Transcript of David Sztybel's ARZone Guest Chat ~ Part 1

[Carolyn Bailey]

 

Transcript of David Sztybel's ARZone Guest chat

15 January 2011 at:

5pm US Eastern Time

10pm UK Time and

16 January 2011 at:

8am Australian Eastern Standard Time

 

Part 1

 

Carolyn Bailey:

ARZone would like to welcome Dr. David Sztybel today, as our Live Chat Guest.

 

David is a Canadian ethicist who specialises in animal ethics. He is a vegan, and has been an animal rights activist for more than 22 years. David has attained his Ph. D. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto (1994-2000) as well as his M.A. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto (1992-94) his B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto (1986-91) and a B. Ed. in English and Social Studies from the University of Toronto (2005-2006)

 

David has published numerous articles pertaining to the liberation of all sentient beings and has lectured at the University of Toronto, Queen's University, and Brock University.

 

David has developed a new theory of animal rights which he terms "best caring," as outlined in "The Rights of Animal Persons.” Criticizing conventional theories of rights, based in intuition, traditionalism or common sense, compassion, Immanuel Kant's theory, John Rawls' theory, and Alan Gewirth's theory, David devises a new theory of rights for human and nonhuman animals.

 

David maintains his blog site at http://davidsztybel.blogspot.com/ and a very informative website at: http://sztybel.tripod.com/home.html

 

David is looking forward to engaging ARZone members today in reference to topics ranging from his literature to his position on animal rights and welfare.

 

Please join with me in welcoming David to ARZone today.

 

Welcome, David!

 

Will:

Hello

 

Jason Ward:

Good day David!!!

 

Brooke Cameron:

Welcome, David!

 

David Sztybel:

Hi there, Will and others!

 

Tim Gier:

Hello (again) David!

 

Kate:

Hello David. Thanks for being here.

 

Eduardo Terrer:

Hello, David

 

Erin:

Helloooo

 

Fina:

Hello

 

Adam Weissman:

Hi, David

 

Barbara DeGrande:

Welcome

 

Mangus O’Shales:

hi, Dr. S

 

Sky:

Hi

 

Brandon Becker:

Thanks for being here today!

 

David Sztybel:

G'day Jason, hi again Tim, Kate, Eduardo, Erin, Fina, Adam, Barbara, Mangus, Sky, and Brandon

 

Carolyn Bailey:

Before we begin, I’d like to request that members refrain from interrupting David during the chat session, and utilise the open chat, at the completion of David’s pre-registered questions, for any questions or comments you have.

 

I’d now like to ask Brooke Cameron to ask David his first question, when you’re ready, Brooke.

 

Brooke Cameron:

Hi David, thanks very much for being here! In your opinion, who is an abolitionist, and why?

 

David Sztybel:

Hi there, Brooke.  Thank you very kindly for the warm welcome. This is an important question. So you’ve provoked something of a lecture! Indeed, the following brief essay (as essays go!) is also relevant for addressing questions 2, 6, 11, 13, 14, 15. So I hope you do not mind the considerable length, but I am very serious about these and related questions.

 

As many people know, Professor Gary L. Francione’s core website is entitled “The Abolitionist Approach.” He is implying that his approach alone qualifies as abolitionist. Now by abolition he explicitly refers to abolishing the property status of animals, just like 19th century (and earlier) advocates pushed against humans-as-property, ie, slavery.

 

However, it is important to be clear that by property status, Francione means more than:

 

(1) being legally owned. It is also associated with

 

(2) being treated literally as if one is an object or thing by denying that one has a mind, feelings, or interests as the Cartesians (followers of Rene Descartes) maintain;

 

(3) being figuratively treated as a thing by conceding that animals have minds and feelings but by treating them in a way AS IF they are beings without interests, through a disregarding of interests;

 

(4) being treated as if one is a mere means, tool, resource, instrument, or slave whose value can be reduced to that of a commodity (again disregarding interests);

 

(5) being subjected to unnecessary suffering (again disregarding a specific interest).

 

So an animal eradicated as a “pest” is not anyone’s property or tool but is being treated as in (2) possibly, but certainly as in (3) to (5).

 

Vegans may have legal ownership but refuse other dimensions of animals-as-property in Francione’s sense. Not all conditions need apply since many exploiters grant that animals have feelings as well. This model can be compared to symptoms of a disease, all of which are had in full-blown form but not all of which are needed to make the diagnosis.

 

This is my interpretation of Francione’s not-property theory, identifying five conditions which he does not clearly set out in this manner. It is I who am interpreting the fact that each condition disregards interests. I newly distinguish between literally and figuratively treating animals as objects; and I use my own disease-symptom comparison for the purposes of clarification.

 

Really Francione seems to be getting at speciesism here. He favours the abolition of speciesism. So do I. I am a vegan animal rightist and I advocate that individuals should transform suitably. I advocate the most possible abolition of speciesism.

 

On the legislative front, Francione advocates either:

 

(1) no action (which seems to be his current recommendation);

 

(2) securing proto-rights (Tom Regan’s term that Francione has adopted) that fully secure an animal’s interest, such as freedom of movement or bodily integrity;

 

(3) abolishing a whole area of animal exploitation, such as testing drugs on animals.

 

I however agree with (3), since it would be great to ban, say, animal circus acts, but disagree otherwise since we can make progress for animals by lessening speciesism, say, by seeing that farmed animals are given 70% freedom of movement rather than 100%. I argue that aiming for 100% protection of this interest would be giving animals the freedom of movement found on animal rights sanctuaries, and contemporary companies and the government or both are just not going to pay for that.

 

So advocating 100% protection will be defeated in any contemporary legislature, resulting in no lessening of speciesism whatsoever. By contrast, my approach would lessen speciesism more by securing the maximum degree of protection of animals’ interests that is available. So both Francione and myself aim for the abolition of animals’ property status, which I think is much more clearly termed speciesism the way Francione uses these terms, but we differ in our approach.

 

And you can see, Brooke, that I maintain that my approach eradicates more speciesism, in practice, than his. I also maintain that it is illegitimate for Francione to call his THE abolitionist approach, as if there is only one.

 

Allow me to quote my most recent blog entry on that from December 9, 2010: [My blog, On the Road to Liberation, is found at:http://davidsztybel.blogspot.com/]   “…it is philosophically and grammatically nonsensical for Gary Francione and the Francionists to deny that people such as me are abolitionists. My philosophy aims for the abolition of speciesism, animals as property or slaves. Philosophically, anyone who aims for abolition is an abolitionist. Grammatically, it is unintelligible because the same rule holds for accurate grammarians. On dictionary.com the definition of the suffix “-ist” is as follows: ‘a suffix of nouns, often corresponding to verbs ending in –ize or nouns ending in –ism, that denote a person who practices or is concerned with something, or holds certain principles, doctrines, etc.: apologist, dramatist, machinist, novelist, realist, socialist, Thomist.” Now we are plainly dealing here with abolitionism. Abolitionist in my case and those who are like-minded denotes being concerned with something, and indeed adhering to a principle, namely abolition, making the –ist label not only permissible but grammatically inevitable.

 

Now the 19th century abolitionists only meant to abolish slavery, not racism. But that original intent was insufficient. We need to abolish racism and speciesism alike.

 

Notice how I used the term “Francionist.” This is a significant note for this discussion in general. I quote from my blog entry for August 30, 2010 on the term, Francionism: “Note that Francione in the past has objected to the term ‘Francionism’ but I am tired of pandering to this particular preference. For it does not seem justifiable. It could only be objectionable if perhaps it is insulting, but ‘Marxism’ is not that, for example. Or Francione said ‘Francionism’ overly makes it appear as though the debate is about him in particular. However, that is not accurate. The term merely identifies a set of view associated with him, and therefore is as legitimate as ‘Marxism.’ His form of abolitionism in fact really needs to be distinguished from other forms such as that of Joan Dunayer. Failing to do so would in effect unduly associate ALL abolitionism with Francione, which is not the case but which he actively promotes by vainly calling his strategy ‘the abolitionist approach,’ as though there is only one. Ironically, calling his work ‘the abolitionist approach’ without distinguishing, by name, his brand of it would even more seek to make the relevant ideas about Francione, as opposed to any other theorists.

