advanced anti-speciesist perspective. Thank you. 
I hope that David will want to continue this conversation, it's very useful.

To me this is the most interesting and useful conversation around at this time.

Muchas gracias mi amigo.

Abrazos anti-especistas.

Comment by Eduardo Terrer on January 23, 2011 at 21:57

Hola de nuevo.La barrera del lenguaje es cada vez más desesperante.
Verá. No he dicho que usted esté siendo técnico y no ético. Estoy diciendo que mi pregunta solo puede ser contestada a nivel ético, y usted está adelantando las dificultades técnicas para modificar su respuesta. Por lo tanto, esta cuestión, que solo debería tratar de ética y de "qué beneficia a un individuo" lo está tratando usted según la viabilidad de llevarlo a cabo, y según estadísticas matemáticas para ver los resultados.
Por otro lado, yo no he hablado de si su camino se desvía o no del veganismo. Ese es otro tema que, como apuntaba, no quería tratar en este debate.Tampoco he dicho que usted hable sin ética. He dicho que usted mezcla ética y limitaciones técnicas, y cuando se habla de ética no se puede avanzar los problemas que surgirán cuando nuestras conclusiones las tengamos que poner en práctica.
Le decía que, si hiciésemos eso siempre, nadie se haría vegano por las dificultades técnicas de lograr un mundo vegano.Rescatar a un no-humano no tiene ninguna relevancia para el resto de no-humanos. Del mismo modo, que alguien se haga vegano tampoco tiene relevancia para lograr un mundo vegano.Así pues, siguiendo su modus operandi analítico, no tiene sentido que me haga vegano porque quedan 6500 millones de humano que no son veganos. Debería dedicarme al bienestarismo, por ejemplo.No obstante, usted concluye que debe hacerse vegano, y que lo más ético (no a nivel estratégico, si no a nivel ético) es que todos los humanos seamos veganos.Así pues, esa es su conclusión ética. Si no metemos las dificultades técnicas, usted pensará solo con ética y concluirá que lo más justo es que todos los humanos nos hagamos veganos ¿ok?Pero si metemos las dificultades técnicas, usted podría llegar a la conclusión de que será solo un humano vegano, y que el resto (6500 millones) no serán veganos. Usted llegaría a la conclusión de que no sirve para nada.
Entonces, como el análisis lo hemos hecho correctamente, y solo hemos hecho valoraciones éticas, usted llega a la conclusión de que lo más ético es lograr un mundo vegano.Tras esto, usted ya puede valorar las dificultades técnicas. Evidentemente, hay mucho que hacer, ya que la mayoría de humanos no son veganos y usted quiere que lo sean. Y para ello, usted ideará una estrategia que tiene como objetivo superar esas limitaciones técnicas. Será muy dificil, pero usted cree que lo logrará aplicando esas estrategias, pese a la abrumadora dificultad técnica inicial.
Extrapolando al caso de este debate, usted me dice que no le parece correcto porque quedan muchos (la mayoría, millones y millones) sin salvarse.No obstante, previamente le he preguntado si es más ético rescatar animales o si es más ético hacer su vida menos miserable.Imagino que usted me responderá que es más ético rescatar a esos individuos. Y que lo más ético sería lograr rescatar a todos los no-humanos explotados ¿me equivoco?
Esto sería un análisis ético, no técnico. Si usted mezclase la técnica, su conclusión sería la de sus previos comentarios.Pero si no mezcla las dificultades técnicas, su conclusión será la que le he comentado yo, sin duda!

