Nathan Winograd's "Biological Xenophobia"

[Tim Gier]

Published on his blog on January 8, 2010 by Nathan J. Winograd 

In Wednesday’s San Francisco Chronicle column, “Ask The Bugman,” a letter writer asked The Bug Man the following question:

Why shouldn’t we use pesticides to control invasive species such as the light brown apple moth? If we don’t do anything, it will ruin all of our crops.

In his response, Richard Fagerlund aka The Bugman questioned the very concept of “invasive species”:

How do we decide what is an invasive species? If animals and insects are competitive and adapted to the environment they are in, they will thrive. If they can’t make a living, they will move on. If you call a species invasive because it moves to new areas, then our species, humans, are probably the most invasive species on the planet. Certainly, we have done as much or more damage in some areas as all the other species combined.

“Invasive species” is a term used for economically important (or destructive in our minds) organisms. If an insect or other animal weren’t destructive, they wouldn’t be considered “invasive.” If a beautiful butterfly invades an area, it is a wonderful event. If a moth that feeds on a few crops comes along with it, it is a menace to society.

When we talk about native species, we are referring to species that have been around as long as we can remember. We don’t want to see them displaced by other species we may not know as well. When an “invasive” species becomes adapted, it becomes part of our ecosystem. When we start using pesticides to control the “invasive” species, we are going to affect everything living in that ecosystem, including our own species. We found that out when they started spraying those chemicals to control the light brown apple moth. Many people complained of adverse health effects.

I would imagine that after Wednesday’s article, Fagerlund is getting a whole lot of crazy from the hyperbolic, hysterical “invasion biology” crowd. Yet he is not alone in the views he shared regarding the troubling growth of this harmful ideology. As an environmentalist, I have anxiously watched the spread of this dangerous mindset over the last several years which condones the use of poisons, killing and the destruction of natural places in a vain attempt to stop the natural – and inevitable – processes of life on earth. It is true that the determination as to which species are “invasive” are based on subjective human aesthetics and narrow commercial interests, and that by the invasion biologists’ own logic, humans are “invasive” species #1. Fagerlund’s rational, common sense discussion of the issue is a welcome departure from the jingoistic fear mongering which increasingly characterizes the discussion of migration and natural selection, even among those who should know better, such as scientists and environmentalists.

In both Redemption and again in Irreconcilable Differences, I also challenged the concept:

The idea that some animals have more value than others comes from a troubling belief that lineage determines the value of an individual animal.  This belief is part of a growing and disturbing movement called “Invasion Biology.” The notion that “native” species have more value than “non-native” ones finds its roots historically in Nazi Germany, where the notion of a garden with native plants was founded on nationalistic and racist ideas “cloaked in scientific jargon.” This is not surprising. The types of arguments made for biological purity of people are exactly the same as those made for purity among animals and plants.

In the United States, Invasion Biologists believe that certain plants or animals should be valued more than others if they were at a particular location “first,” although the exact starting point varies, is difficult to ascertain, and, in many cases, is wholly arbitrary. Indeed, all plants and animals were introduced (by wind, humans, migration, or other animals) at some point in time. But regardless of which arbitrary measure is used, Invasion Biologists ultimately make the same, unethical assertions that “introduced” or “non-native” species do not have value and are not worthy of compassion. They conclude that these species should, therefore, be eradicated in order to return an area to some vague, idyllic past.

Trying to move the world to a mythical state that probably never existed lacks a moral or logical foundation. Nature cannot be frozen in time or returned to a pre-European past, nor is there a compelling reason why it should be. To claim that “native” species are somehow better than “introduced” species equally or better adapted to the environment is to deny the inevitable forces of migration and natural selection. No matter how many so-called “non-native” animals (and plants for that matter) are killed, the goal of total eradication can never be reached. As far as feral cats are concerned, they will always exist. To advocate for their eradication is to propose a massacre with no hope of success and no conceivable end. They exist and have a right to live, regardless of how and when they arrived or were “introduced.” Their rights as individuals supersede our own narrow, human-centric desires, which are often based on arbitrary biases, subjective aesthetics, or commercial interests.

The ultimate goal of the environmental movement is to create a peaceful and harmonious relationship between humans and the environment. To be authentic, this goal must include respect for other species. Tragically, given its alarming embrace of Invasion Biology, the environmental movement has violated this ethic by targeting species for eradication because their existence conflicts with the world as some people would like it to be.  And in championing such views, the movement paradoxically must support the use of traps, poisons, fire, and hunting, all of which cause great harm, suffering, and environmental degradation.