 

I suspect that the coy fluttering aside of ‘Francionism’ is merely false modesty, then, given that he seeks to encompass ALL abolitionism. Or so his use of ‘the’ here logically implies. Marxism is not about Marx hardly at all and Francionism is certainly not about Francione. It is actually ODD that Francione thinks that using the term would indicate that the debate is about him. The only name that Francione provides for his views is ‘the abolitionist approach,’ and since that is inaccurate, we need another one, and Francionism will do nicely since it is both accurate and distinctive.” Even ‘fundamentalist’ which I use does not only mean Francionist kinds, since Dunayer is more of a fundamentalist than he is as I defend elsewhere.

 

So in short, abolitionists agree on the end of abolition, however that is defined, but disagree on the means or the way of getting there. Or so my opinion goes, and you asked. But you asked for a justification as to who is an abolitionist. I have given philosophical, grammatical reasons, but also an objection against Francione trying to arrogate the term pretty much solely to himself and those who substantially enough happen to agree with him. Francione himself refers to people like me as “new welfarists,” but in my work I outline how I do not match even ONE of his five criteria of who counts as a new welfarist. I quote the following from my MIRROR PRODUCTION (short form) of “Animal Rights Law”: Francione outlines five supposed characteristics of “new welfarists”:

 

(1) they favour abolishing animal usage so long as animal interests are not devalued due to speciesism;

 

(2) they believe that animal rights cannot provide a practical agenda for seeking abolition;

 

(3) animal welfare campaigns are identical to traditional welfarist tactics;

 

(4) most new welfarists see their measures as causally related to abolishing animal exploitation; and

 

(5) new welfarists believe there is no moral or logical inconsistency in “reinforcing an instrumentalist view of animals.”

 

Although these five characteristics are meant to embody people such as myself, none of them apply at all to my version of animal rights pragmatism. For I favour simply choosing the best of inevitably speciesist legislative options for the short-term contrary to (1), so there is an acceptance that speciesism on the part of others cannot be avoided.

 

Francione also supports speciesist options, e.g., banning dehorning of cattle. That still leaves eating the cattle and abusing them in other ways.

 

Contrary to (2), animal rights is very much part of my practical agenda in dealing with individuals and explicitly as a long-term legislative goal. As against (3), my advocating abolition is not “identical” to traditionalists who wholly approve of speciesist animal “welfare” and do not advocate animal rights. Contradicting (4), I argue in favour of “welfarist” laws being CONDUCIVE to animal rights in some cases, never as simply “causing” animal rights laws. Finally, with respect to (5), I openly acknowledge that animal “welfare” laws are logically different from animal rights laws.

 

The term “new welfarist” has caused ever so much needless division, alienation, lack of communication, and so on. If ultimately I aim to TRANSCEND animal welfare as I explicitly do, it does not seem accurate or fair to label me overall as a “welfarist” since ultimately I aim for abolition, or indeed animal liberation, above all. Also, take the label “new.” It is so inaccurate as well. Henry S. Salt, in Victorian times, e.g., in his book, ANIMALS’ RIGHTS CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS, in late Victorian England, argues both for animal rights in the legislative long-term and animal “welfare” laws in the short term.

 

So Francione, seemingly ignorant of such history, cannot be identifying any “new” form of welfarism unless of course he means that Victorian-era things are really “new.” Take their fashion-sense for example (just kidding).8-)  

 

You asked “why?” with respect to abolitionist approaches. Francione has denied that myself and my cohort are abolitionists, presumably because he thinks his approach works towards abolition and mine does not. I will try to show the exact reverse of what he is telling you. Here I will have to reteach why Sztybelian abolitionism, if you will, is much better than Francionist abolition. [I know, I know, when will this wind-bag just give it up and come to the point already!!!]  :-* Sorry for the length, but you asked!

 

This reteaching will also be relevant to answering other questions in this chat, such as the one from Eduardo Terrer. I have never taught my abolitionist approach as justifiable and better than Francione’s in this way before, and I do so for both clarity and argumentative strength.

 

So the main respect in which Francione’s abolitionism differs from mine is that he would advocate, short of full animal rights in the law, protecting a whole interest of an animal (this can be thought of as winning one animal right at a time, although he never puts matters this way and instead calls this winning “proto-rights” after Tom Regan, which makes sense because one cannot fully respect one animal right without honouring all or most of the others too). So he would say that 100% of the interest in liberty of movement must be honoured in a law, whereas I would say 70% of that would be OK if that is the best we can do. Realistically, he is asking animals be given recognition for their interests equivalent to what they would receive on an animal rights sanctuary (solely with respect to the interest in question though). Who is going to pay for that? Corporations? Government? He never considers this, but I have argued all along that neither will, obviously, in a capitalist society. Therefore his kind of bill would be utterly defeated and replaced with “welfarist” bills or nothing at all. It would be a wasted legislative campaign. (Although it might have some educative value.) Just as full animal rights are unrealistic for the legislative short-term, as everyone agrees, so winning almost a whole animal right or proto-right is equally unrealistic.

 

He has not cured the problem of being unrealistic, but merely splintered it by focusing on one animal interest at a time rather than all of them at once, as it were. I argue in much more detail about protecting whole interests versus the “welfarist” approach of protecting only degrees of interests in my paper, “Animal Rights Law”

 

http://sztybel.tripod.com/arlaw.pdf

 

One thing that is not part of this debate are three things that are absolutely identical in my approach and his:

 

(1) Animal rights and vegan activism, which is good in many ways but will also help build up democratic potential for animal rights laws, as I would put it;

 

(2) Never opting for cosmetic changes in the law. That is both unethical because duplicitous and not furthering moral goals, but more ineffective than no legal change at all because it will further entrench animal misery and give people the illusion that real change has occurred

 

(3) Banning entire areas of animal exploitation. He would of course go for that and I am all over that as well. Good examples are prohibiting animal circus acts and marine mammal shows in England, and banning fox hunting, also in the U.K.

 

Now Francione states in his book, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER, that one can reasonably abstain from legislative advocacy at this time, and that is the approach he favours on his website: focus on vegan education, for example, instead. He calls animal rights an “outsider” position from the legislative process, whereas I demonstrate otherwise in my animal rights, abolitionist approach, although we both agree that animal rights are not forthcoming in contemporary laws.

 

The two key areas for this debate are ETHICS and EFFECTIVENESS. I will both justify my own approach in terms of these, and show that Francionism is no better than but usually much worse than my own, depending which facet one focuses on. Let’s start with ethics, since that is the core of the animal rights movement, after all. These questions are not simple, but complex matters, which will be reflected in my evaluating my many criteria rather than just one or a few.

 

ETHICS

Let us see if we can agree on criteria for evaluating legislative proposals ethically. I will compare for example my advocating controlled gas killing of chickens versus Francione opposing any such change, or only proto-rights. My approach means the birds:

 

(1) are not electroshocked into unconsciousness; that must hurt;

 

(2) would not be left conscious, as they often are after shocking, when they are dipped into a scalding tank for de-feathering

 

(3) would not be left conscious and terrified of what they see and experience before and while their throats are cut, which would also be painful and not perfectly instantaneous I believe.

 

Francione’s approach clearly means torture along the lines noted above (and more no doubt). Now this presumably comes under ‘bodily integrity,’ an interest Francione designates as fitting for a right (I would say a right to welfare; it is obvious why Francione resists that term, although having your body intact is not nearly enough to be doing well or OK physically AND mentally). A measure fully respecting bodily integrity would be the birds not being killed at all or would only come with full animal rights. We’d have a LONG time to wait for that. Other reforms he opposes include larger cage sizes instead of living their whole lives in unbearably minimal enclosures often with no room even to move about or stretch a wing, not providing water to thirsty cows in slaughterhouses, among other cruel deprivations that he would deliberately prolong, which to me is morally obscene because also cruel, but let me set about justifying that opinion. [I say this but bear no personal animosity here; I know people have their reasons.]

 

Anyway, here are the ethical criteria for evaluating such controlled gas killing. Any given legislative measure (whether “welfarist”, proto-rights, or just lack of action deliberately taken as a choice):

 

ETHICS CRITERIA

(1) must have positive significance for animals

 

(2) must not endorse animal exploitation

 

(3) must not exhibit overall complicity with that which is morally wrong

 

(4) must avoid speciesism as much as possible

 

(5) must avoid a conflict with animal rights theory as much as possible

 

(6) must, in the absence of any truly ideal conditions by law, resolve a dilemma choice in a manner that can be reasonably viewed as salvaging the most possible good in the given context.