Ahora tras este análisis, deberíamos enfrentarnos a las dificultades técnicas de nuestras conclusiones. ¿Es posible salvar a todos? No, ahora mismo no. Tampoco es posible hacer ahora a todos los humanos veganos.¿A cuantos podemos salvar? Si cada humano salvase a unos pocos, salvaríamos a muchos, sin duda.¿Existen formas de lograr que podamos salvar a muchos? Por supuesto. Como decía Einstein, si puedes imaginarlo, puedes lograrlo. Realmente es una cuestión de recursos y dinero, no de limitaciones físico-químicas ni de dimensiones espacio-temporales.Si se puede lograr dinero, se puede hacer.
Ahora bien, le estoy diciendo a usted que lo haga? No.Solo le digo que si a usted le preocupa ayudar a los no-humanos ahora, usted debería realizar el análisis de otro modo. Por ejemplo, como yo le señalo.Le pido que sea usted anti-especista en su análisis y que no considere esas reformas como un modo de beneficiar a alguien no-humanos, porque no creo que usted considerase esas reformas como un modo de ayudar a alguien humano.
Así pues, creo que usted añade una variable nueva que es inconsistente. Usted afirma que a largo plazo concienciación, y que para ahora, bienestarismo.Pero creo que es incorrecto. Creo que la cuestión sería así:A largo plazo concienciación. Para ahora, proteccionismo anti-especista (como el de perros y gatos, pero a nivel de explotados en granjas y mataderos).
Si usted apoya las reformas como una forma estratégica de dificultar la explotación (debido al incremento de costes, etc...) me parecerá un análisis correcto (esté o no esté de acuerdo con ello) porque es un análisis técnico. Pero si usted apoya las reformas para beneficiar a los que van a "beneficiarse" de ellas, entonces no estoy de acuerdo, por lo que le he comentado.
Respecto a la cuestión de conocer sus mentes, me basé en su comentario del chat.De todos modos, desde que convivo con algunos no-humanos mi forma de entenderles ha cambiado. Y no ha cambiado solo mi empatía hacia ellos, si no que también ha cambiado lo que considero ayudar y no ayudar, por lo que ha cambiado mi análisis ético y también ha cambiado mi análisis técnico.
Insisto, no he dicho que usted se aleje del veganismo, y de hecho es un tema que no me interesa en este momento.Lo que me interesa es aclarar que las reformas suponen el mismo beneficio para un no-humano que el que suponen para un humano. Es decir, nada.Porque no podemos olvidar que las reformas solo afectan a matices insignificantes. Son explotados constantemente, siempre bajo los parámetros del mayor beneficio (con todo lo que ello implica) y mueren siendo apenas unos niños. Es decir, les provocan sufrimiento y, también y muy importante, les privan de una vida que vivir, y que solo vivirán una vez.

 

-----------------------------------

 

Hello again. 
The language barrier is becoming increasingly desperate. 

You see. I did not say that you are still technically and unethical. I'm saying that my question can be answered only on an ethical level, and you are passing the technical challenges to modify your response. Therefore, this issue, you should only deal with ethics and "what benefits an individual" is treating you as the feasibility of carrying it out, and according to mathematical statistics to see the results. 

On the other hand, I have not talked about if yor way is deflected or not veganism. That is another subject which, as pointed out, did not want to address in this debate. 
Nor have I said that you talk without ethics. I said that you mix ethical and technical limitations, and when it comes to ethics can not advance the issues that arise when our conclusions are we to put into practice. 

I said that if we did it forever, no one would be vegan for the technical difficulties of achieving a vegan world. 
Rescuing a non-human has no relevance for other non-human. Similarly, someone to go vegan is not relevant for a vegan world. 
So following your modus operandi analytical, does not make sense that I go vegan because they are 6500 million humans who are not vegans. Should devote to welfarism, for example. 
However, you conclude that you must be vegan, and most ethical (not at the strategic level, if not ethical level) is that all humans go vegan. 
So, that is your ethical conclusion. If we put no technical difficulties, you will think only ethically and conclude that it is only right that all humans go vegans, it's ok? 
But if we put our technical difficulties, you could conclude that only a human will be vegan, and the rest (6500 million) will not be vegan. You come to the conclusion that it is useless. 

Then, as we have done the analysis correctly, and only we have an ethical value, you come to the conclusion that the most ethical is a world vegan. 
After that, you can now assess the technical difficulties. Clearly, there is much to do, since most humans are not vegan and you want them to be. And for that, you will devise a strategy that aims to overcome these technical limitations. It will be very difficult, but you think you achieved using these strategies, despite the overwhelming initial technical difficulties. 

Extrapolating to the case of this debate, you say that does not seem right because there are many (most, millions) not be saved. 
However, before I asked if it is more ethical rescue animals or  to make your their life less miserable. 
I guess you answer is more ethical rescue these individuals. And it would make more ethical rescue all exploited nonhuman, am I right? 

This would be an ethical analysis, not technical. If you mix the technique, its conclusion would be the same you posted on your previous comments. 
But if you do not mix the technical difficulties on the [previous] ethical analisys, its conclusion will be that I said I, indeed! 


Now after this analysis, we should deal with the technical difficulties of our findings. Is it possible to save everyone? No, not right now. Neither is it possible now to all human vegans. 
How many can we save? If every human to save a few, we would save many, no doubt. 
Are there ways to ensure that we can save many? Yes. As Einstein said, if you can imagine, you can achieve. It really is a question of resources and money, not physical-chemical constraints or space-time dimensions. 
If you can make money, you can do. 