Equally inconsistent in the philosophy of Invasion Biology is its position—or, more accurately, lack of a coherent position—on humans. If one accepts the logic that only native plants and animals have value, human beings are the biggest non-native intruders in the United States. With over 300 million of us altering the landscape and causing virtually all of the environmental and species decimation through habitat destruction and pollution, shouldn’t Invasion Biologists demand that non-native people leave the continent? Of course, non-profit organizations that advocate nativist positions would never dare say so, or donations to their causes would dry up. Instead, they engage in a great hypocrisy of doing that which they claim to abhor and blame “non-native” species for doing: preying on those who cannot defend themselves.

In the end, it is not “predation” that Invasion Biologists object to. Animals prey on other animals all the time without their complaints. In fact, they themselves prey on some birds by eating them, and they prey on animals they label “non-native” by eradicating them. For Invasion Biologists, predation is unacceptable only when it involves an animal they do not like.

Like Fagerlund, I agree that it is wrong and obscene to label any species an “alien” on its own planet and to target that species for extermination. Disguised under the progressive mantle “environmentalism” , this emerging field of pseudo-science should more accurately be labeled “biological xenophobia.”

Visit Nathan J. Winograd's blog.

[Kate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥ]

Hello again.

On the subject of the essay entitled "The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear against the Nonspeciesist Paradigm: A Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature - by Dr. Oscar Horta, here's the link to it as a blog post on my wall

http://arzone.ning.com/profiles/blogs/the-ethics-of-the-ecology-of

If anyone would like to discuss this essay I think this would be a great place to hold that discussion.

 

In relation to this blog post by Nathan Winograd. I think this excerpt from Speciesism explains what may be understood by a term such as "biological xenophobia".

 

"Wildlife Conservation" laws - by Joan Dunayer (excerpt from Speciesism)

 

"The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and other "wildlife conservation" laws are old-speciesist. They afford some protection to species and other groups but no rights to individual nonhumans.
The MMPA is designed to protect "species and population stocks," not individuals. It expresses "concern for the health and safety of dolphin populations," not dolphin individuals. Like fishers, hunters, and trappers, the MMPA refers to nonhuman individuals as if they were species: kill "any species of whale" ("a whale of any species" would be correct.) The MMPA's framers weren't thinking in terms of nonhuman individuals even when referring to the killing of individual whales.
The MMPA doesn't forbid injuring and killing; it sets limits on injuring and killing. For example, it maintains a quota on tuna fishers' collateral killing of dolphins. According to the MMPA, the government may allow the intentional killing of individual seals who eat salmons (whom humans want to eat).
The MMPA's goal is to keep marine mammal populations at levels conducive to maximum human exploitation. For instance, the MMPA limits the killing of North Pacific fur seals to the extent necessary to keep herds "at their optimum sustainable population" - optimal for humans. The MMPA also allows U.S. sport hunters to kill polar bears in Canada and import their body parts as trophies, provided that Canada maintains hunting quotas designed to keep the "affected population stock at a sustainable level."
Imagine a human law equivalent to the MMPA - say, the Native American Protection Act. Because Native Americans constitute a small minority, they would be protected at the level of their various group populations. However, a certain number of individual Native Americans could be killed with impunity. The government would be concerned about the health and safety of the Navajo, Onondaga, and other Native American populations, not individual Native Americans. The goal would be to keep group populations at "optimum sustainable" levels - optimal for other Americans. The government could allow the intentional killing of individual Chinooks who catch and eat salmons (whom other Americans want to catch and eat). Also, U.S. citizens could sport-hunt Inuits in Canada and import their body parts as trophies. In the 18th century, European-Americans did sport-hunt Native Americans and display their body parts.
Like the MMPA, the ESA is aimed at preserving nonhuman groups. It too refers to the possession, sale, transport, and killing of "species," not individuals. The ESA promotes the "conservation" of "depleted" species, because of their "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value" to U.S. citizens, not because nonhumans have any rights or value of their own.
Imagine a comparable Endangered Ethnicity Act (EEA). The act would be aimed at "conserving" low-population ethnic groups, such as Bedouins and Jews, because of their esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to other humans. The EEA would specify how many Bedouins and Jews could be killed and under what circumstances. Members of highly populous ethnic groups, such as the Chinese, could be killed in any number (until their population became small).
If we applied the ESA's principles to humans as a species, it would be legal to kill any number of humans until the human population was greatly reduced. Individual humans would have no rights.
Without laws like the MMPA and ESA, how would we protect species from extinction? By protecting every member of those species - that is, by according rights to nonhuman individuals. As ethicist Bernard Rollin has commented, "A species is a collection of morally relevant individuals." Protect the individuals, and you've protected the species."

[Kate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥ]

Hello C. You're welcome. Thanks for sharing this link to Jeff McMahan's essay The Meat Eaters. I agree with you that the comments are illuminating. I guess you may have noticed that Dr. Oscar Horta has added two comments to that thread. The first of which is this.

-------------------------------------

Oscar Horta

September 20th, 2010 at 1:14 pm

The structure of the main argument of the paper is quite simple. It’s this. Suppose there’s significant harm occurring. We can’t stop it, though who knows, maybe we could at some point. Should we do it?