 

(7) must secure, as much as possible, a just and decent share of good for animals

 

(8) must realize what is really best for animals at the given time, if the best that is conceivable or imaginable is not possible to realize in the time frame in quest

 

(9) must view animals as ends in themselves, not mere means (to use philosopher Immanuel Kant’s influential phrasing)

 

(10) must not permit unnecessary suffering

 

(11) must afford a model that can progressively grow into animal rights

 

(12) must be as conducive as possible towards animal rights laws in the long-term since animal rights is a moral goal

 

(13) must be as consistent as possible with the principle of equal consideration

 

(14) must be self-consistent and avoid any charges of hypocrisy

 

(15) must be sustainable even in light of the fact that we would abolish child abuse entirely, not make it “kinder”

 

(16) must at least allow for individual kindness towards animals.

 

I hope people find these criteria agreeable. If not, so much the worse for someone’s position ethically, I would have to say, although I cannot argue for that here. Instead, I am depending on what many animal rights people would agree with. Some of the criteria are not sufficient to formulate animal rights by themselves, but would still be agreed with in conjunction with an animal rights philosophy even by Francionists as I read them. The same goes with the following criteria for evaluating effectiveness of legislative proposals, before we get down to business and actually apply both sets of criteria to this debate:

 

EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA

The measure:

 

(1) must be regarded as meaningful not only semantically but especially in terms of significance to the animals themselves

 

(2) must not be positively futile to advocate

 

(3) will provide the strongest possible protection for animals

 

(4) must provide benefits that no other pro-animal measure, legislative or other, can result in

 

(5) will provide the greatest possible inroad against speciesism

 

(6) will be positively or most conducive towards adopting animal rights in the law

 

(7) will not lead to such complacency with animal treatment that undermines achieving animal rights in the law or even makes it futile to aim for such laws

 

(8) must be achievable as one criteria of success

 

(9) should not lead to such increases in animal product consumption that would make the measure have an overall negative impact on animals or their rights (EIGHT) again!

 

(10) must pass a reasonable test period to see if the given strategy is successful animal law

 

(11)  should ideally be illustrated to be successful with a real-world example, or at least a plausible hypothetical example

 

(12) must overcome Gary L. Francione’s seven or so supposed reasons why animal “welfarist” laws cannot work in principle.

 

OK, now let’s apply our criteria. (I would defend them in a later work.)

 

APPLYING ETHICS CRITERIA LEGEND:

SZTYBEL = mine and PETA’s and most animal activists’ endorsement of controlled gas killing of chickens (see above), using my framework

 

FRANCIONE DON’T = his advocating abstaining from legislative reform, his actual position

FRANCIONE DO = his proto-rights theory of supposedly acceptable incremental reforms

 

(1)   must have positive significance for animals.

 

SZTYBEL: If actions are to have any positive significance at all, it must be in relation to sentient beings. That is because, simply, nothing is significant to any nonsentient being. That is why toasters do not have rights. But we also cannot ultimately act for things such as rights, abolition, or speciesism. These ideals do not care about anything. But we can act for animal rights for the sake of sentient beings, and that is the best caring framework. By contrast, Francionism tries to act for abolition or animal rights even when that is at odds with what is really best for sentient beings in the LEGISLATIVE short-term. The best that is really possible is the best that can actually be accomplished. What is ideally, conceptually or imaginably best may not be possible, by contrast, except in the long-term. We can and should promote animal rights and veganism in the short-term, but cannot expect to pass laws to that effect. The best caring approach aims for animal rights law for the long-term, and the best that is really possible for animal law, that is for sentient beings, in the short-term. In controlled gas killing the three benefits for animals are all of positive significance to the chickens.

 

FRANCIONE DON’T: Also advocates animal rights law for long-term, but is missing the three items of positive significance.

 

FRANCIONE DO: He has no recommendations for proto-rights since this is a matter of suffering, and he does not recognize a right not to suffer unnecessarily. He does however support avoiding unnecessary suffering. See item (10).

 

(2)   must not endorse animal exploitation

 

SZTYBEL: I do not endorse animal slaughter. Nor does PETA. Anyone who knows us knows this. Other people do and that is why chicken slaughter persists. But we urge lawmakers to offer animals the best relief they can in the short-term since our long-term goal of abolition is not now realizable.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Exploitation means ill-using someone, or using them in such a way that involve harm or injustice. Francione’s do- nothing approach on this front (though he actively promotes veganism) means more (dire) exploitation because more harm, and also a greater degree of injustice occurs.

FRANCIONE DO: Again, no solutions, worse exploitation.

 

(3)   must not exhibit overall complicity with that which is morally wrong

 

SZTYBEL: My ultimate principle of moral rightness is best caring for sentient beings. Seeking animal rights as best that is really possible in the long-term and the best that is really possible in the short-term is obligatory. Improved slaughter is perfectly consistent with this standard.

 

FRANCIONE DON’T: He upholds animal rights, anti-speciesism as fundamental principles that are intuited, or held with no reason. Yet a reason is available, what is best for sentient beings.

But that standard condemns Francionist do-nothingism legislatively.

FRANCIONE DO: Francionists are complicit with what is morally wrong, that is, the state allowing what is avoidably and atrociously worse for birds. Again they have no solution here.

 

(4)   must avoid speciesism as much as possible

 

SZTYBEL: I am an anti-speciesist. Every time discrimination occurs due to species or species-characteristics, that is wrong. One type of speciesism is being unconcerned with avoidable animal suffering, unlike in the case of humans. Best caring would restrict against this in the short-term legislatively.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Allows more speciesist discrimination by permitting the unnecessary suffering, contrary to Francione’s own professed principles.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto, since no solutions here.

 

(5)   must avoid a conflict with animal rights theory as much as possible

 

SZTYBEL: Aims for animal rights in the long-term. Since rights theory is justified by best caring, short-term relief is justifiable. Rights in the law are only really possible in the long-term, as pretty much everyone agrees. If animals have a right to be precluded unnecessary suffering, as I would argue is a requirement of anti-speciesism, then Francione is more at odds with this right than my more humane law. Think of all of the interests protected by rights. Now picture that we can respect those interest entirely or by degrees. My model affords a DEGREE of protection and Francione’s none, so my model more closely approximates animal rights than his model, which disregards animals’ interests more than mine.

FRANCIONE DON’T: At odds with anti-speciesist rights as above.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto

 

(6) must, in the absence of any truly ideal conditions by law, resolve a dilemma choice in a manner that can be reasonably viewed as salvaging the most possible good in the given context.

 

SZTYBEL: Dilemma theory is applicable in any case in which ideal conditions are impossible, so one must choose a course of action that is unideal. It would normally be morally wrong to leave someone to burn in a building if one could save the person, but not ethically mistaken if one can only rescue one person from the fire, a classic example that Francione himself uses. In dilemmas it is most caring to salvage the most good. My approach plainly does this, whereas Francione’s results in less good and more positive harms to the chickens.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Chooses the dilemma option that is less good and more harmful for animals.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto

 

(7) must secure, as much as possible, a just and decent share of good for animals

 

SZTYBEL: Again, picture all the interests of animals. They are closer to a just and decent concern with avoidable suffering on my model than on Francione’s, which is farther away from full respect for this interest. Just because speciesists also speak of unnecessary suffering does not mean that anti-speciesists should not also aim for this. Indeed Francione aims for this he says, but he does not do as he says.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Farther away from just and decent treatment.

FRANCIONE DO: Ditto

 

(8) must realize what is really best for animals at the given time, if the best that is conceivable or imaginable is not possible to realize in the time frame in question.