Now, I'm telling you to do this? No. 
Just tell you that if you are concerned about helping the non-humans now, you should perform the analysis otherwise. For example, as I point. 
I ask you to be anti-speciesist in your analysis and does not consider these reforms as a way to benefit someone nonhuman, because I believe that you don't consider these reforms as a way to help someone human. 


So I think you add a new variable that is inconsistent. You say that long-term abolition awareness, and that for now, welfarism. 
But I think it's wrong. 
I think the question would be: 
A long-term awareness. For now, anti-speciesist protectionism (such as dogs and cats, but at the level of exploitation on farms and slaughterhouses). 

If you support the reforms as a strategic way to hinder the exploitation (due to increased costs, etc ...) I look like a correct analysis (whether or not you agree with it) because it is a technical analysis. But if you support the reforms to benefit those who will "benefit" from them, then I do not agree, so I've told. 

On the question of knowing their minds, I relied on your comment of the chat. 
Anyway, since I live with some non-human my understanding has changed. And it has not changed just my empathy for them, but it has also changed what I believe to help, not help, what has changed my ethical analysis and also changed my technical analysis. 

Again, I have not told you away from veganism, and in fact is a subject that interests me at this time. 
What interests me is clear that the reforms involve the same benefit for a non-human that they pose to human. That is, nothing. 
Because we can not forget that the reforms only affect insignificant nuances. Are exploited constantly, always within the parameters of greatest benefit (with all that that implies) and die while they are only a few children. That is, they cause suffering and also, very importantly, deprive them of a life to live, and live only once.

Comment by David Sztybel on January 23, 2011 at 12:31

Hi Eduardo,

 

The language issues are frustrating, but I guess we'll just have to do the best we can. The state of animals is also frustrating, and we need to make the best of that too.

 

You say I am being "technical" rather than ethical, but that begs the question. That means you are assuming what you need to show, namely that I am talking unethically. I am acting in accord with my ethic. Just because I do not match YOUR ethic does not necessarily mean I am unethical per se. Now you may be right and I may be wrong, but this needs to be shown rather than taken for granted. At the same time, I appreciate your sharing your opinions on this matter.

 

On my ethic, we ultimately serve sentient beings, and it does seem as though the best way in which we can serve the animals is by rescuing some altogether, and trying at least to rescue the rest from the worst outrages of cruelty. That is a form of rescue too, although not as holistic as the happy fate of many sanctuary animals.

 

To say that my way leads away from veganism is absurd, since I advocate that full as well as anyone.

 

Just because I referred to millions of animals does not logically entail that I am insensitive to individuals. There are STILL billions of them, in fact, whether one is sensitized or not.

I don't think it is so hard to know whether abolishing factory farmng helps those animals. I think that is dead easy. That is like saying it is hard to know whether stoppiing torture of a human is beneficial for the victim. As for my not being an expert on the topic of the minds of animals, that lack of academic training does not prevent me from having a sufficient understanding that animals suffer under factory farming. Many academics who are experts in the philosophy of mind might believe that animals cannot really suffer. It does not follow that they have a better overall notion of animal minds than I do, for all their expertise. They might be more technically proficient in their discipline, to use a distinction you used, but not necessarily closer to what is ethical to believe about animals.

 

I hope this message finds you well. Sorry I can only dialogue with you to a limited extent given the langauge barrier.

 

Sincerely,

David

 

 

Comment by Eduardo Terrer on January 23, 2011 at 9:20
Hi David. 
Thanks for answering and trying to understand my broken English. 
Actually the problem is google, not yours or mine. 

I think you have mixed ethical and technical problems, and therefore you are modifing  an ethical issue for the technicals problems you found in this issue.
I think it's more complicated to build a vegan world that make saving a high percentage of non-humans. However, if we did as you do with the matter raised, no one would be vegan because, obviously, a vegan world is almost impossible. They would continue eating meat, for example and, perhaps, they would fight for wellfarism.

But that's not true. It is not impossible or almost impossible, to achieve a vegan world. It is technically difficult, complicated, complex and long, long process. 
That's the reason the activists faced with a type of activism that let them successfully overcome the technical limitations. 

You answered my question with a denial due to technical limitations. However, if we assume that is best for them and that is fair, we only discuss the technical limitations and propose a way to overcome it. 