Most responses to this in this case simply point out that we can’t stop it. But, as Nick Beckstead rightly points out, the paper already ackowledges this. The paper makes it perfectly clear that intervention in nature for the sake of animals would be (or is) a good thing provided that the have the necessary scientific understanding required for it.

JJ also gets this right, though his criticism fails because he doesn’t distinguish “right” and “good”. One doesn’t need to claim that, say, famines are “evil” to accept that they are bad things we should try to stop from occurring.

The way to challenge the argument is one that Jeff McMahan anticipates in his paper, which is to assume that there are things that are more valuable than the wellbeing of animals, such as the existence of species and natural processes per se (not in virtue of their consequences). However, we must note that we do not accept such arguments when human wellbeing is involved. Nobody argues, when it comes to saving humans from suffering from natural causes, that the badness of suffering is debatable. This is the main point: one has to either show how can it be that speciesism is acceptable, accept that humans suffer a fate similar to that of nonhuman animals, or accept the soundness of the view McMahan has presented here.

Of course, another way to oppose McMahan’s point would be to deny that nature is the kind of hell he describes, but this would be wrong. Nature really is a place in which suffering vastly outweighs pleasure or other values (on this see Ng’s “Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal consciousness and suffering” or Dawrst’s “The Predominance of Wild-Animal Suffering over Happiness: An Open Problem“.

-----------------------------------------

 

I agree with you that TNR can be differentiated (morally) from reintroduction programmes of wolves (or other predators) into Yellowstone (or elsewhere). With reintroduction programmes the issues pertain to those about conflicts of interests between those who are predators and those who are prey, and the implications of this, whereas with TNR I think the issues are more concerned with conflicts of interests for those who are trying to survive, and that it's also about whether or not someone/anyone has the right to breed. I am confident that Oscar Horta would agree with me in the view that whilst everyone has the moral right to life and liberty, no-one has the moral right to breed. So done properly TNR is not something we should oppose.

As you seem interested in this subject I will offer you a link to another paper by Oscar Horta, as it apppears as a blog on Tim's wall. I would be very interested to know what you think of this thought experiment, and I'm sure Tim would be also.

http://arzone.ning.com/profiles/blogs/predators-and-prey-oscar

 

Thank you

[C. Anderson]

Thanks for both of these texts. I'm a little uncomfortable with Horta's argument, though I don't think I've understood it well enough yet. It seems to entail an obligation, or at least a reason, to prevent predation and indeed suffering of wild animals.

Jeff McMahan argued something similar in the New York Times and at the following link last year http://onthehuman.org/2010/09/the-meat-eaters/ The comments are illuminating. Many would say that if our ethical theory entails impossible obligations then that counts against it as an ethical theory. So my knee jerk response to Horta is that the argument is too strong in general, though I find the argument against the reintroduction of wolves persuasive.

 

Though, TNR might be differentiated from Yellowstone wolves insofar as it is a population control measure for already ensconced predators, but that would take some more complicated arguments, I think.

 

Thanks again to both of you.

[Kate✯GO VEGAN+NOBODY GETS HURT Ⓥ]

Hi Tim. Thanks for sharing this with us. Very interesting and pertinent!

I fully agree with Nathan Winograd's position on this, and I find his explanation of biological xenophobia to be accurate and well expressed.

 

I find C. Anderson's comment interesting and relevant too. Below I provide a link to an important essay that I know you're familiar with. I think it's possible that C. Anderson he has not read it yet, and will find it interesting and useful.

Thanks

http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/issue_10/10horta.pdf

[C. Anderson]

I think three are some environmentalists who hold this sort of nostalgic view of the primeval state of an ecosystem, but I'm not sure it really gets to the most serious ecocentric views that see invasive species as disruptive of the stability of an ecosystem.

 

The privilege of native species for ecologists is not simply the fact that they were native, but that an ecosystem developed which attained a sort of stability and integrity which these ecologists might hold has intrinsic value.

 

Human action that disrupts this balance is held to be immoral by thinkers such as Leopold and Callicott, and some infer because of this that we have a sort of obligation to restore ecosystems to as close a state as possible prior to human interference. The reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone Park could be justified on these sorts of grounds. But, such a reason would not justify introducing a non-native predator into Yellowstone if dong so would disrupt the ecological balance.

 

So, although I appreciate this response to a view that seems aptly described as "nativist." I don't think that it accurately captures what ecologists are worried about, or what the HSUS seems to be concerned with, when they stipulate that TNR programs should take account of ecological effects. There are good reasons to be worried about invasive species, not because they have less value as individuals than native species, but because they can cause significant ecological damage. Though I agree that the elimination of invasive species may not be morally justifiable, it's not clear to me that the deliberate introduction of a predator into the wild is justifiable either.