 

SZYTBEL: See above. Also, respecting 80% of an interest is really better than respecting an interest not at all, or advocating 100% respect for the interest knowing that would be defeated as a law-proposal.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Animals remain further from what is best for them. Francione writes: “I agree with [Peter—DS] Singer that it would be better for ‘food’ animals if we adopted true ‘free-range’ farming and discontinued factory farming.” (INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS, p. 145) Yet he actively resists what is best for sentient beings out of idol worship, to use a metaphor, of ideas such as rights, resisting so many anti-factory-farming legal measures.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto

 

(9) must view animals as ends in themselves, and not as a mere means (to use philosopher Immanuel Kant’s influential phrasing)

 

SZTYBEL: By this, Kant means persons should not be exploited, or we should not disregard the interests of others if we use them or their services (e.g., exploiting a worker). On my model there is less disregard for animals’ interest in not suffering. There is no BETTER regard for interests than seeking the best for someone that is possible at that time, and that is precisely what my best caring affords.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: Animals get less treated as ends in themselves, or with dignity, and more as a mere means, or with blatant disregard for their interests. Animals get treated as mere means I in other ways on Francione’s framework:

 

(a) He asks whether helping these chickens will conduce towards animal rights law eventually. Thus the birds are considered as a mere means towards a distant goal; my approach does not do this because it considers present-day animals as ends-in-themselves as much as possible

 

 

(b)  He approves of laws, such as banning dehorning, that still would treat animals as mere means (so would mine, but I am MINIMIZING this, and can justify it, unlike Francione)

 

(c ) He says we should realize that animal “welfarist” laws lead to complacency (discussed under effectiveness); the logical implication is that keeping conditions cruel makes people less complacent, thus using animals as a mere means towards the end of checking complacency

 

(d) he acts ultimately for mere things as rights, abolition, using animals or sentient beings as mere means towards these because their interests are degraded and not addresse not addressed out of “service” to these ideals— not that they care about anything; animals become subordinated to a concern with abstractions

 

(10) must not permit unnecessary suffering

 

SZTYBEL: Plainly animals would suffer less as I explained.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Francionism leads to more suffering. He champions the principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering but oddly only considers this principle in terms of abolishing animal exploitation. He does not consider unnecessary suffering that can be curbed with “welfarist” laws although that is a key component of this debate. He fails to consider this only because he cannot win on this point, even conceivably. His approach tolerates much, much more animal suffering by advocating no change or else unrealistic proto-rights that equally result in nothing.

FRANCIONE DO: ditto

 

(11) must afford a model that can progressively grow into animal rights

 

SZTYBEL: Again, there are an array of interests that rights protect. Securing a degree of respecting interests under “welfarism” brings us closer to higher degrees of respect or even the full respect that rights involve.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: His approach of course can grow into animal rights, although it leaves us farther away from that full respect for interests in the legislative short-term, which is probably a very long time or even the rest of history if we never achieve animal rights laws (I prefer to remain optimistic however).

 

(12) Must be as conducive as possible towards animal rights laws in the long-term since animal rights is a moral goal SZTYBEL: see effectiveness discussion. But ending up with nothing as in this example is again more far short of rights.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: see effectiveness discussion

 

(13) must be as consistent as possible with the principle of equal consideration

 

SZTYBEL: Animal “welfarism” brings animal suffering closer to parity with consideration for humans as the suffering is negated. Humans are supposed to have their unnecessary suffering negated, although this is far from always true in practice. I advocate a much fuller form of equal consideration for the long-term, as Francione does too.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: Farther from being at parity with the consideration of suffering in a non-speciesist manner. Advocating equal consideration for animals in the legislative short-term does not win such consideration. Francione would claim that in the human case we would not embrace reformist measures. But if a vegan animal rightist were unjustly imprisoned, and we could not free him or her, we should support making sure he or she gets access to vegan food, which is not always the case, at least adequately. That is reforming the injustice, not abolishing it. Dehorning being banned as he says also regulates cattle-destruction, not abolishing it too, which makes Francione a mammoth hypocrite. I can say that without prejudice or ill will, but just as a descriptive fact.

 

(14) must be self-consistent and avoid any charges of hypocrisy

 

SZTYBEL: All of my findings are consistent with the best caring principle.

 

FRANCIONE: Pays lip service to opposing unnecessary suffering, antispeciesism, but when it comes down to cases he allows more suffering which is allowed to occur by government for speciesist reasons. He opposes a law to provide water to thirsty cows in slaughterhouses because it leaves a speciesist practice (RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER p. 208-) and involves a conflict with rights theory (RAIN p. 211). Yet he approves laws to ban dehorning, which equally leave speciesist practices that conflict with rights theory. Plain hypocrisy.

 

(15) must be sustainable even in light of the fact that we would abolish child abuse entirely, not make it “kinder” SZTYBEL: I would abolish child abuse. But asking for normal treatment of animals just leads to their abuse, unlike in the disanalogous case of children.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: His proposals such as banning dehorning would only abolish the abuse by degrees too. And the torture of the chickens plainly involve worse abuse of these birds, further highlighting his basic hypocrisy.

 

(16) must at least allow for individual kindness towards animalsSZTYBEL: Full freedom on this score.

FRANCIONE DON’T AND DO: Says we can help thirsty cows in slaughterhouses out of a consideration of their welfare (individuals at the micro level as he calls it), [I know this is like the speech  of the Ents in the LORD OF THE RINGS, although I did not take as long to say "hello"] but cannot help them with laws at the macro level. But macro laws address each individual affected by them, and individuals going to stockyards is a macro phenomenon.

 

(17) consistent with non-violence

FRANCIONE: Does not address the violence often done to birds of electroshocking, scalding alive, being hung upside down, and being killed in a cut-throat manner while fully conscious.

SZTYBEL: Makes an inroad in this specific form of violence against nonhuman animals.

 

I conclude that Francionists are immoral inasmuch as they are inconsistent with all of the above principles to the fullest possible degree. He does no worse than my approach on items 2, 11, and 15, but in all other cases is patently further from satisfying the given moral ideal.

 

** David regrets writing the above sentence as it may have offended. That was not his intention and would like it known if he could change it, he would, to:

 

I conclude that Francionism is at odds with the best kind of moral principles for sentient beings insofar as it is inconsistent with the above ethical principles.  **

 

APPLYING EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA

 

The measure:

 

(1)   must be regarded as meaningful not only semantically but especially in terms of significance to the animals themselves

 

SZTYBEL: Meaningful relief for birds in 3 aspects, even though Francione dogmatically writes: “The status of animals as property renders meaningless our claim that we reject the status of animals as things.” Welfarist measures reject animals as mere things since their suffering is avoided, although they are not FULLY respected through imperfect laws. FRANCIONE: No meaningful relief for the chickens.

 

(2)   must not be positively futile to advocate

 

SZTYBEL: Not futile. PETA has won this provision with some companies, etc.

FRANCIONE DON’T: Doing nothing to affect the case is certainly futile from the birds’ point of view.

FRANCIONE DO: If one advocates fulfilling a right in effect that is futile. But again he can have no solution to this or offers none.

 

(3)   will provide the strongest possible protection for animals

 

SZTYBEL: A higher degree of protection offered in 3 aspects. FRANCIONE: There is nothing weaker than no additional protection at all.

 

(4)   must provide benefits that no other pro-animal measure, legislative or other, can result in

 

SZTYBEL: This is a key point. Those chickens in the slaughterhouse can ONLY get relief through legislation, not through education, talk shows, or whatever. Exploiters will only treat the birds differently if laws are enforced to that effect.

FRANCIONE: Utterly misses a key opportunity to help these birds, and endless other animals who suffer needlessly.

 

(5)   will provide the greatest possible inroad against speciesism See above under ethics part.

(6) will be positively or most conducive towards adopting animal rights in the law

 

SZTYBEL: I do not claim that animal “welfarist” laws CAUSE abolition, as Francione claims “new welfarists” believe. “Welfarist” laws CONDUCE towards animal rights though, because they affect society and make it kinder. Animal rights seems ridiculous and contemptible in an unkind society. China has few vegans and animal rights sympathizers, and so less democratic potential for animal rights as I would put it. However, animal rights is both interesting and plausible enough in a kinder society. To disagree here, the Francionist would have to say that kinder laws do not contribute to a kinder society, even though everyone is supposed to look to the law, that it is more or equally likely to have animal rights in a crueller culture. Both theses are ludicrous. Also, people can be convinced of animal rights without animal rights laws, as is proven every day. FRANCIONE: Leaves bird cruelty, which is not maximally conducive towards a kinder society and hence animal rights law.