Honestly, if you suddenly decide to suspend all business operators, I would consider that a big disaster because all the millions of non-human individuals have no place to go and end up in the slaughterhouse. 

There are technical ways to save many exploited nonhuman. If you analyze the issue through the differential between exploited non-human and saved non-human, you can fall in any type of analytical fallacy (I have to think about it). 

You say that if we do it, many will lose their salvation. You sees this as a problem. 
Similarly, I could say that if we don't do it, everyone will die and no one can be saved. 
If we save a few VS if not save anyone. 
Unable to agree to save animals and proposing reforms. Both positions are incompatible because the reforms are failing to raise saving animals. 

On the other hand, I remember a conversation with someone who thought much like you. He said: 
"Although consiguiéramos save 1% of animals exploited, would be 99% on farms and in slaughterhouses. "
I then did not answer. And I did not answer because my response was so overwhelming that I was unable to do so. I couldn't understand how he could think so.
Honestly, save 1% of individuals rescued are millions of lives! We did not fight to abolish slavery. Our fighting is to save lives, prevent suffering. Save millions of individuals  would be the greatest achievement of all "the history of mankind." Abolish salvery is manes, not an end. 
And on the other side ... How can anyone think that 99% will die, qhen if we don't do anything, 100% will die and suffer the explotation? 

And besides, there is a problem when we might be thinking about unique individuals and we end thinking in numbers and statistics. 
We speak of saving and giving them a new opportunity to millions of individuals. 

I think that while dealing with this subject you enter math mode (statistics) may not discuss the issue on the basis of ethics, and will therefore be talking about helping a movement, a strategy and not a individuals who, for help, you need to think in code of ethics. It is very difficult to know what is really helping someone. 

You commented that you are not an expert in the minds of non-human (or so I understood when answering one of the last questions). So, I wonder under what perspective you analyze what constitutes help to someone if you  dont't know their way of feeling.
Comment by David Sztybel on January 23, 2011 at 8:08

Thanks for your thought, Brooke. I appreciate it!

Hey Eduardo,

I agree we should rescue as many individuals as possible and give them sanctuary in homes or formal santuaries. I agree killing healthy animals is not even “euthanasia” as Regan points out in THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS. The term derives from “eu” = good, thanatos = death, a good death. Certainly not good for the animal though, I would say! However, we cannot rescue most animals now trapped in industry, Less than 99% of them by far in fact. So to make the best of that situation we should rescue as many as possible, and reduce cruelty for the rest.

Your were right, if it were humans, we’d just rescue them. But  concern for humans and concern for nonhuman animals is completely disanalogous (i.e., hopelessly different) at this time in history, when we start talking about these kinds of huge numbers of animals. It is unfortunate, but no less true for all that. Realistic consideration is essential to this whole discussion.

Sorry if I missed much of your thought. The problem is more with my Spanish than your English, Eduardo. You know a ton more English than I know Spanish I’m sure.

Comment by Eduardo Terrer on January 23, 2011 at 7:36

Hello. 
Yes, the language barrier seems insurmountable. 
I am not advocating the abolition strategy in this debate. 
What I am doing is defending the liberation and rescue of non-humans and the creation of sanctuaries as the animals protectors places (dogs and cats in a place where they will not suffer the "euthanasize" and they will be adopted). 
Because I believe that helping a non-human is to take them to a safe place, let him live according to their natural longevity, etc ... and because I think to get to a little less miserable life of an exploited nonhuman going to die just been born, is not help. 
It's so important what someone experience in his life like the future experience he lost at death. If they were humans, if they were human children die within months or, at best, a few years, no one would see the reforms as a means to help them. no one would see that human infants who die with 5 years of age will live better with less pain death or because they have a slightly larger cage. 
So I think it is not honest assessment that you do get reform is to help one or millions of individuals. 

What I am trying to say is that the reforms as a strategic means to bring speciesism is a strategic perspective, not an ethical perspective, and therefore contributes nothing to the individuals who will be exploited with the welfarist legislation. 
As a strategy seems inadequate, but that's another debate and i don't want to speak about it at this moment.

As ethics, it seems inconsistent. That's why I raised the dilemma of assessing whether to help non-humans now you should abandon the idea of getting reforms and, if you really want help to them now, you might try to get thousands of sanctuarys as there are thousands of animals protectors places, and so you can still help specific individuals who feel and suffer.

 

I want to explore the difference of save individuals VS get welfarism reforms. The theme of the difficult to do this is another theme. Now i try to stablish the difference real help VS actions that realy not helps non-human animals.

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