 

(7) will not lead to such complacency with animal treatment that undermines achieving animal rights in the law or even makes it futile to aim for such laws

 

SZTYBEL: It is qualitatively worse to be content with a miserable state of affairs than a better one. Quantitatively, “welfarism” conduces more towards animal rights. A concern to always get the best for animals counts against complacency, as does the best caring dictum that “welfare” is really animal ILLFARE. (see “The Rights of Animal Persons”). That is nothing to be smug about. It is implied by Francionists  that “welfarist” laws will retard or prevent animal rights laws, but it all depends on human motivation. If there is enough motivation, then we will eventually pass such laws. If there will be insufficient motivation, then we will never have animal rights and we should aim for the best we can get for animals all the same. If we are unsure, it is one of the above, and that again means “welfarism”. FRANCIONE: If we achieved his more stringent proto-rights, this would inspire even more complacency, since people would say it is almost as if animals have rights. Again, it treats animals as a mere means to keep them miserable so that people will be less complacent.

 

(8)must be achievable as one criteria of success

 

SZTYBEL: OK

FRANCIONE: Well, nothing is always “achievable”; proto-rights now are not as discussed above.

 

(9)should not lead to such increases in animal product consumption that would make the measure have an overall negative impact on animals or their rights

 

SZTYBEL: I show that overall my approach leads to less suffering and death even if there is a temporary spike in animal product consumption if we consider the long-term. [see http://sztybel.tripod.com/pragmatism.pdf for details]Less cruel meat is more expensive, denting consumption. FRANCIONE: His proto-rights would boost consumption even more since people would be more satisfied with them.

 

(10)  must pass a reasonable test period to see if the given strategy is successful animal law

 

SZTYBEL: The test period is not over for animal rights pragmatism. It’s too soon to tell what will work best. We need both animal “welfarism” in the short-term and animal rights in the long-term, and we do not need to “wait” to know this.

FRANCIONE: The test is over because it is convenient for him to say so.  Or at least he gives no reason why else.

 

(11)    should ideally be illustrated to be successful with a real-world example, or at least a plausible hypothetical example Let’s use Sweden this time. It has banned anti-biotics and so factory farming. Hogs have more room, better surroundings, time outdoors, less stress, straw bedding, no farrowing crates, and toys.

 

SZTYBEL: Obviously better for the pigs.

FRANCIONE: Has nothing to say except usual dogmatic pronouncements that we cannot have animal “welfare” and so forth, that it is still speciesist, etc., but see above discussion.

 

(12)    must overcome Gary L. Francione’s seven or so supposed reasons why animal “welfarist” laws cannot work in principle

FRANCIONE:

 

1. will not result in good for animals only their more efficient exploitation

2. only property owners’ interests will be considered

3. property cannot have legal relations with owners

4. if animals have no market value, they have no value at all

5. a pen cannot have rights against its owner, neither can we balance the interests of animals against property owners

6. there is a presumptions owner look after their animals

7. Legal wrangles: laws not adjudicated in animals’ favour; minor penalties; lack of enforcement; needing to prove cruel intent; many species of animals exempt

 

SZTYBEL:

1. Not in Sweden

2. Not in Sweden

3. Apparently not in Sweden

4. Not in Sweden

5. Pens have no interests, animals do, and their interests are respected to a considerable degree in Sweden

6. Not in Sweden

7. All these can be avoided and did not stop Swedes from really accomplishing something

 

(13) be a worthwhile use of time, money, and other resources to help animals

SZTYBEL: These reforms are the only thing that can help billions of animals who  need help today, yesterday and in the future, who as argued above, cannot be helped in any other way. Not all activists need work on this, but only those so inclined who are suited to the task, who can and probably would do other things as well.

FRANCIONE: No investment in relief for these chickens, so a moot point.

CONCLUSION

 

Thanks for your patience. I say there is no mere difference of opinion here. I think can show that Francione is just plain wrong in what he says about ethics and effectiveness. I don’t think everyone will agree, but it is easier to dismiss my claims than to refute them. My case keeps getting more refined, and I keep finding more faults with Francione’s, and he never addresses them. My arguments have been around for years and no one has really put a dent in them, to the best of my learning. I hope this explains why I am a more consistent and effective abolitionist than are Francione and the Francionists.

 

Brooke Cameron:

Wow, thanks for taking my question so seriously, and replying with such detail! May I ask a really quick follow up please?

 

David Sztybel

That is kind of you to see. Clearly the little box was meant to constrain windbags like me. But please, what is on your mind, Brooke?

 

Roger Yates

go Brooke

 

Brooke Cameron

David, is it that you are essentially saying that you'd be happy if Gary Francione's site was called Animal Rights: An Abolitionist Approach, rather than THE Abolitionist Approach?

 

David Sztybel

Yes, I think that would be perfect. More accurate, and more respectful of other abolitionists such as Joan Dunayer, and, I even think, myself.

 

Brooke Cameron:

Thanks, David. I agree.

 

David Sztybel

Cool, thanks to you.

Part 2 of the ARZone chat with David Sztybel continues here:

 

http://arzone.ning.com/profiles/blogs/transcript-of-david-sztybels-1

 

[blackpanther]

I agree with Brandon when he says: "You have nothing to lose and everything to gain by thinking independently and forging your own path in the movement. Far too many advocates follow Francione's direction rather than their own conscience. I used to be one of them and it's good to be able to speak my mind and direct my own course as to what I think is best for other animals."

I'm not a philosopher, neither an expert, I read many books on the AR question. I think it's a pity to see AR "philosophers" or "thinkers" fight in such a way. There are good ideas here and there, in my opinion. I don't think being vegan and doing nothing for the animals right now is the good way of acting.........and I came to that conclusion after reading a lot.

I understand and share your point of view, Roger, when you say that being vegan and informing people about veganism is the thing to do......but I cannot let all those suffering animals down, waiting for every one to be vegan....I have to act and release some pain for some animals, otherwise, my conscience would not be at peace. If some call me a welfarist when I do that.....after all I don't mind, it's not an insult for me, as I know my aim is the end of animal exploitation.....

and Gary Francione didn't succeed in convincing me of the contrary, sorry......

What I just don't like is when people insult each other, it's not very friendly.........and aren't vegans supposed to be friendly people? you can disagree with someone, and still respect him/her! but I feel there are very old disagreements, that have lasted for very long and that we're (at least I) not aware of, between people here....

[Brandon Becker]

Roger, thanks for inviting Sztybel to ARZone rather than let Francione control the ARZone guests and discussion. You have nothing to lose and everything to gain by thinking independently and forging your own path in the movement. Far too many advocates follow Francione's direction rather than their own conscience. I used to be one of them and it's good to be able to speak my mind and direct my own course as to what I think is best for other animals.

[Brandon Becker]

Since it is Gary Francione's views that most who claim to be "abolitionists" associate with in the animal rights movement, it makes sense that David Sztybel thought to take on Francione's views directly when laying out his own theory. You may remember that Steve Best's "Radical Abolitionism: Total Liberation By Any Means Necessary" essay also challenged Francione's views directly throughout. I personally am glad that Sztybel is willing to openly critique Francione's views because, if nothing else, it at least opens up the possibility of reflecting on what is the most effective strategy for liberation.

[Eduardo Terrer]

Muchas gracias Kate.

Tenemos el deber de esforzarnos en profundizar, no solo en "qué hacemos", si no también en el "por qué" y, sobre todo, en el "para qué"

 

Un abrazo anti-especista

[Kate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥ]

Hola Eduardo. Ojalá que usted sabe lo mucho que agradezco tu tiempo para agregar sus comentarios sabios aquí.  Me parece que a pesar de que la traducción de google es bastante buena, en algunos aspectos el traductor de Bing es mejor, por lo que también añadiría que la traducción de su comentario aquí. Un ejemplo de donde Bing es mejor es con las palabras "santuario = "sanctuary" o "shrine". Bing dice "sanctuary" (un lugar donde los refugiados son atendidos) que es la palabra correcta en este contexto, pero Google dice "shrine", que sugiere un lugar donde reciben ofertas religiosas (de modo que esto claramente no es correcto)

Me sorprende la frecuencia vea con cosas que demuestran que aún entre los que tienen gran conocimiento y experiencia de derechos de los animales, muchos todavía parecen ignorantes de la ética de la antiespecismo. Tengo algún conocimiento de esto y sigo aprender de usted sobre estos asuntos. Muchas gracias.

Hi Eduardo. I hope you know how much I appreciate your time to add their wise comments here.

I think that while google translation is quite good, in some respects Bing translator is better, what would also add that the translation of your comment here. An example of where Bing is better is with the words "santuario" = "sanctuary" or "shrine". Bing says "sanctuary" (a place where refugees are cared for) that it is the right word in this context, but Google says "shrine", which suggests a place where they receive religious offerings (so this is clearly not correct).

I am surprised the frequency I see things that show even among those who have great knowledge and experience of animal rights, many seem to still be ignorant of the ethics of antispeciesism. I have some knowledge of this and still learning from you on these matters. Thank you.

Previous comment by Eduardo Terrer created using a different translation tool -

 

I do not understand is that a debate on the ethical and strategic position of someone on speciesism is turning into a debate about francione, whether it is or is not consistent.

Personally, the questions I asked were not as shallow as posed you to Sztybel. Were questions to test which I think is more relevant: the concept of what is better, what is worse, what is really help, etc...

I may be due to my limited knowledge of English, but gave me the feeling of what quickly Sztybel me labeled as Francionist and responded as he would respond to a francionist.I am not much with Francione in many respects. I do not think Francionist.

So, my questions were as objectively assessing the depth of reflection was the copyright on what help and not a unique and unrepeatable individual having full right to live and do free or at least as free as it can be.

The question to sanctuaries itself in order to (complex, certainly) save a high percentage of exploited individuals sought to know the reason why the author was considered to be the best way to help individuals now (at this time) promote measures welfarists.To begin with, the measures welfarists are not helping now. Are to help in the future, in the short term, but future.Therefore promoting reforms beyond the scope of "improving the lives of those who are now exploited".

I wonder because protectionist it is correct to create protective sacrifice 0 and not abandoned to their fate to dogs/cats and is struggling to improve their conditions in killing centers.In this case it seems clear mind knows discern clearly which is help and what is not helping.

If we take the case of non-human to use animals, don't see because we assume help them is to strive to "improve" their exploitation and murder, instead of fighting to achieve places (thousands or millions) where free them these Hells.

If the answer to this will be the number of individuals, the social image, some are taken and other not, and that complicates the matter, etc... then I wonder whether it is ethical and/or coherent attempt to form statistical unique experiences that only individuals will live their lives to an end at the slaughterhouse.I also wonder what would fight for reforms was best to fight for free to all who can.I wonder what would happen if we talk human.

I wonder which is the reasoning that says it is better to change the laws of operators, which change the minds of operators to achieve "better treatment". For example, here where alive laws say that now is not hunting season. And humans are still hunting. Not certain species can hunt. And the cazan…Although there is a reasoning obvious to think that changing laws they end up changing minds, I see no clear seem to indicate some, and I see not nor more effective that go to directly change the minds (but this is another debate that now does not interest me maintain).

Ultimately, I think, of establishing courses of action to help non-human, clarify whether we are going to engage with the future or present.If we are committed to the future, the question is clear.And if we are committed to the present, then we should deepen much what is truly relevant to who is going to be exploited, and what is more ethical to do for them, regardless of easy or difficult than achieving it. And I say that regardless of how easy/difficult, because once we are clear that what we should be doing, only we must overcome technical difficulties to succeed.I don't know you, but my seems to me that technical difficulties are much more easily surmountable ethical difficulties, reason why engineering genius which never will be vegan.

And finally, I found that advance 70% animal welfare was advance 70% against speciesism.If I understood correctly, I would be a tremendous doubt: how is possible, then, that there are millions of very expensive, "beautiful" human living with dogs and cats and pedigree, are treated as they treat their own human children and that, however, enjoyed the object status and when a problem arises are discarded as if they were a sofa?I think here is moving 100% to improve their living conditions, and has been 0% towards speciesism.

We must not forget that there are humans who have an impeccable car and others dealing with blows, so speciesism does not necessarily beat.

Little more, I see that they respond to questions about the other day and although I had lost interest in discussing this, I thought an opportune moment to specify the meaning of my questions.

A greeting from anti-speciesist.

[Eduardo Terrer]

I do not understand is that a debate on the ethical and strategic position of someone about speciesism is up becoming a debate on Francione, whether what he says is or is not consistent. 

Personally, the questions put to him were not as superficial as posed to Sztybel. There were questions to test what I consider most important: The concept we have of what is best, what is worse, what is really helping, etc ... 

Maybe because of my low level of English, but I got the sense of how quickly branded me as Francionist Sztybel and responded as a francionist respond. 
I'm not quite agree with Francione in many respects. I think Francionist. 

So, my questions were aimed at assessing the depth of the reflection was the author of what is helping and not helping a unique and unrepeatable individual who has full right to live and make it free, or at least as free as can be . 

The question of making shrines systematically, in order (complex, of course) to save a high percentage of individuals exploited, sought to know the reason why the author felt that the best way to help individuals now (right now) was to promote welfare measures. 
For starters, welfare measures are not helping now. Are to help in the future, short term, but future. 
Thus, promoting reforms beyond the scope of "improve the lives of those who are now being exploited." 

On the other hand, I would like to know that in the field is right to create protective protective sacrificial 0 and not abandoned to their fate to the dogs / cats and struggle for better conditions in the killing centers. 
In this case it seems clear that our minds can discern clearly that it is helping and what is not helpful. 

If we take the case of nonhuman animals for consumption, do not see why we should assume that help is to fight to "improve" their conditions of exploitation and murder, rather than strive for more (thousands or millions) where they are free these hells. 

If the answer to this will be the number of individuals, social image, which some are adopted and others not and this complicates matters, etc ... So I wonder whether it is ethical and / or consistent attempt to statistically unique experiences that are unique individuals to live during her life to end in the slaughterhouse. 
I also wonder what would have to fight for the reforms was better to fight to free all you can. 
I wonder what would happen if we were talking about humans. 

I wonder what is the reasoning that says that for a "better deal" is better to change the laws of the operators, to change the minds of the operators. For example, here where I live the laws say that now is not hunting season. And humans still hunt. You can not hunt certain species. And the hunt ... 
Although there is an obvious reason to think that changing laws will eventually change minds, do not see it as clear as some suggest, I do not see it more effective to go directly change the minds (but this is another debate that does not interest me right nowhold). 

In short, I consider essential before establishing courses of action to help non-humans, to clarify whether we are going to commit to the future or the present. 
If we commit to the future, the issue is clear. 
And if we commit to this, then we should go too deeply into what is really relevant to who is going to be exploited, and what is more ethical to do for them, regardless of how easy or difficult it is accomplished. And I say that regardless of how easy / difficult, because once we know that is what we should be doing, just have to overcome technical difficulties to achieve it. 
Do not know about you, but I find that the technical difficulties are much more easily overcome the ethical problems, why is the engineering genius who never made vegan. 

And finally, I seemed to understand that progress to 70% on welfarism was to advance 70% against speciesism. 
If I understood correctly, I would be a tremendous doubt 
How is it possible, then, that millions of humans who live with dogs and cats, very expensive, "beautiful" and pedigree, which are treated as they treat their own human children, however, have the status of object and when any problems are dismissed as if they were a couch? 
I believe this is moving 100% to improve their living conditions, and has advanced a 0% to speciesism. Do not forget that there are humans who have a perfect car and there are others who try to shock, so the abuse does not necessarily speciesism. 

Little more, I see that respond to questions about the other day and although she lost interest in discussing this, I thought it an opportune time to specify the meaning of my questions. 

Anti-speciesist greetings

[Eduardo Terrer]

Yo lo que no entiendo es que un debate sobre la posición ética y estratégica de alguien respecto del especismo se acabe convirtiendo en un debate sobre francione, sobre si lo que dice es o no es coherente.
Personalmente, las preguntas que le formulé no eran tan superficiales como le planteaba a Sztybel. Eran preguntas formuladas para poner a prueba lo que yo considero más relevante: El concepto que tenemos de qué es mejor, qué es peor, qué es realmente ayudar, etc...
Quizás se deba a mi escaso nivel de inglés, pero me dio la sensación de qué rápidamente Sztybel me catalogó como Francionist y respondió como respondería a un francionist.No estoy muy de acuerdo con Francione en muchos aspectos. No me considero Francionist.
Así pues, mis preguntas tenían como objetiva valorar la profundidad de la reflexión que hacía el autor sobre lo que es ayudar y no ayudar a un individuo único e irrepetible que tiene total derecho a vivir y a hacerlo libre, o al menos tan libre como pueda serlo.
La pregunta de hacer santuarios sistematicamente, con el fin (complejo, ciertamente) de salvar a un alto porcentaje de individuos explotados, buscaba conocer la razón por la cual el autor consideraba que la mejor forma de ayudar a los individuos ahora (en este momento) era promover medidas bienestaristas.Para empezar, las medidas bienestaristas no son para ayudar ahora. Son para ayudar en un futuro, a corto plazo, pero futuro.Así pues, promover reformas escapa del ámbito de "mejorar la vida de los que están siendo ahora explotados".
Por otro lado, me gustaría saber porque en el ámbito proteccionista es correcto crear protectoras de sacrificio 0 y no se abandona a su suerte a los perros/gatos y se lucha por mejorar sus condiciones en los centros de exterminio.En este caso me parece evidente que nuestra mente sabe discernir con claridad que es ayudar y qué no es ayudar.
Si tomamos el caso de los animales no-humanos para consumo, no veo porque deberíamos asumir que ayudarles es luchar por "mejorar" sus condiciones de explotación y asesinato, en vez de luchar por lograr lugares (miles o millones) donde se les libre de esos infiernos.
Si la respuesta a esto va a ser la cantidad de individuos, la imagen social, que unos se adoptan y otros no y eso complica el asunto, etc... entonces me pregunto si es ético y/o coherente tratar de forma estadística las vivencias únicas que individuos únicos van a vivir durante su vida hasta acabar en el matadero.También me pregunto qué haría que luchar por las reformas fuese mejor que luchar por liberar a todos los que se pueda.Me pregunto qué sucedería si hablásemos de humanos.
Me pregunto cual es el razonamiento que afirma que para lograr un “mejor trato” es mejor cambiar las leyes de los explotadores, que cambiar las mentes de los explotadores. Por ejemplo, aquí donde vivo las leyes dicen que ahora no es temporada de caza. Y los humanos siguen cazando. No se puede cazar ciertas especies. Y las cazan…Aunque hay un razonamiento obvio para pensar que cambiando leyes acabarán cambiando mentes, no lo veo tan claro como parecen indicar algunos, y no lo veo tampoco más efectivo que ir a cambiar directamente las mentes (pero este es otro debate que ahora mismo no me interesa mantener).
En definitiva, que considero primordial, antes de establecer vías de acción para ayudar a los no-humanos, aclarar si nos vamos a comprometer con el futuro o con el presente.Si nos comprometemos con el futuro, la cuestión es clara.Y si nos comprometemos con el presente, entonces deberíamos profundizar mucho en qué es realmente relevante para quien va a ser explotado, y qué es más ético que hagamos por ellos, independientemente de lo fácil o difícil que sea lograrlo. Y digo que independientemente de lo fácil/difícil, porque una vez tenemos claro que es lo que deberíamos estar haciendo, solo tenemos que superar dificultades técnicas  para lograrlo.No sé a vosotros, pero a mi me parece que las dificultades técnicas son mucho más fácilmente superables que las dificultades éticas, razón por la cual hay genios de la ingeniería que nunca se harán veganos.
Y por último, me pareció entender que avanzar un 70% en el bienestarismo era avanzar un 70% contra el especismo.Si lo entendí correctamente, me quedaría una tremenda duda:¿Cómo es posible, entonces, que haya millones de humanos que viven con perros y gatos, muy caros, “bellísimos” y con pedigrí, que son tratados como tratan a sus propios hijos humanos y que, no obstante, gozan del status de objeto y cuando surge algún problema son desechados como si fuesen un sofá?Creo que aquí se avanza un 100% hacia mejorar sus condiciones de vida, y se ha avanzado un 0% hacia el especismo. No olvidemos que hay humanos que tienen un coche impecable y hay otros que lo tratan a golpes, por lo que el especismo no implica necesariamente maltratar.
Poco más, Veo que responden a cuestiones sobre el otro dia y, aunque había perdido interés en debatir sobre esto, me ha parecido un momento oportuno para especificar el sentido de mis preguntas.
Un saludo anti-especista

[Brandon Becker]

Roger, I do not think anyone "fear[s] of losing the will to live" by reading the transcript. This was an informative chat and I thought David was justified in laying out his theoretical framework alongside Francione's to help others compare similarities and differences. We should embrace critical discussion on the path to emancipation to be sure we are doing our best for other animals.

[David Sztybel]

Although Roger’s discreditable and on top of that unapologetic conduct (which I have already documented) has made him irrelevant to me personally, I would like to respond to his comments on a rather impersonal level.

I am not embarrassed by citing Rain without Thunder. First of all, it is widely cited by people and studied by people, scholars and activists, interested in that sort of thing, making my own work quite relevant. It is a peer-reviewed book published by a reputable university press. I am not familiar with Francione’s disowning of it. I guess that would be known to people who have explored his work further. However, his regretting writing ch. 7 does not make it worth ignoring. He went on record in the book that we was, far from “speculating” as Roger misleadingly put it. Francione explicitly wrote that his 5 incremental criteria are intended as a platform that should be a “conceptual rallying position” for animal rightists. (RAIN p. 191) That is very ambitious and obviously making it clear that he wants people to use his critieria in legislative efforts. He may have said it was a beginning of discussion, and Roger apparently takes this as a sign that the work should NOT be discussed! I never said it was a final indication of Francione’s position. That’s ridiculous. I just cited a scholarly publication and engaged with it appropriately. It certainly IS hypocritical, as I document in my blog entry on Francione’s “boomerangs” or remarks that he aims at others but which are applicable to himself. (see blog entry for July 15, 2008, which addresses more than just that book). Any attempt to backpedal is too late when it comes to making the chapter somehow immune to comment on Roger's say-so. It may also be that Francione's criteria are theoretical refuse but I think it is instructive to say what is wrong with his ideas, or why they should be refused. If he does not put forward his incremental criteria any longer, then it is not clear he has anything to take its place besides counsel to abstain from legislative reform, which is inherently and extremely cruel to the animals, and which I have duly noted anyway. Francionists and other animal rights fundamentalists think they have good reason to abstain, but my work argues that in the end they have nothing to show for their cruelty except cruelty itself.

The other thing is that I am chided for not knowing something, and yet I went above and beyond the call of duty to check all of my work. I invited Francione to an internet debate on the list-serve for the Toronto Animal Rights Society partly for this purpose, and he agreed to participate. From the very beginning I told him that a draft of my paper would figure prominently into the debate. Then he actualy bolted from the whole thing when I asked him the first tough but fair question. His lame excuse? He did not know the discussion would be so much about my paper. All of this is a matter of public record. Yet my paper is obviously about the relevant ISSUES, not at all about me or Gary for that matter. I also vetted the paper by two prominent, academic insiders with Francione and they certainly never called me on what is being whined about now. It’s Francione and the Francionists’ fault if I was not informed about some new development of “the” abolitionist approach.

Also, even Roger gives the reason why Francione regrets writing ch. 7. It is because “the engagement it asked for was never forthcoming.” This is unclear. What engagement? If it means people were not practically engaged with the platform, there is a reason for that. Any sober legislative reformer knows the proto-rights increments are just as unrealistic as full-rights proposals, as I have argued at length, and as no fundamentalist has even come close to refuting. If people have not engaged practically with ch. 7 it only shows that it is marginal, not explicitly that Gary otherwise regrets any of the theory he wrote in the chapter. But I reserve judgment on this obscurantist “reason,” since it is unclear what the heck is even meant. Anyway, I have engaged with it theoretically, although few have bothered. Francione himself in his blog on AR-AW from not so long ago refers people to read RAIN for further insight. Perhaps Roger is unaware of that.

 

For Roger to call me “underhanded” just reveals more of the totally irrational and apparently hateful aspect of his nature as he has demonstrated in his previous unrepentant attacks on me and my work. Only someone who hates another would apply these insults to me so freely and without conscience.

I make it plain in all my writings that Gary’s latest idea is to abstain from legislative avenues. I must infer that Roger is ignorant of what I write. The other option is misrepresentation, and I am never hasty with such charges. This implies that Gary is not promoting the incremental criteria. But people still go by those criteria extensively, so of course it is appropriate to critically asses. Just because Francione would not use it anymore, other people might, and he published it so it’s simply fair comment.

 

To say that it is misleading to say Francione “opposes” welfarist measures is ludicrous and ignores Francione’s extensive and current diatribes against such efforts.

It is misleading for Roger to comment that I think AR will not bring about fundamental change. To me it just shows that he is illiterate in relation to what I have written, and I need not say more on that score. My work is out there and speaks for itself.

The remarks re the chicken slaughter are merely dismissive and there is no attempt, as usual, to engage my arguments. The concrete benefits of the quick kill that I list are compelling in the absence of EVIDENCE to the contrary. Muddying the waters does not settle any debate, but only makes intellectual mudpies. I am confident that most activists oppose cruelty, contrary to Roger’s absurd questioning of this. Most animal rights activists are in tune more with PETA than Francione. Join any local animal rights group (apart from the Francionist ones, I mean the big ones) and you will find this out very easily as I have time and again with MANY different groups. Most people applaud attempts to curb cruelty, except those who think they have some special excuse for it, be it either directly speciesist or merely specious.

 

Why have faith that lawmakers will bring relief, Roger asks? Because they have in the past and there is wide public support for SUBSTANTIVE measures. I don’t ask Roger to have faith. That would be asking too much, I fear. To address Roger's idea that we should have faith in speciesist animal "welfarists" and not bother with AW ourselves, animal welfarists of a traditional type, all on their own, are not rigorous or passionate enough to advocate maximum relief for animals as I advocate. I see animal rightists taking the lead on such campaigning, here in the real world, and I am not surprised. It is because they take cruelty to animals the most seriously (aside from Francionists, who ofen seem to take cruelty less seriously even than many speciesists, such as the allowed cruelty to those chickens).

 

Examples of weak “welfarist” legislation is irrelevant to my position because I am equally critical of that. I focus on strong examples such as Sweden. It is nothing short of absurd to imply that banning fox hunting was a step backwards for animal protection! Anyone presenting that at a conference would get an incredibly negative reception, unless it were a hunter’s gathering. We do not need to rescind such a bill, as might be the case if it were genuinely bad law, but to see that it is better enforced if need be. I would not take unsubstantiated claims that more foxes are killed seriously. Hunting in general is severely on the decline (hunters in Western society are having a devil of a time trying to convince youngsters to carry on bloodsports traditions), making such a claim sound on the surface like an ill-thought-out remark that someone, somewhere took as fact.

 

To dismiss bans on wild animals in circuses does not show lack of benefit for animals, but just the sort of negativism that I am accustomed to sensing on more than one level in these debates. From the other side, that is.

 

It is absurd to imply that I am weak on vegan advocacy, or that that is the only concern of the animal rights movement. The blinkers are tightly on, I see. You are pipe-dreaming if you think vegan advocacy now will bring significant relief to birds suffering in industry, apart from some reduced demand. The remaining birds will certainly suffer. Anyone who does not see that I would have to say is not looking at reality.

 

Also, anyone who actually reads what I write and understands it knows I am not pessimistic about animal rights. Read the text, Roger. You do not advocate vegan animal rights stronger than me, but I argue more weakly, and you have not scratched, let alone refuted, such arguments. For the most part you do not even recap them, let alone consider them. Funny I am chided for lack of familiarity with Francione, when I see people showing ignorance of even the basic arguments that I make. If I focus rigorously and thoroughly on Francione texts such as RAIN, typical Francionists call me “obsessed” and “misguided” even though Gary touted the book as a conceptual rallying platform for the whole movement as I documented, and even though Francionists can’t be bothered to engage my views with a very few exceptions.

I am called “obsessed” with Francione merely because I offer the most rigorous and detailed assessment of his work that is out there, so far as anything I have seen. For Roger to say I should have “moved on” is patently ridiculous for a host of reasons:

(1) many of the questions in the chat were about abolitionism, which made my report on the AR-AW debate very relevant, and much better for giving good answers to those questions than, say, off-hand textual references to my own writing; to say I should discuss these abolitionist questions without reference, extensively even, to the dominant commentator on these questions for the fundamentalist side is pure hokum. Roger was so obsessed with what I wrote in a negative way that he counted the number of times I used “Francione”. 80 times in 20 pages? An earth-shattering 4 times per page on average? That is not surprising at all. What is surprising is how far Roger is prepared to go with baseless negativity.

(2) My other work was questioned in some of the questions, but it was not needed to go on and on about my theories beyond what was actually asked; the details are there in my writings, or are available if I am actually asked. Also, most people wanted to inquire about activist issues, usually AR-AW-related. I wanted to honour that preference. Apparently a lot of people have not "moved on" from consideriing Francionist-type issues.

(3) Roger obviously did not pay attention to what I offered the forum since I offer the longest list of criteria for evaluating legislative proposals ever given. He makes it sound like I was just attacking Francione rather than articulating my own view. For a scholar to miss that “little” detail should be embarrassing to the one who makes such allegations, but I have learned that Yates is quite content to continue, on standing record, that I am “Francione’s stalker.” Shame on you, Roger Yates. I was praising how civilize the Zone is but you were certainly not a part of that. You and the fellow who in the chat said he should set up a FaceBook page arguing that I am “weird.” You of course once again showed ill behaviour by chiming in that you might go around telling people I am weird. That exchange was gracefully struck from the transcipt because it is unworthy of AR Zone. It is more the kind of drivel one finds on ARCO, as I documented earlier. You do not meet the bar of the kind of civility that people like Carolyn are working so hard to achieve in AR Zone, instead making this some sort of personal WAR Zone. Perhaps you invited me on just to take more pot shots, or perhaps not entirely. Either way you could not resist. You did not come clean, but just dished out more dirt by calling me "underhanded," which means deceptive, which is publicly calling me a liar. You have defamed me. Will I sue? You can wonder about that. However, I will not stoop to your level, Roger. Anyway, I am told it was Tim Marshall’s idea to have me on, NOT yours, and that you were asked personally because it was thought you would offer the most resistance. No surprise there. But I think credit should be given where it is due, and I thank Tim. He is not so insignificant, nonexistent or whatever that he does not deserve credit for his idea. Tim, you are a great credit to this list in so many ways, if you are reading this.

 

It is obvious that Francione and his close followers do not wish to engage with my ideas. They should. As I have pointed out on other occasions, I am making converts. Many consider it to be the most rigorous encounter with Francionism to date, at least the AR-AW aspects. Even Rob Johnson, who agrees with much of Francionism. For Roger to expect my chat not to be “about Francione” even though Roger had access to the questions in advance, and should know that 6 of them ask specifically about AR-AW, which is fully 37.5% of the questions, or more than a third of them… Well, such a complaint seems so lacking in merit, why bother even discussing it any longer?

 

Anyway, whatever Roger’s personal attacks on me, I am glad that at the impersonal level of cold, hard facts and logic, he has not even scratched the surface of my arguments, not least of all because he almost leaves them entirely out of account in his critique. He makes my job of rebutting counter-claim very easy.

[Kate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥ]

Hello Roger. Thanks for writing this interesting, informative and useful comment. It helps to facilitate a clearer understanding of the relative positions and differing ideologies.

One point you make that I think many may be unaware of is that Francione has stated that he regrets writing chapter 7 of Rain Without Thunder. I still see people referring to this chapter saying that they think it's the most valuable thing that Francione has ever written, whilst others say that they prefer his later perspective. It's not hypocrital to change one's position, but this can of course lead to confusion if people are unaware that there has been a position change. I'm not suggesting that David Sztybel is likely to be unaware of this. I think it's clear that he knows Francione's work far better than most do. I think whilst people still cite any of Francione's work as being relevant and useful then it's reasonable to offer a critical analysis of that work. Respect and politeness should require acknowledgement of it if there has been a known shift in position by the author since the time of writing. I think we'd agree that referring to work that is obviously dated isn't wrong or underhand in itself, but it may be impolite if it's offered as though it reflects the author's current thinking, if it is known not to. Another danger of referring to someone else's work is that such references can be taken out of context. This is something we must all try to avoid, and by gaining a deeper understanding of differing ideologies it makes it easier. Your analysis helps us to reach this deeper understanding. Thank you.